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ABSTRACT
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 set AMTRAK up as a "for profit" corporation. The initial route
structure took the form of an inter-connected set of infrequently-serviced, nationwide routes. Despite
a restructuring effort in 1979, this basic pattern, rather than one of concentrated regional short-
distances services, has persisted. This study sets out to explain why AMTRAK operates on the former
principle rather than on the latter. In the process, it examines how both decision-makers and analysts
address and answer critical questions with a view to better understanding how analysis is carried out,
and thoughts as to how it may be done better.
A series of theories is proposed and discussed. Theories A present a number of seemingly plausible
reasons for having a long-distance network - efficiency, social benefits, energy saving, and even
nostalgia. They assume that there must be a rational reason underlying the pattern, and seek to
expose it. The long-distance system is shown, however, to be illogical from the viewpoint of the
propositions put forward for testing.
Theories B, C and D attempt to explain the pattern in terms of the behavior of Members of Congress,
that of management, and in terms of the organisational and political structure respectively. Theories
of Congressional (Theories B) and management (Theories C) action on the basis of personal risk min-
imisation, rather than efficiency maximisation, are examined and contrasted against theories
explaining behavior in terms of faulty learning processes. Problems of management control are also
included in discussion.
Theory D1 casts the problem in the light of lack of definition of goals and purpose for AMTRAK,
resultant on inappropriate and ill-defined lines of accountability. Theory D2 finds explanation for
the national pattern in terms of centralisation of both management and funding.
Wachs and Schofer have developed a "value-hierarchy" with "values" at the top, "goals", "objectives",
"criteria", and "standards" at lower levels. Though the top is most essentially important, the lower
levels of the hierarchy are easier to grapple with. But, in executing lower-level work, implied
weights are given to the higher levels which may then not reflect the real needs of society.
Theory E, the theory of the Original Sin, shOws that there has never been any examination of the
values which underlie the concept of AMTRAK. Congress, under pressure, created AMTRAK as an experiment,
to be terminated after two years if a failure. But AMTRAK has survived until today, and the values
unknowingly imputed into the scheme at its inception - those of a dated concept - became a prescrip-
tion to program the future of rail passenger service. Subsequent learning has only occurred in accord
with the precepts of the original plan, in formulation of which the real issues of values and
consequent wants were ignored; ideas involving "regionalism" and "inter-modalism", for example, have
not developed because they did not form a part of it.
A section on- "Analysis of Analysis" shows that similar problems to those distorting the output of
decision-makers, afflict the work of the analyst.
In the Conclusion, it is stated that Theories A - D lack meaning if values are ignored. The truth of
any one of them can only be established (or disproved) when put in place on the cause-effect chain in
relation to other theories, and when the whole is set against values.
In order to gain understanding that will allow access to the encoding at the heart of the process, it
is necessary to seek out the values associated with output, and the value program commanding the
process that produces that output. Desired outputs may then be established with respect to values-
to-be-espoused, and the necessary process developed so as to be imprinted with a value program which
permits those outputs to be produced.
There are two principal conclusions. The one is that ultimately AMTRAK's route structure is attrib-
utable to a failure at AMTRAK's conception to start with values, and proceed down the value-hierarchy
from there. Instead, planning was started well up the decision tree, and an imputed value frame was
introduced not reflective of real transportation needs. That frame has programmed AMTRAK ever since,
and has been reinforced by political, organisational and learning processes.
The second conclusion concerns the analyst. Although real understanding requires reference to imputed
values, and resultant goals, processes and outputs, the analyst is drawn to only low levels of
abstraction; as a result, few analyses are of any significant value in paving the way for real change.
There is a need for greater awareness among decision-makers and analysts alike of the need to plan in
relation to values - to plan for what society really wants. However, if AMTRAK norms are entrenched,
so also are those of the decision-makers and analysts.
A value-critical form of thinking is needed. It is more abstract but, because it is set in the reality
of goals, processes and outputs, it is not impossible. We must work towards a greater awareness of its
possibilities, and learn to make it a part of our evaluative norms.
Thesis Supervisor: Alan A. Altshuler
Title: Head of Department, Dep.artment of Political Science; Professor of Urban
Studies & Planning and Political Science
RAILWAYS
A land of horizontal ladders,
Amid your lines a labyrinth grows,
Your countless sidings serve as cemeteries,
For the rusting skeletons of your past.
Simon Richmond
.64
TO SIMON WITH LOVE AND WET FISHES
-6-
And the LORD God sa
done this, thou art
every beast of the
and dust shalt thou
And I will put enmi
between thy seed an
head, and thou shal
id unto the serpent, Because thou hast
cursed above all cattle, and above
field; upon thy belly shalt thou go,
eat all the days of thy life.
ty between
d her seed;
t bruise hi
thee and the
it shall br
s heel.
woman, and
uise they
Unto the woman he said, I will
and thy conception; in sorrow
children; and thy desire shall
shall rule over thee..
greatly multi
thou shalt bri
be to thy hus
ply thy sorrow
ng forth
band, and he
And unto Adam he said, Because thou hast
the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of
which I commanded thee, saying, Thou sha
cursed is the ground for th-y sake; in so
eat of it all the days of thy life.
hearkened
the tree,
lt not eat
rrow shalt
- Genesis, Chapter 3, verses 14 - 17 (Authorised
Version)
"THE PERIOD OF DURATION OF THE CORPORATION IS PERPETUAL"
- Article II, Articles of Incorporation of
National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
March 30, 1971.
unto
of
of it:
thou
-7-
T A B L E O F C 0 N T E N T S
11 A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
14 E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y
25 I N T R O D U C T IO N
31 T H E O R I E S A
32 Al If a system is to be provided at all, an inter-
connecting national network is needed for
reasons of efficiency: the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts;
39 A2 The train is needed as an alternative for those
who do not have access to other modes; social
benefits to be derived in this way justify
the existence of an inter-connected long-
distance system;
48 A3 The train is needed as an alternative to other
modes to save energy, and the more widespread
its coverage, the greater the possible
conservation benefits;
56 A4 The train is a national historic resource;
Americans should be encouraged to see their
country in a leisurely way. The day is past
when any train can capture a worthwhile share
of the business market, but, if for no other
reason than nostalgia, the long-distance
services should be maintained;
62 A5 Equity is a goal of any Federal program. It
is not fair for rail passenger service to be
concentrated in just a few corridors, because
the whole nation is paying for it through
Federal taxation;
69 I N T E R L U D E
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71 T H E 0 R I E S B
72 B1 Members of Congress are not interested in
achieving the most efficient rail passenger
transportation system for the US, whether in
terms of economic utility or with respect to
availability and appropriateness of other
modes. Due to weak party organisation and
identity, they feel very much on their own and
are interested, rather, in pleasing their
constituents in order to be re-elected. Members
therefore lobby for routes through their
Districts;
83 ~ B2 Members of Congress have a large number of
items on their agenda, and cannot be well-
informed about ev:rything. They are only
partially-informed about AMTRAK, and that
information which they do receive not only
represents a biased rather than random sample
of the total information field, but is also
subject to further cognitive filtration.
Public misconception fuels Congressional
misconception which leads to misguided action,
the result of which is the preservation of
the basic long-distance inter-connecting system;
99 T H E O R I E S C
101 CI AMTRAK lacks the equipment to operate corridor
service. Available equipment is most cost-
effectively used on long-distance services;
104 C2 The railroads won't co-operate with AMTRAK, and
take it with suffrance as it is. Slow, long-
distance schedules disrupt freight operations
less than short-distance, high-frequency, high-
speed services. Additionally, labor agreements
make it more costly to operate short-distance
services, nullifying the advantages that might
accrue to small and lightweight self-propelled
vehicles;
109 C3 Development of the route system has been beyond
AMTRAK's control; under the circumstances,
AMTRAK has done the best it can;
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113 C4 AMTRAK has as goal survial, and the subservient
objective to this, growth. In order to best
survive, it is in its interest to have the
support of as many Members of Congress as
possible. This can best be attained by
providing service to as many of their Districts
as possible, and this implies a national system.
Provided this is done,-efficiency is tangential.
Political analysis must take precedence over
economic analysis;
123 C4b The Theory C4 goal - survival - is pursued
vigorously by only som AMTRAK management,
but reflects the organizational goal because,
through power relationships and group dynamics,
the other management have little choice but to
tacitly acquiesce;
128 C5 AMTRAK has inherited the philosophy and
operating procedures of the old railroads, and
has perpetuated them;
140 T H E O R I E S D
141 DI AMTRAK neither has the lines of accountability
of a private corporation, nor the Executive
Branch supervision of a public agency. In the
absence of such direction (which the Legislative
Branch has not provided), AMTRAK has not been
able to properly identify with any particular
goals and, confused, has had to muddle through,
adjusting according to the environment of the
day. This has not been conducive to reform.
154 D2 AMTRAK's centralised management and funding
base orients it towards provision of a
"national" - type system. All planning occurs
in Washington, and there is little contact with
state or local government bodies save over 403b
service which is itself regarded as supplemen-
tary to, rather than part of AMTRAK's main task.
This leads to priority being accorded to inter-
state long-distance services over more region-
alised short-distance services;
168 T H E 0 R Y E There has never been any examination of the
values which underlie the concept of AMTRAK.
When created, it simply perpetuated the mores
of a dated concept, but these became deeply
entrenched, and have programmed AMTRAK ever
since;
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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
It requires more than just good nature to allow an MIT student to descend
into your office, put his grimy tape-recorder two inches from your nose,
and fire all manner of questions at you for up to an hour. 52 individuals
angellically consented to this onslaught, an additional four suffering
trial by telephone. All 56 are listed in APPENDIX J, although in four
cases only office of employment, not name, is given because of requests
for confidentiality. To all of these people, my untold thanks - this
thesis would not exist without you.
Additional help beyond the interview sessions was received from several
of the above, and I would like to especially thank L. Fletcher Prouty
of AMTRAK, Ross Capon of the National Association of Railroad Passengers,
and Mr. A. of the House Appropriations Committee staff.
At MIT, Fred Salvucci proved a source of constant wisdom, and taught me
about the realities of political life. Courses taught by Martin Rein at
MIT, and by Mark Moore at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, also influenced the writing of this work.
Alan Altshuler, my supervisor, read reams of my illegible handwriting
and through his sharp, accurate comments, helped discipline my writing;
I acknowledge his contribution with many thanks.
On the production front, the excellent artwork of Richard Salz of The
Tech, produced with characteristic unselfishness at very short notice,
is very much appreciated.
On the financial side, there were many difficulties because no member of
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faculty was prepared to commit any of his research funding to support
of this work. It is a sad reflection on as great an institution as MIT
that a student's ambition must be narrowed and directly aligned with the
whims of a particular faculty member in order to secure a sure base of
financial support. I knew that in persisting with this unusual topic,
rather than selecting one which might have been funded (but which would
probably have been mundane, predictable and, to me, unexciting), I would
run into trouble. It was particularly disappointing, but unfortunately
not surprising, that Michael Meyer for whom I had dilligently worked for
14 years on projects unconnected with this one, chose not to assist me
in any way. In the event, I was forced to. withdraw from MIT for one
semester because I lacked the resources to pay Tuition. I almost did not
graduate at all; at the last moment, however, Tom Humphrey, Sponsored
Research Technical Supervisor at the MIT Center for Transportation
Studies, came up with an offer of employment which I can only describe
as being as generous as it was unexpected. It is through his kindness
that I shall be able to pick up a diploma which would otherwise have been
witheld. I also owe thanks to Nigel Wilson who has shown more tolerance
of my eccentricities than I deserve, and who also involved himself in
the last few weeks in tring to find a financial solution.
In conclusion, I must express my debt to the United States - United
Kingdom Educational Commission for granting me a Fulbright Scholarship
for the academic year 1979/80. Although they were unfortunately unable to
help me in my second year of studies at MIT, without their initial aid,
I would never have been able to come to the United States, and I should
like the Commission to know of my gratitude.
-13-
My mischievous brother, Simon, contributed the poem which opens this
thesis. It is to him that I dedicate this work - in the hope that my
parents and sister will forgive me for having to wait for later volumes -
with Love, wet fishes , and a toast tr, -s.
Cambridge, Massachusetts,
July 29, 1981
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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y
AMTRAK, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, resulted
from the enactment of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970,
signed into law on October 30, 1970. AMTRAK was set up as a
"for profit" corporation to operate a nationwide system of
rail passenger service.
The route structure constructed took the form of an inter-
connected set of long-distance routes reaching out through-
out the nation with daily (or less frequent) service on much
of the network; the major exception to this was on the
Northeast Corridor. Despite a restructuring effort in 1979,
this basic pattern, rather than one of concentrated regional
short-distance services, has persisted. This study sets out
to explain why AMTRAK operates on the former principle rather
than on the latter. In the process it examines how both
decision-makers and analysts frame, address and answer
critical questions. The aim is not to form normative
conclusions on whether AMTRAK should have a nationwide
pattern of long-distance services, or concentrate on region-
alised markets. Rather, it is both to explain how the present
pattern came about and has been so resilient, and to better
understand how analysis is carried out, with thoughts as to
how it might be done better.
A series of theories is proposed and discussed. Theories A
present a number of seemingly plausible reasons for having a
long-distance network. They assume that there must be a
rational reason underlying the pattern, and seek to expose it.
It does not take much probing, however, to show that the long-
distance system is not logical from the viewpoints of the
propositions put forward for testing.
Theory Al tests the assertion that if a system is to be
provided at.all, an inter-connected national network is needed
for reasons of efficiency, the whole being greater than the
sum of the parts. It is found, however, that while this may
have once been true, the development of air travel has lost
rail its inherent advantage for transporting passengers over
long distances. Taking into account, further, competition
from the automobile, the passenger train's inherent advantage
is confined to high-density short to medium distance regional
corridors where a frequent and fast rail service has the
potential to compete with other modes (this is further
demonstrated in APPENDIX A). The current network, however,
reflects the previous, but now invalid, monopoly assumption
that rail is the only form of inter-city passenger
transportation.
Theory A2 tests the proposition that the train is needed as
an alternative for those who do not have access to other
modes, the social benefits to be thereby derived justifying
the existence of an inter-connecting long-distance system.
This is also, however, found to be a function ot the now
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invalid monopoly assumption. Any social good arises from
transportation services provided (by whatever mode), and not
from rail service per se. Service to small towns on long-
distance routes is largely a by-product of inter-regional
service, trains being timed with end-points often thousands
of miles apart in mind. As a result, it tends to be incon-
venient in schedule, and ill-suited to regional needs. Most
towns of similar size do not have rail service, but are
served only by bus which reaches 14,000 communities as against
the 500 reached by rail.
Any social service should be suited to the needs of the
communities involved and use whatever transport - often bus
in rural areas - that is best suited to meeting those needs.
If there is to be rail service in low-density areas, low cost railbus
service timed to meet regional needs would be more relevant than long-
distance, high-cost services which are not oriented towards providing
social benefits, but to serving a market which no longer exists.
Theory A3 examines the case for retaining rail on a nationwide
basis because of its energy-saving capabilities. APPENDIX B
considers studies of AMTRAK and energy in greater depth, and
finds that there are many misconceptions on the subject, and
that studies have been poor and, often as a result of invalid
assumptions or global aggregations, highly misleading.
Energy efficiency is not found to be uniform across all
markets served by AMTRAK. While, because of the inadequacy
of the various studies, it was not found possible to reach a
firm conclusion about the relative energy-efficiency of rail
as compared to other modes, it was found reasonable to
conclude that currently-operated long-distance services were
markedly less fuel-efficient than short-distance services .
and, given their low market-share, did not make a worthwhile
contribution toenergy conservation. Short-distance corridor
services with higher-density seating, and greater passenger
volumes which also represent a larger proportion of the total
market, show the potential to make a much greater contribution,
especially as the possibility exists for electrification.
Other short-distance needs could be more fuel-efficiently
served by railbus service over sectors currently on the
routes of long-distance trains.
Theory A4 considers the assertion that long-distance services
should be maintained for nostalgia because the train is a
national historic resource, and because no train can capture
a worthwhile share of the business market.
The long-distance services are, however, oriented towards a
non-existant transportation market, rather than provided
specifically as a tourist attraction, any benefits of the
latter type being largely derived as an externality. Such
tourist needs might be better and more economically
provided for were they to be recognised for what they are, and
catered for possibly by the provision on non-scheduled "package
tour" "cruise trains" on a few particularly scenic routes.
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That the business market is inevitably lost might be a
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the manner in which
resources have been allocated. Low capital investment has
meant a failure to develop effective corridor service where
rail might maximise its inherent advantage while on long-
distance services, tansportation benefits have been confused
with consumption benefits (riding the train just for the sake
of doing so), with the result that neither has been properly
provided for. "Joy-ride" externalities are inadequate reason
of themselves for retention of a comprehensive pattern of
long-distance passenger services of low "transportation"
utility.
Theory A5 states that it is not fair for rail passenger
service to be concentrated in just a few corridors when the
whole nation is paying for it. There was found to be some
strong sentiment reflecting this. However, the concept of
"fairness" that implies that each area must have equal rail
services could lead to unequal results in that the relative
attractiveness of rail, and of the various types of rail
passenger service, as compared to other modes, is not uniform
across the country. The imposition of an efficiency constraint
does not harm "fairness" provided it allows of a re-allocation
of resources that enhances transportation provision.
Because, however, it is human nature to regard it as more
-profoundly unfair to take away something you already have
than not to provide something you never had, there may be a
case for the introduction of low-cost, low-density "railbus"
service as a second-best solution, alongside the development
of the more dense corridors. Although corridor exponents
might argue that such service would carry few passengers,
and be little more than symbolic, it is perhaps that
symbolism which matters. At the same time, it could help meet
regional needs and be more relevant to the communities served
than the long-distance trains which they may want to keep,
but which are of little use, and little used.
Theory B1 suggests that Members of Congress are more
interested in pleasing their constituents in order to be
re-elected than achieving an efficient transportation system,
and therefore automatically lobby for routes through their
Districts. There was evidence from interviews to suggest that
it was politically very difficult to eliminate train service
even if it was used by few people and that Congressional
support requires trains running through as many Congressional
Districts as possible. While under most normal subsidy
situations, capital expenditure is more acceptable than money
for operating deficits, for AMTRAK it has been the other
way round with greater political advantage to be derived from
a poor but spread out service, than from a high-quality but
concentrated service.
Several examples are given, especially of the 1979
restructuring process.
I
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Theory B2 suggests that Congressmen are well-intentioned,
but misinformed. The first section examines the public
desire which fuels Congressional action, and finds that it
itself is misconceived in that more people wish to retain
the service than use it. One commentator said he felt the
"Lake Shore Limited" (Boston - Chicago) train was
"prestigious for Massachusetts. Worcester people, and
Springfield people, and Pittsfield people. I think they
like having a train; I'm not sure they ever use it." Emotion
is a driving force of the rail passenger lobby, and a force
calling for conservation rather than change.
Examples are given of misinformed beliefs, and the processing
of information by Members of Congress is considered next.
There is a great deal of information and Members, unable to
appraise all of it, must have a framework of analysis. Yet,
this framework, far from admitting a random sample of inform-
ation, tends to be biased. Information from and relating to
constituencies is considered more important than more
general information, and the National Association of Railroad
Passengers has been effective in setting up a wide
constituency base; this helps explain why many Congressional
staff strongly felt that constituents were "demanding" rail
passenger service. While there is much mail in support, there
is little in opposition.
Reports attacking AMTRAK only construct a general picture
which is much more difficult for Members to relate to than
pin-pointable constituents' requests. A process of cybernetic
reinforcement takes place whereby the reception of acceptable
information leads to increased receptiveness of the same
type of information, other material being rejected as noise.
Right-wing Members may reject the case for AMTRAK altogether,
rather than attempt any reconfiguration towards greater
efficiency; they tend to see AMTRAK as one output, rather
than a series of different services and service types.
Evidence suggests that while Congressional supporters tend to
be at least appraised of the service in their District,
opponents are- less well-informed on any aspect of the problem.
Thus, both supporters and opponents in Congress serve to
maintain the current route pattern - supporters assuming
that as AMTRAK serves their constituents it must be good,
opponents by aiming at AMTRAK as if all AMTRAK service was
the same.
Theories C1, C2 and C3 all suggest that AMTRAK is cramped by
its environment. It is doing as well as it can, but cannot
win out against factors beyond its control.
Theory C1 suggests that AMTRAK inherited poor equipment, has
lacked capital investment, and that the most efficient use of
available assets has been in the provision of long-distance
services.
Theory C2 deals with problems of unco-operative railroads,
and labor. AMTRAK does not own most of the track over which
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it runs and operating railroads, seeing passenger service as
disruptive, have been hostile. High-speed, frequent "corridor"
service is much more disruptive to freight traffic than
infrequent long-distance trains, and railroads have been
particularly wary of allowing such short-distance service
to develop. At the same time, the interests of labor, an
important supporter of AMTRAK in Congress, are seen as lieing
in a nationwide structure. Manning levels, out of AMTRAK's
control, present a particular problem, especially for
development of the railbus.
Theory C3 posits that AMTRAK has been powerless; the
Corporation did set up discontinuance procedures, but met
trouble in trying to apply them. It also strongly advocated
corridors in its 1977 - 81 5 Year Plan, and called for a
reduction in operations in low density areas coupled with
increases in high-density areas. Congress has unilaterally
acted in route planning, however, C3 suggests, AMTRAK being
no more than a pawn, incapable of implementing any internally-
generated plan without Congressional approval.
Theory C4 is the management parallel of Theory B1. It
suggests that AMTRAK does have some discretion, but rather
than choosing to maximise anything in an output sense, it
prefers to keep as many people as possible happy in order
to best stand a chance of survival. Concentration is therefore
focused on attending to organisational secutity requirements,
at the expense of production efficiency.
There was support for this theory from interview materials.
As one AMTRAK manager said: "we have to know which side our
bread is buttered on." Said another: "you really have to have
service in as may places as you possibly can in order to
continue to exist."
AMTRAK's planning base appears to be poor. Such activity as
does go on is primitive; the Route Forecasting Model
(critiqued in APPENDIX C), for example, is bizarrely
inadequate. The GAO has, further, claimed that such power
as AMTRAK has had has not been used well, particularly in
regard to discontinuing "unprofitable" routes.
Short-distance service that has been developed has been
largely associated with State efforts, rather than AMTRAK
initiative. There was an air of mistrust concerning AMTRAK
among certain regional officials interviewed. And, accused
one US DOT administrator: "AMTRAK is more interested in
political service than they ever were in economic sense."
This requires the maintenance of a nationwide system, however
inefficient it may be.
Theory C4b is a variant on Theory C4. It suggests that not
all AMTRAK management are necessarily responsible for the
security-oriented activities seen in Theory C4. Marketing
appears to be the most "corporate" minded department, with
emphasis on financial results. But the more conservative and
risk-averse Government Affairs and Planning departments set
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the scenario, and send a fait accompli down to Marketing and
Operations.
Theory C5 is the management parallel of B2 and puts forward
the idea that rather than being wilfully negligeant, due to
faulty learning mechanisms, management has failed to advance
beyond the operating procedures they had inherited. Long
decades of neglect had left railway philosophy in another
age, and the dated route structure AMTRAK took over was-seen
as a foundation upon which to build rather than an anachronism
to be remodelled.
There is strong belief in some quarters at AMTRAK that major
improvements, based on the current orthodoxy, could yield
substantial success, and a tendency for this to overshaow
potentially greater success from a reconstitution.of norms of
operation. And, the purchase of luxury "Superliner" cars
helped to institutionalise the continuation of long-distance
trains. Said an AASHTO official: "AMTRAK were living under an
anachronism that people wanted to go from New York to
California {by train}."
To make the shift towards development of corridor services
based on regionalised markets, and away from the traditional
role, a different statement of norms and procedures is
required, one which has eluded AMTRAK. The problem is put in
the context of various learning theories. It is put forward,
for example, that while written Corporate statements of
objective may demonstrate that top executive management have
learned, this does not mean that the organisation has learned.
It is suggested that "revolutionary cognitive investment" is
required to stimulate change.
Theory D1 shows that AMTRAK neither has the lines of
accountability of a private corporation, nor the Executive
Branch supervision of a public agency.
Private operations must remain financially solvent, and strike
out for profits, or risk going out of business. AMTRAK has
been set up to operate on this basis, but has lacked corporate
identity or freedom. A 1975 AMTRAK report indicated that
AMTRAK did have power to change the route system as an
independent corporate entity, but this proved to be illusory.
The AMTRAK Reorganization Act of 1979 recognised that goals
had been inadequately defined but, while it did set specific
targets, these were arbitrary and were not issued in
conjunction with an adequate financing program for their
achievement.
From another angle, one US DOT official commented that: "if
they screw up, then there's no bottom line to worry about."
However, while it might be hard to classify AMTRAK as a
corporation, it is also different from any other public
transportation agency in that it is not under proper Executive
Branch supervision.
DOT and AMTRAK tend to regard each other with mutual hostility.
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The DOT has been unable to keep control because of Congress-
ional intervention, and is frustrated. Unable to reallocate
without increasing costs (because Congress might implement
additions, without acceptance of parallel reductions is less
efficient service), DOT is pushed into an adversarial
relationship with AMTRAK in which the prime effort is to
prune.
Failure to define realistic goals and establish firm lines
of accountability has left AMTRAK unable to identify with
any particular goals and, muddled, it has had to base its
task definition on whatever today's "environment" allows.
Up until now the environment has allowed little other than
the status quo.
Theory D2 suggests that AMTRAK's centralised management and
funding base orients it towards provision of a "national" -
type system.
The centralised management approach gives rise to a total
systems perspective that sees AMTRAK in its totality as a
"symbiotically" inter-connecting nationwide system.
AMTRAK's dependence on Congress means that its daily contact
is with this body, rather than with state agencies. And,
while Members of Congress may be contented simply by the fact
that some service is going through their Districts, it will
be the local-level organisations that will be concerned most
with the promotion of regional needs. Yet AMTRAK has little
responsibility towards them, and they rarely form part of the
decision-making process unless the state is part-funding
service under Section 403b ot the Rail Passenger Service Act.
A curious paradox emerges. The result of the dichotomy of
attitudes and responsibilities has been that several markets
which might have been good for rail passenger service, but
which are of solely regional significance and which the states
have not felt valued funding themselves, have not been
exploited at all. At the same time other, less good, markets
in those very states, have been served because they form part
ot the "Basic" national system.
Ohio is considering its own high-speed regional passenger
system because it does not believe that AMTRAK can provide
for the State's needs.
AMTRAK's organisation is very concentrated compared to the
bus industry in which there is both considerable regional
autonomy in the operation of the two major carriers, and the
presence of many small, independent, regional carriers.
An alternative configuration of AMTRAK might have involved
"federal" organisation with autonomous regional territories
reporting to a central body. Going one step further, funding
might be channeled through the state level. Both measures
might have increased regional awareness, service-orientation,
and service. There could be the risk, however, that were the
states to control the funding, rather than continue with
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AMTRAK, they might prefer to provide their own rail service,
or use the money for modes otner than rail. This could,
however, lead to a more efficient and relevant total trans-
portation system being provided.
Theory E, the theory of the Original Sin, shows that there
has never been any examination of the values which underlie
the concept of AMTRAK.
Congress had been under pressure to act from the railroads,
wanting relief from the duty of operating passenger trains,
from the rail passenger lobby and from labor, both anxious
to keep things as they were. The resulting legislation, which
established AMTRAK, was a compromise and initially only
established the Corporation as a two-year experiment, to be
discontinued if unsuccessful. The "national" scheme that was
established, however, contained an imputed value frame
which was to program AMTRAK's future to today.
Key issues are often ignored by Congress in favor of more
immediately pressing sub-issues. Thus, the problem during
pre-AMTRAK debate was defined in terms of an already-existing
service, rather than in terms of user needs. And once the
AMTRAK structure was established, discussion continued only
under the assumption of that structure, concerning itself
with conponents within the framework, rather than with the
framework itself.
Learning only occurred selectively and in accord with the
original plan. Ideas involving "regionalism" and "inter-
modalism", for example, did not develop because they did not
form part of it. The plan programmed future change.
Wachs and Schofer have developed a "value-hierarchy" with
"values" at the top, "goals", "objectives", "criteria", and
"standards" placed at lower levels. Though the top is most
essentially significant, the lower levels of the hierarchy
are easier to grapple with. In exacuting lower-level work,
however, implied weights are guven to higher-level orders
which might well be different from if goals and values were
to have been considered directly. The 1979 "restructuring",
for example, merely set narrowly-defined criteria, without
making reference to values and goals. Although the criteria
set were claimed to put an end to political subversion and
improve efficiency, they simply dictated the continuance of
the present system by doing nothing more than setting a
minimal standard which much of the present network could meet.
Their aura of respectability helped strengthen the case for
the retention of any train which met them, and helped
perpetuate the dated original conception, rather than lead
to reconfiguration. By failing to look values and goals head
on - and hence address the central question of the transport-
ation wants of society - the past was allowed to continue
programming the future.
The real issues of values and consequent wants were ignored
during AMTRAK's pre-natal stages. Discussion did not center
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around how these wants might be satisfied, but started with
a given machinery. In 1979 it was therefore the yet more
essential that a return to basic values be made. Yet, the
talse path established, it was the yet more unlikely that
steps would be re-trod, thinking started anew. The Original
Sin had been committed; now the consequences had to be borne.
The section on "Analysis of Analysis" focuses on the work of
the analyst, and shows that similar problems to those
distorting the output of decision-makers, afflict his work.
The analyst not only tends to assume "rational" behavior
among actors, but conducts his own analysis within a
"rational" framework in which the unmeasurable tends to be
neglected, though the unmeasurable may be the most essential.
Often analyses gain respect because they bear the hallmark of
"science" while in reality they are but partial. The dangers
of the partial appearing scientific are most immediate in
the CBO energy report (critiqued in APPENDIX B) used in
evidence during House Appropriations Committee Hearings,
though a worthless, biased'document.
But the supposedly "objective" "value-neutral" academic world
also has problems. Thus a study by Hilton is nothing more
than an attempt to validate - in quantitative cookbook style -
a pre-established opinion. His "analysis" is wholly within
the bounds of the current faulty framework of AMTRAK, and
therefore misses any benefits that might be derived from an
alternative one. A study by Mulvey is better, but ignores
the value, political and organisational frameworks within
which AMTRAK operates. He recommends change, but makes no
connection between the values imputed into the present
system and those of his proposals. In recommending change,
he fails to enlighten us on how it may be achieved.
A value system creates a visible object such as AMTRAK
through which organisational and political structures implied
by the value system, act to create the output of a structure
of routes and services. If we are to understand the core of
the issue, we must penetrate to the values inherent in the
scheme, and subject them to criticism. A value-critical
approach (the term is Rein's) is needed.
This is a theme continued into the Conclusion in which it is
shown that all of Theories A through D lack meaning if
values are ignored; any explanatory ability they may have is
only helpful in relation to the underlying value frame,
directly discussed in Theory E. It is perhaps most helpful
to regard Theories B, C and D as a system of conditions
relating to each other through the value structure in a
hierarchy of stimuli and -reactions. The links between the
theories, access to decoding the puzzle, only becomes possible
when seen in relation to values. The truth of any one theory
can only be established (or disproved) when put in place on
the cause- effect chain in relation to other theories, and
when the whole is set against values.
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In order to gain understanding that will allow the analyst
access to the encoding at the heart of the process, and not
merely to non-controlling (though likely reinforcing) co-
variables, it is necessary to seek out the values associated
with output, and the value program commanding the process
that produces that output. Having done this, desired outputs
must be established with respect to values-to-be-espoused,
and the necessary process must be developed so as to be
imprinted with a value program which will permit those outputs
to be produced.
Under this approach, "travel" (as consumption) values can
be disaggregated from "transportation" values, and each
provided for appropriately. "Train cruises" might thus be
provided as a separately identified item for the "travel"
market, and would not be confused with transportation
provision which latter would be supplied where rail held an
inherent advantage in relation to other modes. As at least
an interim measure, certain "second best" solutions may be
required to reflect the tenacity of value mis-programming.
Thus, although the value in question is transportation and not
rail service, the railbus might be a desirable initial dev-
elopment for low-density rural areas because it implies some
rail service to the areas concerned, and satisfies the (mis)
understood notion that rail passenger service should reach
all locations. It is a change which the values imputed into
the current processes might allow, and a base for subsequent
iterations.
There are many things which can be understood at low levels
in the value-hierarchy if the levels above are "good" and
change may legitimately take place with the unchallenged
assumption of them. If a value frame is good, then many
routine functions may be properly organised, evaluated,
altered, underneath its umbrella without specific reference
to it. The problem is to know when the value frame is a good
one, and to make this judgement, perception of its existence
is important on a continuous basis.
In a study as complex as the route system of AMTRAK, it is
essential to be aware that a value frame exists, to identify
it, and examine how, through control of process, it produces
output. Both outputs and process must be examined in the
light of the values which program.
This work has two principal conclusions. The one is that
ultimately, AMTRAK's route structure is attributable to a
failure at AMTRAK's conception to start with values and
proceed down the value-hierarchy from there. Instead, planning
was started well up the decision tree, and an imputed value
frame was introduced not retlective of real transportation
needs. That frame has programmed AMTRAK ever since, and has
been reinforced by organisational, political and learning
processes.
The second.conclusion concerns the analyst. It is that in
complex situations such as this, the only way to gain real
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understanding is with reference to imputed values and
resultant goals, processes and outputs which may (in a
normative sense) be compared against the values-to-be-
espoused, and the goals, processes and outputs which they
suggest. Despite this, the analyst is drawn to only low
levels of abstraction, not only because he feels less
exposed and can produce a more "concrete" product, but also
because he doesn't know any better. As a result, few
analyses are of any significant value in paving the way
tor real change.
There is a need for greater awareness among decision-makers
and analysts alike of the need to plan in relation to values
or - to put it in a nutshell - to plan for what society
really wants. However, if the AMTRAK norms are entrenched,
so also are those of the decision-maker and analyst.
A value-critical form of thinking is more abstract but
because, as I see it, it is set in the reality of goals,
processes and outputs, it is not impossible. We must work
towards a greater awareness of its possibilities, and learn
to make it a part of our evaluative norms.
The study ends with a question: how can we achieve change?
The path ahead is complicated, but at least if the right
questions are asked, there is a fighting chance of finding
our way through the maze to the right answers.
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I N T R 0 D U C T I O N
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On October 30, 1970, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, the creation
of the 91st Congress of the United States, was signed into law (US
Congress, 1970; contained in APPENDIX D).
Section 101 stated the Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose
thus:
The Congress finds that modern, efficient, intercity railroad
passenger service is a necessary part of a balanced transportation
system; that the public convenience and necessity require the
continuance and improvement of such service to provide fast and
comfortable transportation between crowded urban areas and in
other areas of the country; that rail passenger service can help
to end the congestion-on our highways and the overcrowding of
airways and airports; that the traveler in America should to the
maximum extent feasible have freedom to choose the mode of travel
most convenient to his needs; that to achieve these goals
requires the designation of a basic national rail passenger
system and the establishment of a rail passenger corporation for
the purpose of providing modern, efficient, intercity rail
passenger service; that Federal financial assistance to certain
railroads may be necessary to permit the orderly transfer of
railroad passenger service to a railroad passenger corporation.
The Act created a "National Railroad Passenger Corporation" which was
to be "for profit." It was not to be "an agency or establishment of the
United States Government." And so AMTRAK was born.
The end-points of the route structure were to be designated by the
Sectretary of Transportation, the routing between these points to be
determined by the Incorporators of the Corporation. The result is shown
in APPENDIX F, MAP 3.
The route structure took the form of an inter-connected set of long-
distance routes reaching out throughout the nation, and service on most
of the system was to be daily or less. The major exception was to be
on the Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington, on part of which
high-speed equipment (the "Metroliners") had already been introduced, to
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provide fast and frequent service.
Though a restructuring effort in 1979 under the AMTRAK Reorganization
Act of 1979 (US Congress, 1979d) did reduce route mileage some 21 per
cent (although the Secretary of Transportation's report (US DOT, 1979)
which formed the basis of discussion had asked for a 43 per cent cut),
this was an act of surgery rather than reconfiguration, and to today,.
the basic pattern established in 1970, one which lays emphasis on a
nationwide and complete network, rather than on concentrated regional
short-distance services, remains in force.
This study attempts to explain why AMTRAK operates this pattern of
long-distance routes, rather than a series of shorter-distance high-
density lines. But in doing this, it simultaneously tries to draw some
lessons for the analyst: it looks at the way we understand phenomena,
and critiques it.
The technique of this work is to propose a set of theories, and discuss
them.
Theories A present a number of seemingly plausible reasons for having a
long-distance network. They assume that there must be a rational reason
underlying the pattern, and seek to expose it. It does not take much
probing, however, to show that the long-distance system is not logical
from the viewpoint of the propositions put forward for testing.
Theories B, C, and D all present a number of believable explanations for
the pattern of the AMTRAK system. Theory BI suggests that Congressmen
deliberately distort the system in order to further their own political
ends (basically security in terms of re-election). But Theory B2
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suggests Congressmen are perfectly well-intentioned, but support the
wrong system because of the incomplete and biased way in which they
receive information, this process a result of sub-conscious cognitive
filtering and cybernetic reinforcement.
Theories C focus on AMTRAK management, Cl, C2 and C3 focusing on
constraints under which they must operate: lack of equipment, unco-
operative railroads, and lack of control. Theory C4 is the management
parallel of BI, and proposes that AMTRAK's first objective is self-
preservation. Theory C5, on the other hand, is the parallel of B2 and
views poor decision-making in relation to learning processes.
Theories Dl and D2 examine the system as a whole, Dl dealing with
problems of definition, identity, organisation and accountability on
the national level, D2 examining the effects of centralisation of
management and funding, as compared to what might result from a
regionalised structure.
I used the word "discuss" above because these are not theories which may
be "proved" in the manner that a mathematical equation is solved.
Many of Theories B, C and D are convincing, yet there is a danger in
accepting any one of them, however attractive it might be, because the
activity observed which suggests validity for the theory may simply co-
vary, or be derivative of, the root cause, and may not point to a fruitful
line of attack for effecting real change. There is a need for ordering,
the necessity of establishing a chain of causality so that the root cause,
rather than merely a symptom thereof, may be identified. But the
necessary reference point for this comes only in Theory E which throws
previous theories into perspective by casting them in the light of the
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set of values - or value frame - unknowingly imputed into the AMTRAK
scheme at its inception, a frame which continues to program the pattern
of services provided by the organisation.
Much of the material included in this work is drawn from the transcripts
of 56 interviews conducted over the Summer of 1980, 52 in person and
4 by telephone (listing included in APPENDIX J). Few serious analyses
can be found which take this approach. After all, the comments of a set
of partial commentators can hardly be taken as "factual."...
Yet, what one finds when undertaking an interviewing project if this
type, is that there are not so much "facts" as perceptions of facts
amongst decision-makers (or surrogates for them such as Congressional
staff). But, it is these perceptions which determine beliefs, opinions
and subsequent actions. Although these beliefs may not be backed up by
concrete proof, it is important to know what those beliefs are and how
they have been formulated, for such knowledge can provide the key to the
inner truth of actual process at work, and to the essential value frame
programming it.
The concrete answer is, indeed, often only very much a partial answer.
One of the key problems of much analysis is that it tends to restrict
itself to those phenomena which are most easily identified, precisely
measured, and thereby understood. But there is little use in finding,
for example, that a certain practice is not "energy efficient" (itself
much of a value-judgement, as is shown in APPENDIX B), if there is no
awareness of how it has come into place. The cause must be identified
and attacked in order to change the effect. The less tangible, and
less simple to process information must not be ignored to avoid the risk
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of erroneously accepting the "understanding" obtained as a whole
explanation, when it is in reality bereft of conception of actual
process and therefore valueless in pointing the direction towards
change.
This study shows that it is necessary to step back, at a high enough
level of abstraction, to examine the framework in which the visible
components undertake their interplay, in order to understand their
nature, and how they may be altered. It suggests that both decision-
makers and analysts have operated at low levels of abstraction, on
obviously physical phenomena, the wrong questions about rail passenger
service have been asked, and that unless there is a move towards a more
value-critical approach, based on both output and process, change is
unlikely.
The aim here is not to form any normative conclusions about whether
AMTRAK should have a nationwide pattern of long-distance routes, or
concentrate on regionalised markets. Rather, it is both to explain how
the present system came about, and has been so resilient, and to better
understand how analysis is carried out, with thoughts as to how it
might be done better.
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T H E O R I E S A
Theories A contend that the pattern of AMTRAK routes in existence is the
result 'of rational analysis in which, according to Hart (1976):
(i) A clearly recognised problem exists;
(ii) The objectives of the policy-makers are known and it is
possible to roughly determine whether they are being
achieved;
(iii) An "envelope" defining the action space available is both
known and well defined with regards to possible
alternatives;
(iv) There is also an outcome envelope containing the
consequences of available options; and
(v) The policy-makers have a preference function with regard
to the outcome envelope which allows them to select and
rank alternatives in terms of order and priority.
According to Theories A, decision-makers have optimised through the use
of "rational" analysis to create the best possible route structure.
Each of Theories Al to A5 is in fact a proposition falling within the
theory that output is a result of such rational analysis, each one
containing a certain attribute which it is claimed has been optimised;
these propositions are tested below.
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T H E O R Y Al
If a system is to be provided at all, an inter-connecting national
network is needed for reasons of efficiency: the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts.
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Theory Al would have it that since the more complete a network the
greater its overall efficiency, the more a network inter-connects,
the greater the number of potential journeys that can be made. A
subway system's lines will tend to connect with each other at various
transfer points to allow for convenient journeys between as many
individual subway stations as possible.
This could also be said to be part of the basic philosophy of AMTRAK.
Long-distance lines inter-connect to provide for the maximum number
of origin-destination possibilities. Chicago assumes strategic
importance as a central connecting hub, and timetabling is performed
to maximise the number of connections that might be made. Each train in
the system is se positioned as to relate to other trains.
As Tom Gillespie, AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer, said: "If
you're running a service that doesn't connect, you kind of isolate a
market," while Howard Henry, Director, Market Planning and Forecasting,
stressed the advantages of "synergism where routes feed each other."
Amy Dunbar, Legislative Assistant to Senator Tsongas (D, Massachusetts),
maintained that an integrated system was important for AMTRAK "and
it's probably in a greater sense worthwhile for them to maintain the
long-haul than to provide a short-haul that might not be well-
trafficked. And, if AMTRAK maintains its image, then it's imperative
that you have these connections for paople who are making those
distances."
Appendix A reports the results of testing the logic of these arguments
using the classical gravity model and the Janelle (1969) theory of
spatial reorganisation. They are found to hold validity only when rail
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passenger service is in a monopoly position. Under such circumstances,
a route structure consisting of a series of regional systems organically
integrated into an inter-regional trunk network would maximise potential
for interaction.
Regional systems would exist in their own right, as well as in relation
to the trunk system. A "distance" effect would influence interaction
within regional systems: interaction with other centers decreases as
their distance from the point of origin increases. Interaction in
the inter-regional system would, however, be significantly related to
a "hierarchy" effect under which the attractive power of major centers
considerable distances apart would offset distance decay in stimulating
movement.
Air competition would hit the inter-regional system hard because its
greatest market inroads would ne between major centers long distances
apart (rail inter-regional system end-points) between which it could
best exercise its ,speed comparative advantage over rail. End-point
rail traffic is lost, and intermediate points which lack "hierarchy"
end-point trunking, can no longer sustain the previous level of service.
If frequency is reduced, but the route unchanged, then the benefits of
any regional-type service that was provided as a consequence of
inter-regional service (because frequency of service was adequate to
generate short-distance demand) will be lost. As rail's inter-regional
role fades, it is logically best consolidated within individual
regional systems.
The development of the automobile also negatively affects the viability
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of rail, especially in the lower distance ranges. Rail is then
constrained in effective operation to short-to-medium distance, high-
density markets.
The Joint Federal Railroad Administration/AMTRAK (1980) study:
Rail Passenger Corridors - Analysis of Potential Improvements, states
that:
Although rail travel once held a competitive advantage in a wide
range of travel markets,.improvements in the air transportation
and highway systems, combined with the dispersal of residential
and business activity-away-from rail stations have greatly
reduced the competitive-advantage, especially over long distances
and through lightly populated areas. However, at a "corridor"
distance range of about 100 to 300 miles, fast, frequent rail
service is capable of competing with travel by air or auto
for some types of trips.
It is only over such distance ranges and in such high-density markets
that the capital improvements needed to produce such results might
be justified.
The current pattern of AMTRAK operation assumes the now-invalid monopoly
conditions. Ross Capon, Executive Director, National Association of
Railroad Passengers, explained that:
The general experience has been that there is a magnet, a major
city at one end of the route, and that the most acceptable
schedule, if possible, will.put the arrival at that magnet in
the morning, and the departure in the late afternoon. That tends
to facilitate connections with other trains at that city.
The effect of this is to subordinate the needs of the intermediate points
to- those of the end points. Louis Rossi, Director, Rail Division,
New York State Department of Transportation, complained that:
They historically have constantly held the Lake Shore Limited
eastbound for connections from Chicago. It really is giving a
serious service problem to all those intermediate cities...
And that's why you find.the eastern Lake Shore has much less
local business on it than the westbound Lake Shore...
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They're more concerned about the small number of people that
cross the trains at Chicago linking from the Western to the
Eastern region market than they are with serving the Eastern
region market with trains.
Commenting on the trains which cross Ohio as part of long-distance
runs from the East Coast to Chicago, Robert Casey (1980), Director,
Ohio Rail Transportation Authority, said: "They are slow, badly
scheduled, and do not connect our major cities." Service is not
oriented to high-density Ohio city pairs but to inter-regional
end-point service, base-line "demand" for which has evaporated
with the onslaught of air. Rail might be able to capture a significant
market share in Ohio were service reconfigured to meet the needs of
regional centers, and to be fast, frequent and reliable.
Sloss and Kneafsey (1977) 'stress the importance of speed. In a
comparative study between Britain and the US Northeast Corridor,
they found that: "in the British case the results suggest that a 10
percent increase in speed would yield a 26.1 percent increase in
journeys, while in the US case a 10 percent increase in speed could
yield a 36.2 percent increase in journeys."
The FRA/AMTRAK Corridors study sees "percentage of total trips that
would use each mode between given locations" as a function of the
"comparative attractiveness of each mode in terms of travel time, cost,
and frequency of service." It.
assumed that doubling of frequency would probably generate 70%
more traffic from 3 to 6 daily round trips, and 40% more traffic
from 6 to 12 daily round trips. These projected increases are
actually conservative in view of AMTRAK's experience on routes
where frequency has been increased... and on observed ridership
in the Northeast Corridor. Using more optimistic assumptions
would make the higher frequencies in each corridor even more
attractive.
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In contrast to AMTRAK's 1976 0.3% systemwide share of passenger miles,
it carried 16 percent of New York - Washington traffic, and 40 percent
of air and train traffic on that route. Also noteworthy is the Los
Angeles - San Diego route on which half of the six daily round-trip
trains are paid for by the State of California. When AMTRAK took over
the route from Southern Pacific in 1971, ridership was 300,000 passengers
per year. In the 12 months following the addition of the sixth train in
February, 1978,. patronage was almost 850,000; in fiscal 1979 ridership
was 1108,527, and volumes of 148,000 in May, 1979, broke the previous
high set during train-dependent World War II (though part of the
stimulation did come from fuel shortages). The added frequency has led
to exponential growth in ridership so that by August, 1979, the farebox
was covering 82 percent of the cost of service on the three added trains,
and one state-subsidised train was actually making an operating profit
(see Kizzia, 1980).
Markets such as the Northeast Corridor and Los Angeles - San Diego are
self-sufficient; they do not require, nor thrive off the "synergy"
of being connected to a nationwide system. Instead they serve a function
of integration within regions. Service within them is viable because it
can offer transportation advantages over other modes, advantages which
can no longer be capitalised over longer distances. It is in markets
such as these that the train can best develop the inherent advantage
it holds today.
On February 6, 1980, Alan Boyd, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, AMTRAK, addressed the
Wharton Transportation Club thus:
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Rail passenger service is really a wholesale operation. It has
no value if it only serves the individual. When yuu plan to move
trains, you must plan to move millions of people. With this as
your base, your plans begin with the movement of travelers
between the most densely populated centers of the country. The
railroad is by far the most efficient transporter of passengers
into and through densely populated centers. This is where we
must begin the study of-AMTRAK's future. AMTRAK's future is
linked with corridor development, commuter service, intermodalism
and the revitalization of the city center... One train a day
anywhhere can be little more than a costly curiosity, like the
circus which comes to town each year.
I have not tried to prove above that there is necessarily a case for
expanding corridor services. What the materials collected here have shown,
however, is that with historical developments towards the multi-modal
society, it is no longer necessary or desirable for the rail passenger
network to retain an inter-connected structure across the whole country.
The whole is no longer greater than the "sum of the parts" and may be
considerably less than were those parts to be rearranged to maximise
the re-adjusted inherent advantages of rail.
That the system becomes l'Balkanised", with non-connected regional
systems each functioning independently, and oriented to the needs of
their respective regions, far from being a sign of disintegration
could be interpreted as a response to the demands of modified socio-
economic efficiency.
Such a shift has not, however, occurred. AMTRAK maintains the skeleton
of an inter-connected nationwide system. This cannot be explained on
pure efficiency grounds; it will be necessary to dig a good deal deeper
to gain an appreciation of why an archaic principle persists.
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T H E O R Y A2
The train is needed as an alternative for those who do not have access
to other modes; social benefits to be derived in this way justify the
existence of an inter-connected long-distance system.
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While, in disproving Theory Al, it can be shown that rail is not an
efficient alternative relative to other modes in inter-regional services,
Theory A2 posits that these are nonetheless worth retaining for the
social benefits therefrom to be derived.
Judging from interview responses and Congressional discussion, such
benefits are widely thought to be important. AMTRAK is seen as the
servant of those without access to cars, and of those who could not
afford to, or were afraid of, flying. A role was clearly seen for the
Corporation in areas with generally poor transportation provision.
Others simply felt that AMTRAK was a good and needed 'alternative."
As the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (US Congress, 1970) says, the
Congress finds "that the traveler in America should to the maximum
extent feasible have freedom to choose the mode of travel most convenient
to their needs." This fires the argument for "AMTRAK the alternative,"
though there is clearly a problem in the vagueness of a word such as
"feasible," a term which has at times proved to be elusive, and at
others unclear.
The most widely-supported long-distance service amongst those
interviewed was the "Empire Builder" which takes a northerly route
from Chicago to Seattle (see Map 7, APPENDIX F). According to Matthew
Scocozza, Senior Minority Counsel, Senate Commerce Committee, this "is a
good example of where AMTRAK should be. Even if it is not cost-beneficial,
there is no alternative service; very, very poor intercity bus services,
and the air service is almost non-existant because the small carriers
just don't go into those particular areas any more."
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The "Empire Builder" leaves Chicago and Seattle daily during the summer,
thrice weekly at other times of the year, to complete the 2281 mile
journey to the other end of the line in 47 hours, 25 minutes. En route,
it stops at numerous small towns which are seen to benefit from the
service.
A Spring, 1978 survey by Richard Day of the University of Idaho, found
that only 9 percent of Chicago - Seattle and Chicago - Los Angeles
route passengers were travelling on business, however, and a high
proportion of the remainder could be termed discretionary rather than
essential travellers (see TABLE 1) (Day,1978).
T A B L E 1 : AMTRAK Ridership By Purpose Of Trip, April - June, 1978,
Chicago - Los Angeles and Chicago - Seattle services.
Purpose
Business or Work 9
Recreation or Vacation 27
Visits to Friends and Relatives 50
Personal Affairs 10
School 4
Day also asked passengers how they would travel should train services on
these routes be discontinued (see TABLE 2).
T A B L E 2 Mode of Transport Specified By Passengers If Train
Were Not Operating, April - June, 1978 (routes as above).
Mode
Automobile 22
Plane 34
Bus 12
Another Train 7
Would not have made trip 24
* At the time two train routes were in operation between Chicago and
Seattle.
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A great deal of caution must be exercised in evaluating this data. If
the majority among the 24 percent who indicated that in the absence
of the train they would not have made the trip, are people who have
been deprived of making the journey because their only means of
mobility has been removed, this could be said to constitute a social
loss. There are quite different implications, however, if they are
individuals who are travelling for the pleasure of the journey itself,
using the train as a form of consumption, as it were. The train's high
attractiveness for this purpose was indicated in a 1972 Louis Harris
survey in which 44 percent of the respondents indicated that sightseeing
en route to the destination on a train trip was as important or more
important than what one did at the ultimate destination.
It is therefore likely that a good-proportion of the 24 percent who
would no longer travel would no longer be doing so because the loss
of the journey itself constituted a greater disutility than the
loss of the benefits to be derived at the destination. It is clearly
open to discussion whether this counts as social loss. It is possible
that those involved would take some other vacation of equal value.
Ross Capon, Executive Director, National Association of Railroad
Passengers commented that: "the public hearing which attracted the
greatest number of people was in Fargo, and I would suggest to you
that these people are not fundamentally tourists, but that that train
is heavily used and depended on by people who live up there, and
literally have no alternatives."
The train, however, is timed with end-points in mind. It arrives and
departs from Fargo at 01.18 and 01.33, and 02.25 and 03.50 westbound
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-and eastbound respectively, and inevitably passes through many other
settlements during the night hours.
The train is composed of luxury "Superliner" cars, complete with
restaurant, lounge, sleeping and dome cars which, together with the
nature of the schedule suggest that the service is designed to serve
inter-regional rather than regional needs. For a regional-type service,
speed, frequency and convenience are important factors. Where population
is very sparse, one or more.of these factors may have to be sacrificed,
but the train does not appear to provide any of them. It is infrequent,
often late, partly as a result of the great distances covered, and for
many of the settlements along the route it is inconveniently timed.
Further, it is clearly not the only form of transportation available.
There is air service within striking distance of all points en route,
and smaller settlements having their own airports include Fargo, Grand
Forks, Devil's Lake, Minot, Williston, Wolf Point and Glasgow. Over
shorter distances the car will be far more convenient than the train
in terms of both access to service and availability.
Bus service does exist along almost the whole route, and bus travel is
possible between all points served by the "Empire Builder" and Chicago,
Minneapolis and Seattle. The bus provides good inter-connection between
smaller points and regional foci between which most interaction will
take place. Inter-regional connections may be made at these larger towns;
thus, bus service integrates individual points effectively into the
larger hierarchy of settlements.
By contrast, most of the points on the "Empire Builder" route
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are very small, and demand for interaction between them will be minimal;
the train does not provide for the larger intra-regional interaction
between small points and larger towns in the central place system.
One of the reasons bus service along the actual route of the train is
of relatively low quality is the existence of the train itself. One
operator, Brown Bus Lines, which formerly provided service between
Cut Bank and Kalispell, has indicated its willingness to restore service
should the "Empire Builder" be eliminated. It should be remembered,
however, that the train does not follow its particular route for the
purpose of serving the minor settlements along its way; rather, the
rail line and train service are designed to link inter-regional markets,
and the position of routes between larger centers is to a great extent
a matter of historical accident.
The majority of points of similar size to the smaller towns on the route
of the "Empire Builder" have no train service. In fact, while there
are only some 500 AMTRAK stations, in excess of 14,000 communities
are served only by bus (ICC, 1978a). Demand cannot support a train
for these latter, and they do not happen to be on an inter-regional
route. I am inclined to be suspect of an argument that a service should
not be discontinued because it provides a service to a region, when the
reason for that train's existence is not the servicing of that region,
but the addressing of some conceived demand for inter-regional tourism
between highly-populated end-points.
The train might be a more meaningful alternative were it to connect
Minneapolis with Fargo, or Spokane with Seattle at hours when people
are prepared to travel, or if it were to provide a shuttle service
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between various other points on the route. This might be operated by
self-propelled railcars, providing only basic coach seating, and would
be timed with the convenience of regional points in mind. The
restaurant and sleeping cars which do little other than add to the
mystique (and cost of operation) of the train would be dispensed with.
Congressman James Florio (D, New Jersey), Chairman, House Transportation
Committee, did not think that such service as existed on long-distance
routes was often used as a transportation mode. "The thing could be
free from New York to San Francisco, and I and most other people would
not use it, just because of time constraints," he said.
The "transportation" provider capabilities of the "Empire Builder"
would appear to be very much a by-product of the "rail-buff" function.
The base-line cost is attributable to this latter category which
requires extraordinarily expensive equipment and modes of operation.
A true "social service" for the empty north might well be very
differently constituted, and offer more units of "social value" per
subsidy dollar than the currently-offered service.
The possibility of expanding the present bus service which, in relief
to the train, is fired by demand rather than fortuitousness, should not
be overlooked. The social product being sought is "mobility" rather
than train travel per se and, especially given the low density and
dispersed form of population patterns in the region, a bus service
developed under subsidy could provide a far more comprehensive and
convenient, if less comfortable, service than an infrequent train which
is accessible to only a small part of the regional population.
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During the 1979 route restructuring the southern route between. Fargo
and Spokane was dropped, the northern one - the route of the "Empire
Builder" - was kept. This might seem odd given that settlements on the
southern route are much larger than those on the northern route.
However, it was argued that there were fewer alternatives on the latter,
and that adverse weather conditions might impede access by other modes
at other times of the year. Consideration was not given, however,
to whether bus service (or possibly more regionalised and lower cost
railcar service) might not be more appropriate, or to how great the
social loss incurred by the train's removal might be (for example, how
many people actually used rail transport during bad weather?) as
compared to the social gains that might accrue from the transferral of
the resources deployed to some other market or system.
The "Empire Builder" is generally recognised as the long-distance
service most essentially of "social" value. There are other routes where
such claims are less easy to make. The thrice-weekly Los Angeles to New
Orleans "Sunset Limited" is virtually entirely a tourist service.
The expensively-equipped "Superliner" train from Ogden, Utah, to Los
Angeles is used almost entirely by vacationers en route for Las Vegas.
They constitute an insignificant proportion of total arrivals and
departures from that city, could easily be accommodated by other modes,
and the service cannot be said by any stretch of the imagination
to serve any "social" function whatsoever.
At the same time, several regional markets with high potential for
passenger service development are not properly served because service
which may exist is made up so as to serve a vanished inter-regional need,
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and not the requirements of these markets.
While the "social" benefits to be derived from particular types of
rail service are, in essence, derivatives of value-judgements, as will
be seen later, the political system has never formally faced up to this
issue. My reading of the problem leads me to believe that AMTRAK long-
distance services provide little of social amenity because they are not
oriented towards those markets which might stand most to gain in these
terms, but are geared towards a largely optional, and highly specialised,
leisure market which could, for the most part, be accommodated on other
modes at little "transportation" if not "consumption" loss. Theory A2
fails to hold water.
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T H E O R Y A3
The train is needed as an alternative to other modes to save energy,
and the more widespread its coverage, the greater the possible
conservation benefits.
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According to this argument, rail passenger service can be seen to
be more energy efficient than alternative means of transportation,
and should therefore be encouraged. The greater the distances covered,
the greater the potential for energy savings, it is argued.
A number of those interviewed attested to rail's energy saving abilities
in general, without attempting to differentiate netween market types.
"The most efficient is rail, next bus, next auto and air," declared
one State official in support of the idea that since rail was a good
thing in energy terms, the more of it the better.
Mr. Y of the Federal Railroad Administration, summed up attitudes as
follows:
The Executive Branch sees AMTRAK as a permanent subsidy situation
and feels that a large part of the AMTRAK system does not justify
the public cost in terms of either energy saving or cost per
passenger. There are elements of the Executive Branch which feel
there are corridors which have the potential to justify their
cost in terms of public benefits; the largest consensus would
be on the Northeast Corridor. Congress sees AMTRAK as an energy-
saving device which justifies any public expenditure in energy
saving and other less tangible benefits.
While this is possibly a somewhat extreme summary of the situation,
it is indicative of a lack of knowledge and evaluation of the energy-
saving potnetial of AMTRAK. General "black-box" views of AMTRAK as
energy-saver by their nature support a large network. Interestingly
enough, though, lack of insight by some of the most virulent opponents
of AMTRAK subsidisation, implicitly supports a larger system, rather
than a more concentrated one. (This is discussed more thoroughly under
Theory B2). By failing to discriminate amongst the various types of
rail passenger service, change towards development of the more energy-
saving types is not promoted because all are seen as below the
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minimum level of viability in terms of not being capable of covering
costs from fare revenues. Efforts are thus made to reduce the system
in its totality, rather than to rearrange its elements towards
maximisation of energy-saving potential.
Theory A3 assumes that the train will have an energy advantage over
other modes over all distances, and that this advantage will not
vary according to market served. It assumes that cost of service
provision, in energy terms, is constant, and does not consider what
effects service characteristics will have on market penetration and
hence, energy saving ability.
That a particular train is sold out does not automatically make it a
success in energy terms. The argument that it is a success looks at it
in isolation, an unacceptable position to take given that resources are
limited and must be allocated. For each case, two questions should be
asked. First, "is this train an energy-efficient alternative over the
link being considered and how may it contribute to energy conservation?"
Second: "would limited resources be put to greater use on this link
relative to the set of all other choices?"
In fact it seems evident that little serious research is done on the
subject of the first question by the proponents of particular links,
who for the most part are content with rhetorically attesting to what
they see as the self-evident facts. And, the second question receives
even less attention. Such studies as have been carried out are, for the
most part, wholly inadequate. They have been narrow, and have
been - sometimes hideously - slanted towards promoting the interests
of the body conducting the "inquiry." A full review of these studies is
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included in Appendix B which provides a more detailed and technical
treatment of the subject.
Because of the contradictory and confusing nature of this work, it is
not easy to reach firm conclusions. Attention will be focused here on
the most axiomatic and significant inferences which can be made.
Energy efficiency is not uniform accross all markets served by
AMTRAK. As the Congressional Budget Office (1979) reported:
a long-distance train with four coach zars, four sleeper cars,
one dining car, one baggage car, and one observation car has
about the same passenger carrying capacity as a train with five
coach cars. Assuming that the energy required per car is roughly
the same on either train, the long-distance train in this
illustration requires more than twice the energy per seat-mile
as a train with five coach cars.
Mulvey (1978) finds similarly. Short-distance trains with Amfleet
equipment produce more than double the passenger miles per gallon of
long-distance equipment, he asserts.
Comparing AMTRAK performance to that of other modes is extremely
hazardous because of the assumptions which must inevitably be made.
Thus, for example, should one compare rail performance against an
assumption of average automobile load factor, or attempt to take a
marginal approach based on the theory that since many of the people going
by train are travelling alone, were they to switch to automobile, they
would continue to travel by themselves? This sort of problem is
extremely hard to resolve, and results in considerable variance in
interpretation amongst the various studies.
So, while the General Accounting Office (1978c), on an analysis of 11
(mostly long-distance) routes found that: "the trains on the 11 routes
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reviewed consumed more energy in fiscal 1977 than would have been used
if every passenger had used an automobile," AMTRAK (cited in Mulvey
(1978) TABLE 2.7, p.6 8 ) claims that even its (less fuel efficient)
conventional equipment (of the type which was generally employed on the
routes studied by the GAO) is almost twice as fuel efficient as the
automobile. Standing in the middle, Mulvey finds that AMTRAK long-
distance equipment does only slightly better than automobile.
Over shorter distances rail is seen to do far better than over long
distances by both AMTRAK and Mulvey, rail being seen as performing over
four times better than automobile in the passenger miles per gallon
stakes in the former estimate, almost three times better in the latter.
The joint FRA/AMTRAK (1980) Corridors study projected fuel efficiency
more than three times better for rail than for automobile on the short-
distance corridor proposals they studied.
In a statement which Hilton (1980) mis-attributes to AMTRAK (an
exceptionally unacceptable piece of carelessness since it occupies 7
out of the only 27 lines devoted to energy, and is somewhat contradictory
to the real AMTRAK view), the Federal Railroad Administration reported
to the House Appropriations Transportation sub-committee (US Congress,
1979a) that:
With existing conditions, rail is far from a favorable comparison
with intercity bus from the standpoint of energy efficiency. While
new lightweight equipment, an emphasis on short-haul corridor
operations, and greater use of electric trains in the Northeast
Corridor will surely increase AMTRAK's overall energy efficiency,
equality with bus will seldom be achieved, if ever, on long
distance routes, barring a technological breakthrough in
railroading.
While AMTRAK claims that its Amfleet (but not conventional) equipment
produces more passenger miles per gallon than bus service (cited in
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Mulvey, (1978) TABLE 2.7, p.68), other reports share the view that the
bus is more energy efficient than either long or short-distance rail
passenger service.
Taking all alternative modes into account, Mulvey finds that: "AMTRAK
long-haul services presently consume nearly as much fuel as would have
been used by the riders' second choice alternative. AMTRAK's contribution
to fuel consumption is effectively zero for long-distance travel."
This last comment is partly driven by AMTRAK's low contribution to long-
distance inter-city passenger-mile market share. But, while long-
distance rail service can make only negligeable inroads into the total
passenger transportation market (possibly 0.3%), regional corridor
systems could, as we have seen, have the capability of serving a
significant proportion (eg. 16 percent in 1976 between New York and
Washington). Thus, while long-distance services, even were they to be
more energy efficient than available results would suggest, could have
no impact on a national scale, short-distance services could be of
considerably greater importance on a regional scale.
Also relevant is the point that in the event of an energy crisis, a
regional system already carrying say 30 percent of the market at 50
percent load factor, could readily accommodate an extra 30 percent of
the total market - 43 percent of the normally non-rail market. A long-
distance route carrying 0.3 percent of the market under normal
conditions, at 50 percent load factor, could only accommodate an extra
0.3 percent of the total market (0.31 percent of the normally non-
rail market), providing insignificant relief.
-54-
Further, a fault in the way diversion factors are used in all studies
is the assumption that if x more passenger miles are transferred from
rail to bus or air, this will imply an increase in air or bus fuel
consumption in proportion to x. It is vehicle miles, and not passenger
miles which determine actual energy use, however. Because rail passenger
traffic on long-distance services represents such a small share of total
traffic in these markets, it seems unlikely that more than a slight
increase in vehicle miles for bus or air would result were rail passenger
service to be terminated. The insignificant number of passengers
transferring might simply marginally increase load factors.
Or, to put it another way, the existence of AMTRAK service on long-
distance routes may have little or no effect in reducing vehicle miles
by air or bus. Rather than rail passengers causing less energy to be
used than had they flown, the existence of the train might mean that
more energy is consumed. In contrast, where AMTRAK has a significant
market share, discontinuance of its services could result in the need
for large increases in capacity on other public carriers. Improvements
in Washington - New York rail services, for example, were accompanied by
decreases in air.shuttle capacity.
Also worthy of note is that short-distance rail services compare more
favorably in energy use against air than do long-distance services,
because the heavy fuel use for airplane take off and landing has to be
spread over fewer miles in the latter case than in the former. Short-
distance rail also scores over long-distance in that while there is
potential for electrifying short-distance corridor-type routes, this is
clearly less than feasible over longer distances.
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Not only this but, as we have seen earlier, transportation demands in
low-density areas currently served on long-distance routes could be
better met by long-distance services. As Mulvey said: "If appropriate
short-distance rail passenger service could be provided to meet the
needs of short-distance passengers on long-haul trains, the energy
savings would be much larger, other things being equal." The recent
railbus developed by British Rail Engineering and British Leyland,
for example, is literally a bus fitted with rail bogies. Its fuel
consumption is that of a bus, while in performance it shows many of
the advantages of a fixed guidance system. And, the Budd company claims
better than inter-city bus fuel efficiency - on a seat-mile basis -
for their single vehicle railcar, the SPV 2000 (US Congress, 1979b).
While, because of the inadequacy of the various studies, it is not
possible to reach a firm conclusion about the relative energy efficiency
of rail as compared to other modes, it is reasonable to conclude that
currently-operated long-distance services are markedly less fuel
efficient than short-distance services and, given their low market
share, do not make a worthwhile contribution to energy conservation.
Short-distance corridor services with higher density seating and
greater passenger volumes which also represent a larger proportion of
the total market, show the potential to make a much greater contribution,
especially as the possibility exists for electrification. Other short-
distance needs - if they are to be met by train - would be better and
more fuel-efficiently served by providing railcar-type service over
certain sectors currently served by long-distance trains. Theory A3
fails.
-56-
T H E O R Y A4
The train is a national historic resource; Americans should be
encouraged to see their country in a leisurely way. The day is past
when any train can capture a worthwhile share of the business market,
but, if for no other reason than nostalgia, the long-distance services
should be maintained.
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Everyone loves the train; it is part of America's heritage. It is a
vehicle for nostalgia. There are some who claim that the train should
be preserved for this reason alone. In America's history, it was the
long-distance train steaming westwards through vast emptynesses that
had the image of prestige; starched-jacketed waiters would serve
feasts to the passengers as the train roared into the grey darkness,
city limits past. The sleeping car attendant would meanwhile be
getting the gracious accommodations ready. This is what the nostalgia
hunter wants to be preserved and if this is to be done, then it is
indeed the longer-distance services tha.t need to be kept open.
The case for an inter-connected network as against a series of short-
distance corridors was examined under Theory Al purely on efficiency
grounds, where the only demand under consideration is the derived
demand to get from A to B at which latter point a primary want can be
satisfied. Theories A2 and A3 rested on the same principle.
Ex-AMTRAK President, Paul Reistrup said, however: I think there's
some national justification for having people see their country."
Asked whom he thought used the long-distance trains, Gordy Peters,
Chief for Rail Marketing, New York State Department of Transportation,
replied: "I'd say somebody who wants to do it for an experience.
It's not cheap to take the train between New York and Los Angeles.
And, they're a lot of people, like the rail fan types, who took a
train when say they were in the Service, and they want to recapture
some of that experience today." Under Theory A2, a Louis Harris
(1972) survey which reported that 44 percent of survey repondents
found sightseeing en route to a destination by train equally
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or of greater importance to what they did on arrival, was discounted
as not being socially beneficial.
Such travel does benefit from a rather unusual externality associated
with rail passenger transportation, however, in that the journey, as
well as serving a derived demand, can be an end in itself - in effect,
a form of "consumption." There- is a good deal of evidence to suggest
that rail has lost the lucrative business market except on the Northeast
Corridor and, perhaps, in Southern California. That it has lost it on
longer-distance routes is a virtually irreversible fact. Given this
scenario, while there is perhaps a diminishing case for rail as a form
of transportation, there may be potential for developing it in the
"nostalgia" markets, capitalising on the "consumption" externalities
associated with long-distance train travel.
This is what the 1972 Louis Harris survey concluded:
It is perfectly apparent that if AMTRAK tries to sell speed
and shortness of the trip, it is bucking into the airlines'
strongest motivator. While it is desirable to have higher speed
trains and to shorten elapsed time in reaching destinations, it
is also the least likely tack for AMTRAK to score through on.
The report found that rail scores highly on:
a kind of special personal freedom and comfort which is unique
to train travel. It consists of the ability of the passenger to
get up and stretch, take a stroll, to take in interesting sights,
and to enjoy the trip with a feeling of security and safety...
AMTRAK could begin by stating that it did not have as much space
available for travellers as other forms of transportation, that
it was basically marketing a limited and select commodity and
service. Train seats of modern, inter-city trains are meant for
special people who can enjoy the pleasures of train travel...
AMTRAK should forget about competing with other modes of
transportation and should concentrate on selling positively
those attributes which are unique and appealing about train
travel. Basically, the plan outlined above is a method to employ
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a self-selection process among a minority of travellers who will
grow to feel they belong to a rather distinctive class in society
who prefer train travel. By stressing that AMTRAK has only a
limited number- of seats to sell turns current low usage into a
sense of exclusivity. By advertising and promoting this approach
among the young and the educated and the affluent, the entire air
of travelling inter-city by train will also be more appealing to
the lower middle income and less well educated, since they will
view the process of travelling by train as an upgrading of their
own experiences in travel.
There are dangers, though, in trying to combine a nostalgic novelty with
a mode designated for the provision of transportation services. If
America wants a system of elite travelling museums, it is questionable
whether it should be provided by AMTRAK, the same Corporation which
operates the businessman's Metroliner, and which is in business, the
Act would lead one to believe, to move people from A to B, rather than
to provide a joy-ride to nowhere in particular.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with joy-riding per se. The
problem is, however, that if a large system of daily trains is to be
kept reasonably filled, a relatively low general fare must be charged.
With the high capital and manpower requirements of a regular scheduled
service, this means high levels of subsidy. The form of pricing in use
prices AMTRAK as a transportation service. AMTRAK is priced relative
to fares on other modes, rather than in relation to its costs. Many of
the joy-riding passengers will, nonetheless, be earning a consumer
surplus (benefits they didn't pay for) because, in using the train as
a form of consumption, in effect as a vacation in itself, they will be
deriving benefits from these unpriced externalities.
Mr. Y. of the Federal Railroad Administration felt that the long-distance
train "belongs more in the National Park Service than it does in a
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transportation agency," and Mr. X, also of the F.R.A. suggests how
such "nostalgia" service could be marketed economically separate from
trains which provide for "transportation" needs. He advocates a two-
tier system with a "cattle-car" approach to basic service, and a
luxury "cruise" service priced on the basis of fully allocated cost,
and marketed through the travel trade. When air travel developed to
such a stage that ocean service lost viability as a transportation
mode, almost all scheduled service ceased, and the ship was developed
to provide for a luxury cruise market. The same could happen with rail.
Whether trains should be retained for "nostalgia" reasons is, of course,
a value-judgement. But the Act specifies, and the service is scheduled,
as a transportation service. If the base-line of passengers on these
trains are travelling for transportation reasons, because they find
AMTRAK the cheapest, fastest, or most convenient method of getting from
A to B, then all well and good for additional traffic to be attracted
to the service for the sake of riding trains. Under such circumstances,
marginal revenues from such travellers could exceed marginal costs,
given that fixed costs were already allocated. But, if the fixed cost
facilities are being provided for a clientele concerned with travel
rather than transport, then it must be doubted whether the present
comprehensive pattern of long-distance "luxury" services is either
needed or desirable, and whether this particular segment of the market
could not be recognised for what it is and could not be otherwise better
served at lower cost and with greater efficiency. Special "cruise"
service could be planned to cover particularly scenic routes, make
stops at points of interest, and be marketed as a vacation. The
comprehensive, inter-connected national "service" of the type provided
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now would not be continued.
The "cruise" trains might well still fail to cover their fully allocated
costs, though the circumstances under which they would be operated
would present an opportunity for marked improvement over the financial
performance of the current service, and allow it to be budgetted
as a separately-identified item. Congress could then decide whether
this was justifiable.
That the business market is inevitably lost might be a reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the manner in which resources have been
allocated. With low capital investment for high-density short-distance
corridors in which rail could maximise its inherent advantage as a
transportation provider, and a service oriented (intentionally or not)
towards the occasional casual wanderer, rather than the regular
traveller in a hurry to make an appointment, it is hardly surprising
that the bottom has fallen out of the market for "serious" travel
by train.
Transportation benefits have been confused with "consumption" benefits
with the result that neither have been properly provided for. It may be
questionable whether further investment in "corridor" markets is
warrented. It may be debateable whether "cruise-train" vacations
should be subsidised at public expense. But, it cannot be doubted
that the existence of "consumption" externalities is not-adequate reason
of itself for retaining dmprehensive pattern of long-distance rail
passenger services of low "transportation" utility. Theory A4 is
rejected.
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T H E O R Y A5
Equity is a goal of any Federal program. It is not fair for rail
passenger service to be concentrated in just a few corridors, because
the whole nation is paying for it through Federal taxation.
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"You have the utility problem," declared L. Fletcher Prouty,. Senior
Director, AMTRAK Public Affairs. "The telephone company would like
to have all the telephones in the city and forget the farmers in the
outlying districts, and make more money. The railroads have to serve
the country as well as the city; that goes along with the concept if
franchise."
As Paul Molloy, Minority Counsel, House Commerce Committee, characterised
the situation, America has an "egalitarian system that says that
everybody is entitled to everything." Thus, as Ira Silverman, Director
of AMTRAK Marketing, said: "You have groups in regions such as the
South-West which we don't feel are as appropriate for inter-city
passenger service as say the North-East or the Upper Mid-West, and their
return is that they're being discriminated against."
According to Randy Mills, Legislative Aide and Press Secretary to
Repre-sentative Pat Williams (D, Montana), Montana residents saw AMTRAK's
desire to cut the former route through the south of the state as
explicable by the need for Northeast Corridor finance. As he said,
"Why should someone in Montana wish to fund AMTRAK to compete with
Eastern over a very small, specific, route section, when there's no
benefit to them altogether?"
John Ingram, Federal Representative, California Department of Transport-
ation, felt that his agency's support for the "Superliner" car
acquisition was justified because "we will get some equipment, some
money from AMTRAK west of the Mississippi. It's about time. The people
of California are getting tired of subsidising train service in the
Northeast Corridor."
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Another Californian view of the problem saw the picture quite differently,
though also through an equity filter. As Barbara Beatty, Legislative
Assistant to Representative Rousselot (R, California) put it: "The
Congressman would feels he would like AMTRAK to be self-sufficient and
have fares so that the riders would carry the expenses of the rail and
that the person who for some reason can't have ridership there wouldn't
have to be taxed to pay for the other person."
"I think it's questionable from the matter of equity if we are going to
use public funds to create a super railroad so a bunch of rich businessmen
can ride trains at 170 mph," said Ross Capon, Executive Director,
National Association of Railroad Passengers. And, "no matter how
economically efficient the corridors that are subsidised are, there are
some states that are putting in money and getting nothing," cautioned
the pragmatic John Lussi, Director, Rail Planning and Marketing Bureau,
New York State Department of Transportation.
Mr. Y. of the F.R.A. complained that members of the AMTRAK Board had
argued to DOT that "a state ought not to have to subsidise a train
until it's had its first one provided at national expense." But, said
AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer, Tim Gillespie: "You want to try
to serve as many of the taxpaying people as possible; it becomes very
difficult to justify everybody paying a portion of their tax-dollar
when they're not getting anything from it."
And, Congress found the cuts recommended by the Secretary of Transportation
in DOT's 1979 restructuring report to be unacceptably heavy. They then
proceded to restore proposed cuts according to a "Regional Balance
Amendment" introduced by Representative Duncan (D, Oregon)
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(included in Sec. 119, US Congress, 1979d - see APPENDIX E). This
divided the country in four, then required one train to be added back
from the proposed cuts to each quadrant. While such an arbitrary
system of allocation could not be justified on efficiency grounds,
it could be seen to accord with Mr. Molloy's definition of "egalitarian."
Theory A5 is a difficult one to evaluate because judgement cannot be
meaningfully made on the basis of quantitative data analysis. It is
different from the earlier Theories examined, all of which promote the
maximisation of some benefit; Theory A5 contends that equity demands
the distribution of some benefits to all States, even if this is not
the most efficient arrangement on an aggregate basis.
William Druhan, Secretary, National Conference of State Rail Officials,
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (1980) writes
that:
AMTRAK was designed as a national railroad system. To date
"national" has been interpreted to mean a connecting system
from coast to coast and border to border with as many areas
served as possible. A growing faction, however, believe that
"national" should be defined to mean merely that it is the
only system going.
The first view is consistent with the idea of franchise: that in return
for the grant of monopolistic powers, less lucrative but socially
deserving markets must be served. The second view is one rooted in
the concept of efficiency.
If followed through logically, however, the two positions may not be
found to be as immutably mutually exclusive as they might appear at
first sight. Impositions on the beneficiary of franchise rights imply
that there is an interest which should be served which would otherwise
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lose out, and which the holder must therefore be obliged to provide for.
In transportation, though, this can only make sense when not only is
the service in question the only one available, but also when it
constitutes the best alternative which might be available, bearing in
mind relative costs and benefits.
But, although AMTRAK may have been traditionally viewed as an edifice
unique, and separately from consideration of other modes, it is rarely
the only transport available, and should be considered in the context
of the total transportation system.
One Congressional view dissenting from the "franchise" idea was that
of Joseph LaSala, Legislative Assistant to Representative Hagedorn
(IR, Minnesota); he did not think it was necessary for all States
to have rail passenger service: "It's important that all States and
all the people have viable transportation available to them," he said.
It is possible that some areas might be better served by other modes
than AMTRAK, and that funds currently committed to rail service would
produce better results for such regions if accordingly re-allocated.
A rural area might, therefore, derive greater benefits from a well-
developed bus system than from an erratic daily long-distance train.
The concept of "fairness" that implies that each area must have equal
rail could then lead to unequal results in that the relative
attractiveness of rail, and of the various types of rail passenger
service, is not uniform across the country. The imposition of an
efficiency constraint thus does not harm the "fairness" argument
provided it allows of re-allocation of resources in a way that enhances
transportation provision.
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If this is the case, then provision of corridor s-ervice for Mr. Capon's
"rich businessmen' is not necessarily inequitable at all. If rail is
the best form of transportation in dense corridors, but is less
appropriate elsewhere, then perhaps rail should be provided in the
former case, but something else in the latter.
During my interview with William Druhan, he threw the net even wider in
suggesting alternative action for Congress concerning rural areas:
"You give me a train; I'll give you farm support." Regional priorities
may vary, and fairness may imply according prime status to each region's
first concern, rather than equal concern to all concerns over all regions.
As will be discussed further in Theory B2, it is human nature that to
take something away which you already have seems more profoundly unfair
than to not give you something which you don't yet possess. A general
fault with studies is that they have not considered this. They have not
looked at the full range of possibilities. Some have concerned themselves
solely with cutting (eg. DOT). And corridor studies have been restricted
to consideration of traditional multi-car equipment operating in well-
populated areas.
There may, however, be a case for the introduction of low cost, low
density "railbus" service alongside the development of the more dense
corridors. Although the corridor exponents might argue that such service
would carry few passengers, and be little more than symbolic, it
is perhaps that symbolism that matters, and the fact that it could be
wNote that the railbus could be seen as preserving "rail" service. which.
symbolic value an ordinary bus could not have; it is therefore a. second-
-bestsolution-when. rail service-cannot be disontinued altogether because
of p.qo.ples.' (albeit illogical) interpretations of equity. See Theory B2.
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seen as doing something useful for a particular community could help no
end in rallying support. It would help satisfy the need for "fairness"
to be seen to be done, and would be a move towards "to each according
to his need" instead of the wasted prescription of the same medicine
for different diseases.
Fairness in the abstract might imply going even further and trading
off transportation needs against those in other sectors of each regional
economy. But, the short-distance railbus idea is a more practical
proposition for the less densely populated areas given the way in
which people see justice.
As Druhan (1980) concludes, very much in accord with these sentiments:
In short, rather than selecting a small number of specific
city-pairs to be eligible for federal financing and excluding
the rest of the nation, a program should be developed permitting
all areas some amount of assistance to overcome its needs to
transport people. Everyone must have an opportunity to get a
piece of the pie. It's the American way.
Adherence to the American way does not, however, require a dated and
inefficient long-distance system to be retained. There are better
choices available.
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I N T E R L U D E
Theories A recognise that AMTRAK exists to achieve something. That there
are goals which determine how it does its job. And that, on the basis
of these, following comprehensive evaluation, AMTRAK selects from
amongst the alternative strategies that one most likely to maximise
attainment of those goals.
This is, essentially, a presentation within the classic "rational actor"
model. As Allison (1971) describes it:
The rigorous model of rational action maintains that rational
choice consists of value-maximizing adaptation within the context
of a given payoff function, fixed alternatives, and consequences
that are known (in one of the senses corresponding to certainty,
risk, and uncertainty).
The concept of rationality is attractive because it implies that we know
what we want, can find the best way of achieving it, can then activate
our purpose-built machinery, and realise it. Rationality implies that
we can shape our destiny; it is a key assumption in human activity
because it gives us faith in organisations, and a feeling of control.
It minimises insecurity, shunts self-doubt into a siding.
It is therefore a reflex action to start any inquiry with a search for
evidence of the results of rational behavior. To set out the goals,
and show how they are being achieved. In this case, the search is in vain.
Goals were defined. They were stated in relation to the stated aims of
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 subsequent Congressional
discussion of it, and in relation to the functions which those
interviewed felt AMTRAK should serve. The extent to which these goals
were served by the AMTRAK system was then assessed. In each case the
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network was found to be unsuited to their satisfaction. Rail's current
optimal position in relation to the characteristics of other modes
was found to be in the "corridors" market. Should there be any role for
inter-city rail passenger service at all (and this was not proved),
this was where rail's inherent advantage could now be exploited, and
where it could logically be best integrated into the totality of
transportation systems. Long-distance services were not oriented to
social needs, but rather to nostalgia trippers who could be better
and more economically served by special "cruise trains" sold as a
vacation package, and making no pretence at providing transportation
services. Any potential for energy saving lay in corridor markets.
And equity was not maintained by providing regions with token services
which did not serve their requirements. There might be a case for railbus
service in low density areas to meet public expectations of equity.
Such service would also better serve social and energy goals.
In effect we have systems failure. This is the theme taken up in the
remainder of the Theories here presented. Each one attempts to tell the
"story" from a particular perspective.
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T HE OR IE S B
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T H E O R Y Bl
Members of Congress are not interested in achieving the most efficient
rail passenger transportation system for the US, whether in terms of
economic utility or with respect to availability and appropriateness of
other modes. Due to weak party organisation and identity, they feel very
much on their own and are interested, rather, in pleasing their
constituents in order to be re-elected. Members therefore lobby for
routes through their Districts.
Though individual actors, scholarly critics, and media
commentators typically stress a single priority or evaluative
scheme, the political system as a whole seems to strive for
inclusiveness and broad support rather than for theoretical
consistency or elegance. That is, it seeks to accommodate new
demands as they emerge by means, insofar as possible, that leave
previous settlements (programs and administrative arrangements)
undisturbed, that involve the least possible disruption for
private enterprises, and that involve the least possible
inconvenience and annoyance for individuals who have built
their life-styles around the expectation of system stabilty...
The political system- strives to maintain the security of its
key institutions and personnel as it responds to outside change
stimuli. Virtually all institutionalized systems exhibit
such security-oriented behavior in high degree. Systems vary
widely in the strategies that they utilize to pursue security,
however, and in the priority that they accord it relative to
other key objectives.
The American political system in this respect is something of
a paradox. On the one hand, its task is to manage an extra-
ordinarily dynamic society, which throws up a constant stream of
new demands and opportunities. Numerous officials in the system,
moreover, are highly attuned to the need for constant adaptation
in the face of changing conditions. On the other hand, the
organisation of the political system itself is such as to generate
an extreme orientation towards caution. The system is most
notably characterized by fragmentary authority, weak party
organization, and minimal ideological coherence. It affords
numerous opportunities for veto and/or delay during the life of
any bill and subsequently during the implementation of any policy.
With party organization rudimentary in most locales, with party
identification weak among the electorate, and with nomination by
direct primary rather than by the favor of party leaders, moreover,
individual elected officials feel highly vulnerable (even when
representing supposedly safe districts) and very much on their own.
- Altshuler (1979)
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Allison (1971) has developed a model of Governmental Pollitics (his
Model I) as an alternative to the Rational Actor. In this, players
act in terms of no set of consistent objectives, but rather
according to various conceptions of national, organizational,
and personal goals; players make government decisions not by
a single rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that
is politics... Each player pulld and hauls with the power at
his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception
of national, organizational, group, and personal interests...
"solutions" to strategic problems are not found by detached
analysts focusing coolly on the problem. Instead, deadlines
and events raise issues and force busy players to take stands...
Where you stand depends on where you sit.
Theory B1 focuses on the role of the political process in shaping
AMTRAK's perspective from one narrow perspective - that of the individual
Member of Congress at risk. The premise of this Theory, supported by
virtually every interview conducted for this study, was that given
weak party identity and organisation, Members are made to feel that they
have particular responsibilities to their Districts. They have to
satisfy them even when it is not in the greatest national interest, or
risk not being re-elected. Thus, while they may be able to pick up some
of the kudos resulting from the inauguration of new service, this will
only benefit them if the service benefits their District. Similarly,
voting for removal of service through their District could be seen as
treasonous, and a dangerous move politically.
Further, although the issue at hand may demand long-term consideration,
the interval between elections is short, and Members will see it to
their advantage to satisfy their constituents now, rather than to promise
long-term restructuring; by the time any such benefits arise, they may
have lost the election. As Coates (1979) points out: "There is no
constituency for the future."
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Thus, each Member pursues his own individual short-term interest. And,
as Taebel and Cornehls (1977) say: "responsibility for transportation
policy is so fragmented that any cohesive and integrated system is
difficult to attain."
In following his own interest, however, each Member knows that each
other Member is at similar risk to he and, especially when there is
little spelled-out Party orthodoxy and unity on the issue at hand,
will be cautious not to disturb their interests unnecessarily lest
they, in retaliation, disturb his. As Argyris and Sch8n (1978) see it,
individuals know what is wrong but don't want to discuss it for fear
of blame on either themselves or others. The problem therefore gets
camouflaged - hidden, disguised or denied. "The fact that counter-
productive activities exist and are not discussably means that people
are, in effect, in collusion to deceive the organization, and each other."
Under such circumstances, the status quo is often the safest position to
fight for. And, as Bachrach and Baratz (1962) attest:
While advocates of change must win at all stages of the political
process - issue recognition, decision and implementation of
policy - the defenders of existing policy must win at only one
stage in the process. It is difficult.to avoid the conclusion
that all political systems have an inherent "mobilization of
bias" and that this bias strongly favors those currently
defending the status quo.
"The resistance to change exhibited by social systems" has been termed
"dynamic conservatism" by Sch8n (1971); that is: "a tendency to fight
to remain the same."
Such change as may be examined will tend to be only incremental. "Only
those policies are included that deviate only slightly from the status
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quo." (Cobb and Elder, 1972).
As Sch8n continues:
Recognition of dynamic conservatism explodes the rational myth
of intervention pervasive in official rhetoric, which envisages
social change as a process made up of anaysis of objectives,
examination of alternatives, and selection of the most promising
routes to change. Quite apart from its questionable claims to
knowledge, the rational myth assumes implicitly that transformation
occurs in a vacuum rather than in the plenum of self-reinforcing
systems. Variants of the myth assume that rational plans will
implement themselves, or they leave the question of implementation
to a mysterious process of'sales, persuasion, or politics.
The following evidence shows how Members of Congress act to preserve
what they see as their own interests, and how, in the collective,
this results in a strong "dynamic conservatism" holding on to a basic
pattern of inter-connecting long-distance routes for AMTRAK.
According to Deborah Swartz, Special Assistant to the House sub-
committee on Transportation, "it's extremely difficult politically
to eliminate train service. There may be one passenger a day that
uses it, but it's very difficult. And every Congressman not only wants
a train in his District; he wants it to go through at 9 in the morning
and 5 in the evening." While she felt that "the majority of
Congress wanted to see the decisions on AMTRAK made on firm economic
grounds," she thought "that if there was no Congressional involvement
at all with AMTRAK, you'd probably end up with a more efficient route
structure."
Paul Molloy, Majority Counsel, House Commerce Committee, was one of many
others taking up this theme: "as long as you have Congress deciding
where the routes are going to be, you have to have a majority in the
Congress support whatever the proposal is. And the only way to get a
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majority is to cross a great number of states." And, confirmed William
Druhan, Secretary, National Conference of State Rail Officials,
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials: "There is no
incentive for a Member to vote for money that is not going to his
District... So, you Gerrymander your system to go through as many
Congressional Districts as possible." AMTEAK "look at it as running
a railroad, and Congress looks at it as pleasing a bunch of
constituents... There is a financial concept in AMTRAK that is not
available to Congress. He looks only to votes and pleasing a person."
As Representative Pease (D, Ohio) testified before the House sub-
Committee on Transportation and Commerce during the April, 1979 Hearings
on the DOT (1979) proposed AMTRAK route restructuring (US Congress,
979b)"
If you cut the AMTRAK route system by 43 percent, to a large
extent you are cutting support in Congress for AMTRAK by 43
percent. You will not have as many Members of Congress at your
heraing next year if you are trying to provide the money to
maintain the AMTRAK system or improve the rolling stock of
AMTRAK or the roadbed or anything else because, let's face it,
to a large extent the Members of Congress are more interested
in our own districts in our own States. And to the extent that
this system saves a relatively small amount of money by cutting
out service to a great many States and a great many Congressional
Districts, it undercuts the entire support in Congress in the
future of AMTRAK.
From a management perspective, Howard Henry, Director, AMTRAK Market
Planning and Forecasting, said the Congress: "will give you the best
they can without hurting anyone. They're not going to add service at
the same time they're cutting back service somewhere else." As Matthew
Scocozza, Senior Minority Counsel, Senate Commerce Committee, bemoaned:
"Unfortunately, AMTRAK service is considered a mark of political success,
and a Member may say I want that particular train to run .through my state."
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We have here, in essence, a very fragmented picture, of emphasis on
individual interests, rather than the "national" image envisioned under
Theory Al. As John Robbins, Legislative Assistant to Representative
Paul (R, Texas), said: "by patching together these various regional
interests, you wind up with what might be called a national system...
I don't think anybody sees it as an. integrated whole. I think everybody
sees it as just their part." Despite this pattern of individual
interests. though, the emphasis is not on developing particular services
to benefit respective regional systems, but to support a supposed
"national" system in order to maintain political support. Louis Rossi,
Director, Rail Planning and Marketing, New York State Department of
Transportation, summed the situation up thus: "there seems to be more
attention to having one train somewhere than a good service in any one
place."
In any normal subsidy situation, cash for capital is more accetpable
than money for operating deficits. As Ross Capon, Executive Director,
National Association of Railroad Passengers, pointed out though:
For AMTRAK it has been the other way round. When you cut operating
deficits you have an immediate outcry from the constituents who
will lose their train; the longer-term impact is that you're
providing lower quality service, but that it's spread out...
The problem is, the weakest routes are the most politically
potent; they wouldn't be there except for the politics.
This political bias towards operating subsidy is reinforced by the lack
of political gain to be had from capital investment. As Greisman (1980)
put it:
Without the added incentive of job-creation and secondary parts
orders from subcontractors, new railcar purchases are
unattractive propositions for Congressional budget-watchers. This
is increasingly so in view of the general balance of trade
sustained by the US in recent years. Since the majority of
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manufacturers are located in Europe and Japan, massive orders
for new equipment provide few spin-offs for US industry and
labor. The result has been a chronic equipment shortage and the
ordering of bad equipment since nothing else was "politically"
available.
Following this political argument through, we can see what happens
with the relatively small amount of budget apportioned to capital.
Referring to discussion over the Passenger Railway Rebuilding Act, 1980,
one Congressional staff member commented (on assurances of anonymity)
that decisions:
made certain that trains could be used in the national system.
There seems to be a great fear of buying trains that could only
be used in one spot, and staffers on the House and Senate
committee on that Bill specifically objected to any provision
which would allow cars purchased with that money not to be
available for national use.
There are many specific examples of politically-induced service. The
most recent spate fo.llowed the 1979 DOT restructuring plan which
recommended a 43 percent cutback in AMTRAK route mileage. The
restructuring process could be described as collectively-induced
dynamic conservatism spiced by individual power struggles of the powerful
or the opportunist. As ex-AMTRAK President, Paul Reistrup, said:
"Interesting in the restructuring to see where the new trains started
operating were in the States where the political power now rests."
There was a widespread belief that some of the weakest trains in the
system - those operating through West Virginia - had been preserved
due to the influence of Representative Staggers (D, West Virginia)
and Senator Byrd (D, West Virginia). Alan Ciamporcero, Legislative
Assistant to Representative Van Deerlin (D, California) asserted that:
"Mr. Staggers has always had trains without any people on them at all."
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Stuart Serkin, Legislative Assistant to Representative Stack (D, Florida)
bemoaned the loss of a Florida service which had been one of the best
according to the criteria used in the Congressional review of the
restructuring. "We had to lose so that they could have their less-used
trains," he said. "Really, the way it went was not so much that every
region got one as every Virginia or West Virginia Congressman got them."
An interesting example of power politics lies in the efforts of Represen-
tative Conte (R, Massachusetts), member of the Transportation sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, to have the Montrealer,
a train which passes through the west of his state during the middle of
the night en route from Washington to Montreal, retained. During Hearings
before the sub-committee in February, 1979 (US Congress, 1979a), this
train, which DOT had recommended be discontinued, was extensively
discussed. Mr. Conte had the following comment to make:
I'll tell you one thing. I don't like to offer any threats, but
I now sit as a ranking Republican on Appropriations. That means
I have a vote on every sub-committee, and I am going to look at
the Foreign Aid bill with a jaundiced eye this year. I don't care
how many calls I get from the Secretary of Treasury and the
President of the United States and everybody else saying, Mr.
Conte, we need you. If they can cut my Montrealer out, I can cut
a few little trains out in that Foreign Aid bill.
Ross Capon explained that:
In the case of the Pacific Northwest, the train through South
Idaho was weaker than the train through South Montana, yet it
was the Idaho train that was kept. The criteria that were used
were largely political. The Chairman of the House Appropriations
sub-committee on Transportation was Robert Duncan of Portland,
Oregon. He originally supported the Brock Adams plan to cut the
route structure by 43 percent which would have meant the loss of
both. However, his constituents were outraged at his position,
and he observed Mr. Brock Adams caving in to essentially Senator
Robert Bird of West Virginia, Senate Majority Leader, to keep The
Cardinal running.
When Duncan found out about that he was very angry because he
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knew The Cardinal on a statistical basis was even weaker than
South Idaho, so his position was: why should I take all this flak
from my constituents on principle when someone else in the country
is getting an even bigger favor in the sense -of that train being
weaker than mine is?
So, Robert Duncan flirted with the idea of the route freeze,
which we supported, and finally developed a "Regional Balance
Amendment" which provided that there were four quadrants in the
country, and that if any of these quadrants did not get a train
added back to Brock Adams' plan, that train would be added back
one train per quadrant under the regional balance provision...
Duncan observed that the statistics on South Montana were
stronger than his train, so he put a further provision in his
regional balance provision that a train was not eligible to be
added if a substantial proportion of its mileage was duplicated
by another route... Right through 1979, the political necessities
of the various Chairmen dominated the process. Staggers, of
course, is the reason why the Shenendoah was kept, which is
largely a commuter train, and largely empty west of Cumberland,
Maryland. Now, some people hate Birch Bayh of Indiana, because he
is the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations sub-committee on
Transportation {in fact, no longer, since he lost the election},
andhe allowed his National Limited to die without even putting
up a fight, even though the National Limited was stronger than many
of the trains that were kept. And,. I frankly have to say that he
showed a little more integrity than some of the others. It grates
on me to say that someone showed integrity by allowing a train to
be discontinued, but I think in the context in which he was
operating, based on the information which he had, his motives
were a little more respectable than Mr. Duncan's.
During the Hearings before the House sub-committee on Transportation
US Congress, 1979b), Representative Kogovsek (D, Colorado) compared the
proposed rerouting of Chicago - Los Angles service via Denver, Ogden,
and Las Vegas unfavorably to the current route of the Southwest Limited
"my pet train" which made three stops in Southern Colorado, which he
represented. Representative Santini (D, Nevada) had a chilling reply:
I would urge.my good friend from Colorado, however, not to
detract from that marvellous new addition to the AMTRAK system
that runs from Ogden through Las.Vegas, Nevada,- to Los Angeles,
because that is one of the enlightened aspects of the proposal
of the Department of Transportation... I am going to be
particularly sympathetic to the needs of snome of my *fiiends from
the rural Rocky Mountain West because I empathize most readily
with your problems.
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Perhaps the strangest result of the restructuring was the introduction
of Mr. Santini's new train, The Desert Wind. I had occasion to use this
service last year to travel from Salt Lake City to Las Vegas. The train
left Salt Lake City over an hour late, at 2.15 am, having- been held at
Ogden for the arrival of the San Francisco Zephyr from Chicago. This is
very much a traditional "inter-connecting" train, and it was clearly
intended that way. The DOT (1979) plan had called for the termination of
the Chicago - Los Angeles Southwest Limited, and had recommended that
the Ogden - Los Angeles service be started to enable through travel from
Chicago to Los Angeles (by way of the San Francisco Zephyr to Ogden) to
continue. In the end, said Howard Henry, "that proved politically
unpopular and operationally infeasible." But, said Ira Silverman,
Director of Marketing at AMTRAK: "The Southwest Limited was not dropped,
and this leg was still added in. The reason it wasn't dropped, even
though the reason for putting it in originally had disappeared, was
because of Senator Cannon {of Nevada), I'm sure." This was aided, said
Mr. Henry, by the fact that "the new service was in the DOT plan, so it
had a certain validity of its own," even though the rationale for its
being there had evaporated.
There is also evidence of distortion in the selection of potential
corridors for study, even though the corridors idea is based on the
notion of selection of the most economically viable proposition. I
asked William Druhan how the potential corridors were selected.
"Politically," he replied, "who's got the clout." And, Alan Ciamporcero
explained that Representative Van Deerlin (who represents San Diego)
"wanted money just for Southern California. The only way to get that was
to co-operate with a program of new emerging corridors all over the
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country; build a coalition." One Congressional staff member told me that
the Sacramento - San Jose corridor did not appear on the original list
sent to AMTRAK. "Then Mr. Matsui gets on Transportation and Commerce and
it appears. That's as political as you can get." Thus, although the study
is not being hindered by the de facto rights of previous non-viable
systems, implementation of such impedimentia already risks happening.
As Greisman (1980) said:
The trend towards "political trains" could keep AMTRAK going for
several years as a servant of pork barrel legislation and funding,
but as a viable system of nationwide transportation that is
responsive to social needs as opposed to political patronage, it
could fall far short of the mark.
Indeed it could. The evidence above suggests that there is strong reason
to support Theory B1 - that Congressional self-interest preserves a
system of far-flung inter-connecting long-distance trains which do not
serve the nation's needs. But this is best further tested in the context
of the other Theories here to be presented.
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T H E O R Y B2
Members of Congress have a large number of items on their agenda, and
cannot be well-informed about everything. They are only partially-
informed about AMTRAK, and that information which they do receive
not only represents a biased rather than random sample of the total
information field, bit is also subject to further cognitive
filtration. Public misconception fuels Congressional misconception
which leads to misguided action, the result of which is the preservation
of the basic long-distance inter-connecting system.
People like to watch trains but they don't like to ride them, so
AMTRAK is not providing a system of transportation but a form of
kinetic art.
- John P. Fishwick, President, Norfolk and Western Railway,
Trains, March, 1978
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Theory B2 is a theory of imperfect information and perception processes.
In Theory B1 I suggested that Members of Congress deliberately favor
their own Districts in requesting AMTRAK service, even though the
resources to be committed to providing that service might be more
appropriately allocated elsewhere, and even though such action might
distort the total efficiency of the AMTRAK system. The implication
behind this is that the Congressman is appraised of alternatives; he
has the necessary infomation with which to make a sound decision. But
he invariably favors his District to protect his personal security.
There is evidence to suggest, however, that Members of Congress arrive
at conclusions constructed on only a limited data base. Further, the
reception of that information may be selective because of the infor-
mation environment within which the Member finds himself, and infor-
mation, once received, may be filtered, either for ideological reasons,
or sub-consciously according to the pre-set conceptual frame into which
it is received for evaluation. I look first at how the public view the
matter because, as will be seen, an understanding of public perception
is essential to comprehension of how Members receive information.
T H E V I E W F R 0 M T H E G R A S S - U P - THE PUBLIC EYE
People get attached to all sorts of things they don't use any
longer... There's an attachment still in people's minds to
stagecoaches. Look how many Christmas cards will have them on
the front, yet they existed in that form for less than 15 years
and were so expensive that very few people would have had the
privilege of travelling in one.
- Dr. Beeching (in Mandrake, 1980) whose 1963 report led
to mass discontinuances of rail passenger services in
Britain.
The 1972 Louis Harris survey conducted for AMTRAK concluded that it was
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"patently apparent" from the results "that there is a powerful mandate
in the country for massive federal assistance to keep inter-city
passenger rail facilities afloat, and, more than that, to see that such
service is improved a great deal." In 1978, the Harris organisation found
that:
when Americans were asked to rate the importance of nine proposed
improvements in the nation's transportation system, improved
inter-city rail passenger travel finished behind only improved
auto safety and improved commuter mass transportation between
cities and suburbs as an important priority.
And, a study by Peter D. Hart Research Associates for DOT in the same
year reported:
We asked repondents, if it comes to a choice between having the
federal government no longer cover the AMTRAK deficit and ending
most AMTRAK passenger train service or continuing the present
situation, which alternative would they favor? We find that only
20% would opt to cut off federal financing and end most AMTRAK
service, while a majority (53%) would want to continue the present
situation. This is not a regional majority: it includes 50% or
more in each region of the country, and in cities, suburbs, small
towns, and rural areas. It includes majorities of almost every
demographic group, even among the retired - a group which because
of limited income often opposes public spending that might lead
to higher taxes - 48% favor continuing the present situation and
only 24% would allow most AMTRAK service to end.'.. Considering
the large number for whom termination of passenger train service
would make no difference, it is all the more striking that a
majority indicates a willingness to continue the present federal
subsidization of AMTRAK deficits.
Said Mr. Y. of the Federal Railroad Administration:
We spend a lot of time here wondering why it is that there is so
much public support for passenger service when so few people ride
it. The constituency for passenger service is in order of
magnitude larger than its users, and there clearly is some sort
of an irrational desire for passenger service. Mayors of towns,
newspapers, and people who will never use the train will campaign
for it... So people do have this desire for service they don't
use. And, it's seen by people as a matter of entitlement.
Clearly, inadequate information has a role to play in guiding public
opinion. Back in pre-AMTRAK days, an SRI (Brandes and Lazar 1966) study
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of rail passenger traffic in the West found that:
not only is the public generally uninformed about the true state
of passenger trains but there is a large amount of misinformation
current on the subject. The basic piece of misinformation that.the
railroads need to combat is the notion that rail passenger service
is cost competitive with other modes of intercity passenger
transportation. The data needed to prove the cost inferiority of
passenger trains as compared with airplanes or buses are easily
obtainable from public sources. Yet the public is generally
unaware of them.
Yet, the problem appears to be more than just information - it is a
combination of misinformation and love which, in the case of AMTRAK,
certainly blinds. As Brock Adams, then Secretary of Transportation
testified at Hearings before the House Transportation sub-committee in
April, 1979 (US Congress, 1979b):
We have public meetings and the public attending their meetings
still think that there is a downtown railway station, with trains
going to every place in the United States. They do not go down
to the train station. They are talking about riding the trains,
but a great many of the people in the community would just like to
have it there; they do not ride it.
Paul Reistrup, ex-President of AMTRAK, gave me a more explicitly
psychological explanation: "Well," he said, "there's an emotional tie
to the railroads that helped build this country. There's a guilt complex.
People feel that they ought to be using the trains, but they won't."
Other comments confirmed that there might be some plausibility in this
explanation. Tom Gillespie, AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer,
remarking on the widespread affinity for AMTRAK declared that there
was "a lot of interest in each community that a train runs through.
I think they view the loss of rail passenger service as a sign that the
community is dying; and that's why they're always trying to reverse that."
Paul McBride, Assistant Secretary with responsibility for railroads,
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Massachusetts State Executive Office of Transportation and Construction,
gave an example. "You have to provide for certain local pride, local
prestige accommodations," he said.
You've got to recognise the Boston - Chicago Lake Shore Limited
is a symbolic service, rather than a real one serving a large
market... I consider that one of those prestige trans-continental
trains as compared to the Northeast Corridor services... I think
it's prestigious for Massachusetts. Worcester people, and
Springfield people, and Pittsfield people. I think they like
having a train; I'm not sure they ever use it.
There is evidence to suggest that railway psychosis has a
conservative thrust. As Howard Henry, Director, AMTRAK Market
Planning and Forevasting, said: "the people won't appreciate the
add-on, but they're certainly going to remember what's been cut back."
And, according to Ross Capon, Executive Director, National Association
o f Railroad Passengers, "the image AMTRAK has in any given location is
almost completely a function of the type of service it is providing at
that location." In other words, AMTRAK will be demanded most vigorously
where it already is. I asked Mr. Y. whether this would be affected by
the degree to which alternatives were available. "That's not the issue,"
he replied. "It's an emotional issue. Rationality has no part in this
process."
For the majority of people outside the Northeast Corridor, the train
hardly exists; for those under 35-40, observed Peter Derrick, Director
of Policy Studies, New York State Legislative Commission on Critical
Transportation Choices, the train has not been important in their lives,
the car having had the most significant impact. For older people, the
train has passed out of their thoughts as a transportation mode, while
for the younger group it never was one. As a result, neither set demands
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new high-speed rail links because it is the archaic concept that is
imprinted on the psyche of the older group, and it is this same vision -
of a dated concept coupled with modern images of the car and the
'plane, that fail to stir adventurous rail ideas in the young. On the
other hand,. it is federal money coming into the locality, and there is
the general feeling that the train is a "good thing" (for energy or
the other reasons extolled over the media) which, together with the
fact that it is such an insignificant issue anyway, does not warrant
efforts to have spurious service eliminated.
The people most actively involved in promoting the cause of the train
are those in communities which already have service, and who define the
role of the train in terms of its historical position; and that in
somewhat nebulous terms. Gordy Peters, Chief for Rail Marketing, New
York State Department of Transportation, characterised the rail lobby
as having "a desire out of nostalgia to maintain the old." The warhorse
of the rail lobby is that National Association of Railroad Passengers
which, during its history, has emphasised preservation of the present
system, other service being regarded as highly desirable, but extra.
To judge from NARP's newsletter, one gets the impression that they are
fighting a Holy Way. "The Niagara Rainbow Lives," hails the September,
1978 issue. December, 1978 headlines: "0MB: Kill AMTRAK," and July,
1979 proclaims: "Full Trains Near Death." Emotion abounds to fuel public
support for AMTRAK. Neither has it been absent from the media.
Commented Greisman (1980):
Much of the press attention given passenger trains tends to deal
with long-haul expresses that are about to be cancelled after
years of service. When the Southern Crescent made its last run
in 1979, the print and electronic media provided extensive
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coverage of its glamorous past and dismal present. The mass
cancellation of thousands of short lines, commuter runs, and
local services since World War II typically receives little
notice.
An article published in the Washington Monthly by Phil Primack (1979),
a journalist from Billings, Montana (which was handed to me in Montana
Representative Pat Williams" office as illustrative of the way Montanans
felt) is a good example of this. It bitterly mourned the passing of the
"North Coast Hiawatha" thus:
The railroad station at Billings is old, clean, wooden and
deathly quiet, except when the long coal trains roll past along
Montana Avenue. We had a passenger train that used to come - .
through Billings on the run between Chicago and Seattle. They
called it the North Coast Hiawatha. It's dead now, been dead
since October - the victim of a head-on collision with a
thundering herd of numbers, statistics cooked up at AMTRAK
headquarters in Washington to justify killing off some trains...
The National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP) came up
with data showing that trains like the Hkawatha and the doomed
National Limited... were coming close to meeting even AMTRAK's
criteria. AMTRAK's own numbers - released only in slow dribbles
without the usual explanatory press releases - showed the
Hiawatha at 140 PM/TM and 7.9$ "avoidable loss" for fiscal 1978.
Primack quotes an ex-Hiawatha electrician thus:
I went to the platform in Billings and told people that just
about every toilet was frozen solid. They still got on - and
a lot of them were elderly people. Just imagine what our
ridership figures would have looked like with thawed toilets.
Emotion is a driving force of the rail lobby, and it is a force which
calls for conservation rather than change. If people in Montana will
ride trains with frozen toilets, then obviously there is a need for
rail passenger service in Montana. Isn't there? If we further add
the publics which tacitly support AMTRAK - through ignorance, nostalgia,
guilt or even, by default, through apathy, then a majority of the
population is for AMTRAK, for an AMTRAK based on what exists already,
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however, rather than on the form it might optimally take.
There is, of course, a problem here. Is it up to the lawmaker, or the
person whom he represents to establish that which is optimal? Although
current AMTRAK service offers little benefits to the people of low
population density Montana, when I asked Randy Mills, Legislative
Aide and Press Secretary to Representative Pat Willaims (D, Montana)
whether rail corridors would not be in the greater national interest
than long-distance service, he replied:
It depends on how you define the national interest. If the
national interest is the government deciding for the people
what is good for them rather than the people telling the
government what they desire, then you're correct. But, if
the national interest is meeting the demands of the people,
and believe me the people of Montana demanded this, long-
distance service is necessary.
Part of the democratic process involves making available to the
people information adequate to enable them to choose between
alternatives. Ira Silverman, Director of AMTRAK Marketing, told me
that "almost any local group's position is, oh, if we had the train,
there'd be lots of people riding it." Perhaps if peoples' perceptions
were brought up to date, their attitudes would alter. Perhaps if they
were made aware of the cold facts of AMTRAK utilisation in their area,
perhaps if they were made aware of the different advantages of the
various modes, and of which combination of modes and types of service
could best serve their needs, the hold on AMTRAK of low-density areas
would loosen. Perhaps then, romantic visions would also fade. If not,
perhaps it is up to the political system to disaggregate the nostalgia
from the transportation, and allow the public to choose within each,
recognising each for what it is, and providing for the public's desires
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accordingly. This is not what happens. The political system provides for
nostalgia as if it were a desire for transportation, thus confusing
the two roles and providing effectively for neither. It is not difficult
to see how this comes about if Members of Congress take their cue from
the public view as expressed above. We shall seehow thisand other
sources of (mis)information influence Members of Congress, below.
T H E V I E W F R 0 M T H E H I L L D 0 W N
Congressmen are not transportation professionals. AMTRAK is only one
of a large number of issues which they have to cope with on a day-to-day
basis, and they do not have time to be informed about everything.
There was no. shortage of material from interviews with Congressional
staff to suggest that they had only a partial, and sometimes misconceived
view of AMTRAK's role and performance.
We have already seen examples of misinformed beliefs. Beliefs that
rail passenger service was essential to a region's economy even if of
the "train cruise" type. Beliefs that a substantial share of the inter-
city passenger market was still carried by rail. Beliefs that rail
passenger service inevitably meant energy conservation. Beliefs that
rail passenger service could be profitable. Thus, John Robbins, Legis-
lative Assistant to Representative Paul (R, Texas) felt that: "if the
government were to get out of the way, if the labor unions were to be
treated equally under the law as every other party is treated, a private
could easily make a profit on rail {passenger} service." And Randy
Mills made this priceless remark when questioned on the rationale for
long-distance service through Montana:
They want high volume and low cost, and the only way you can
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have that is to have major inter-city transportation. You
can't stop at every point along the way and make a lot of money
becaus'e it costs money to stop the train. And the people who
want to get from Chicago to Seattle want to get there quickly.
At Hearings before the House Transportation sub-committee in April,
1979 (US Congress, 1979b), Representative Kogovsek (D, Colorado)
was concerned to:
re-emphasise the desperate need for AMTRAK service in southern
Colorado today. In addition to being the only major public
transportation system available to more than 2 million residents
of our region, AMTRAK is also a cost-effective and energy-saving
mode of transportation...
Lamar, La Junta and Trinidad are the three towns in my District
that will be left out in the cold. They have been served by
passenger railroads for more than 105 years. We shouldn't change
what has worked for a century unless it is proven economically
viable. And in this case it surely hasn't been.
In fact, all three towns are well-served by buses. There are five buses
daily from Lamar to Denver, four from Trinidad and La Junta. Trinidad
also has direct service to Santa Fe and Albuquerque, La Junta service
to Wichita, and Lamar service to Amarillo, Dallas and even Miami in
one direction, Salt Lake City, Portland and Seattle in the other.
The AMTRAK service through the region, the Southwest Limited, is of
the inter-regional type, complete with dining and sleeping facilities
and, as we have seen earlier, it is doubtful that such service makes
a contribution to energy conservation. Its cost-effectiveness is a
subjective matter but, given the nature of the train's luxury facilities,
it seems doubtful that much of the cost is in -fact effective in serving
Mr. Kogovsek's constituents.
As Mr. Y. told me:
I personally did over 100 Congressional briefings. The
misconceptions are just incredible, and the lack of will
to be educated in the subject is even worse. The National
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Limited was generating 1 person a day from Pittsburgh to Dayton,
and I'm sure the Representative from Dayton thought it was
generating hundreds. People think these trains are profitable.
There's no appreciation of the economics at all.
And, said L. Fletcher Prouty, Senior Director, AMTRAK Public Affairs:
Among the Members. of Congress are some very strong pro-
railroad people. The problem is that, as in any committee
action, there are very few specialists; they are generalists,
and I don't know any Member of Congress who is competent to
understand the technology of passenger railroading. As a
result, their decisions are the kind of decisions that would
tell us their feelings, but they are not equipped to tell
us precisely how they want it done.
As Rondinelli (1973) says: "Policy problems are complex, amorphous,
and difficult to define concisely." Further, there is usually an
awful lot of information to be had on them. The time-pressed Member
of Congress, unable to appraise all of it, must therefore have a
framework of analysis to efficiently keep up with what he feels he
needs to know. Yet, this framework, far from admitting a random sample
of information, will tend to be biased.
Comments Rondinelli:
Factual information, and statistics used to analyze policy
alternatives are subjectively interpreted through pre-
conceived specialised interests... Quantitative data are
rarely. interpreted by participants independently of their
role perception, subjective expectations, preconceived
interests, and ideological predisposition.
This will not necessarily be a conscious matter. According to Kramer
(1975):
We are often not aware of the ideological blinders that we
wear because of our presence in a particular culture at a
particular time and the particular training and experiences
we have had.
Sub-conscious filters may thus channel through only that information
which meets with such ideology.
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Steinbrunner (1974) explores these ideas in his Cybernetic model:
The ability to build stable, reliable perceptual images out of
varying stimulus patterns reveals that the mind is routinely
capable of powerful logical operations on inherently ambiguous
data... The operation of perceptual mechanisms is such as to
bring stored information to bear on incoming data in order to
build the stable, integrated, meaningful content of conscious
perception... Under complexity, cognitive inference mechanisms
tend to eliminate trade-offs from a belief system. In doing
so, of course, they prevent the analytic process from occurring.
The analytic paradigm pictures a decision process using (via
probabalistic calculations) whatever information is available
to build a model of critical environmental relationships. The
model is upgraded as experience accumulates. The cybernetic
paradigm, emphasising that decision makers seek to control
uncertainty, pictures a decision maker who makes no calculation
of outcome and -simply monitors certain information channels,
tying his behavior to what is received in those channels via
some decision rule.
In other words, the busy Congressman, unable to monitor everything,
depends on a reliable source which provides stable information upon
which to make a decision. The view received is further reinforced as
monitoring of that source continues, and other channels are ignored.
The results of empirical work by Kingdon (1973) provide insight into
how Members of Congress reach decisions on various issues. On the
subject of interest groups, he reports that:
Congressmen repeatedly said during the course of the interviews
~that, unless an interest group had some connection with their
constituencies, the group would have little or no influence on
their decisions. Said one, "It doesn't make any difference to me
unless it is from the district." Another said, "We get stuff in
here all the time from the Washington offices of organisations
and I often don't even read it. Another said his mail from the
national organizations "went right in the wastebasket." One
Congressman actually fished such a telegram out of the waste-
basket to show me,- but became very interested in it when I
pointed out who had signed.
Kingdon goes on to conclude that without a constituency base, interest
groups fail to get through to Congressmen. "Constituents coming to them
with petitions for redress of grievances are regareded as entirely
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legitimate, but national lobbyists are regarded as merely "pressing,""
he states.
In the case of MTRAK lobbying, the National Association of Railroad
Passengers has therefore set up an effective machine in providing a
wide constituency base. The organisation has a widespread membership,
and has been successful in urging its members to write to their
representatives. This is reinforced by the existence of regional rail
organisations, which also encourage letter-writing activity. The
result is that the Congressman receives a large volume of mail from
constituents in support of rail service. This helps explain why many
Congressional staff felt so strongly that constituents were "demanding"
rail passenger service.
At the same time that all this mail is arriving in support, there is
virtually none in opposition. The American Bus Association, an industry
organisation, does not have grass-roots support. They are restricted
to operating at the national level where, as Kingdon suggests, they will
be largely ineffective.
Further, as a result of the interest generated by the correspondence
of constituents, Congressmen are more likely to be receptive to
information from those national bodies that support the views of those
whom they represent, than to that from opponents of such positions.
Thus, once National Association of Railroad Passengers have written
in to their representatives, material received in support from the
national body, and especially if relating to the particular District
in question, will be received with interest. So, for example, the office
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of Montana Representative Williams was well-informed on the data
concerning AMTRAK service through that State, and of interpretations
favoring it. There was little conception, however, of how service
to that State related to that provided to the rest of the nation, or
of how important it was as compared to other demands for rail
passenger service.
Additionally, the opposing bus lobby has tended to issue only- general
systemwide information, rather than attempt to draw the attention of
particular Congressmen. And, while the National Taxpayers' Union has
opposed AMTRAK, it has opposed the general concept of AMTRAK; it
may have led its members to write to their representatives to request
general cuts; but rarely has this been aimed at the elimination of
particular trains. The contrast in significance between the specific
and the general is especially important.
This phenomenon is well illustrated by a statement of J. Anderson,
President, Federation of Masons of the World, testifying before the
Rail Service Planning Office Hearings of the ICC in 1978. "To see
Congress throwing away good money to support a national rail passenger
system when black Americans continue to suffer from poverty, unemployment,
high infant mortality and other health problems, poor education, and
deteriorating inner-city communities is unconscionable," he said.
But this is a general concept based picture, much more difficult to
identify with than a constituent's request for a specific train service.
Similarly, reports from the Congressional Budget Office, the General
Accounting Office, and elsewhere which attack AMTRAK only construct
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a general picture which, like material from the American Bus Association,
is less to be trusted and is more than outweighed by what the Member
sees as understandable, pin-pointable, legitimate desires of constituents
for benefits to his District.
In certain cases, ideological filtering according to a Member's own
beliefs may allow a general rule to dictate action but, usually in such
cases, the specific is absent. Right-wing Members of Congress may
reject the case for AMTRAK altogether if, for example, a guiding
principle is the opposition to government participation in what they
see as a private-sector activity. If they feel that the electorate is
strongly conservative, then they may be swayed against AMTRAK by general
requests for "cuts in waste" from constituents, even though such cuts
may be phrased as general philosophy, rather than aimed specifically
at AMTRAK. However, for the general to outweigh the particular, it will
need to have a strong, firm base of support in both the Congressman's
psyche, and in the-perceived desires of constituents. It will take
ten generalistic anti-waste pleas to outweigh one demand for the retention
of a particular daily cruise-train.
Often in such situations where the general does win through, there is
no rail service in the District in question; under such circumstances,
the Member of Congress may only have a "black box" idea of what AMTRAK
is about. He may see it as amatter of pouring more or less money in,
and getting more or less of a product called rail passenger service out,
without differentiating between the attributes of that service under
different conditions. The evidence of the interviews suggests that while
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Congressional supporters of AMTRAK tend to be at least appraised of the
service situation in their Districts, opponents are less well-informed
on any aspect of the problem. They tend to see their task as one of
reduction, and will therefore aim at cutting rather than reconfiguration
even if that re-assemblage might result in a more economically and
socially-efficient system.
Thus, both supporters and opponents in Congress serve, by their
actions, to maintain the status-quo. Supporters work on the assumption
that as AMTRAK is serving their constituents it must be good, and act
to have it retained as it is. Opponents aim at a general target, and
thus fail to dislodge the basic long-distance network..They don't know
any better.
Imperfect information, and the way in which such information is received
and processed, therefore does appear to act in favor of long-distance
routes. Unlike in Theory B1, in Theory B2 the Member of Congress is
assumed to be perfectly well-intentioned, but poorly-equipped
informationally and cognitively in performing his task. Lack of
awareness of "filtration" systems makes any idea of correction that
much more difficult to achieve.
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T H E O R I E S C
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T H E 0 R I E S Cl, C2, and C3 all suggest that AMTRAK is cramped by
its environment. It is doing as best it can, AMTRAK maintains, but
cannot win out against factors which lie outside its control.
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T H E O R Y Cl
AMTRAK lacks the equipment to operate corridor service. Available
equipment is most cost-effectively used on long-distance services.
For some organizations, nature imposes the chief limitation on
resources. People who, through a series of historical accidents,
find themselves on land so poor in water and minerals that
all their energies are absorbed in the daily struggle to
maintain biological life dare not spare hands for longer-range
projects. In order to live, they are compelled to go on as they
did in the past, although they could improve their lot if they
could find some slack in the system.
Herbert Kaufman (1971)
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AMTRAK did not start anew but, having inherited a legacy of neglect to
a changing environment, had to build upon the ashes of a fallen empire.
At the time AMTRAK took over, passenger operations were ina state of
disrepair. Increasingly a loss-making burden the private railroads had,
in the past two decades, done their utmost to shed responsibility for
providing them. They were not interested in heavy capital investment for
corridor services which would further disrupt profitable freight oper-
ations. And while Congress had, in 1965, provided for a program of
research, development and demonstrations of high-speed corridors, the
only progress made was in the Northeast Corridor between New York and
Washington. At the same time,: regulation acted only to restrict exit
from the system; it did not promote change. For these reasons, the
railroads did not adapt by refocusing their passenger operations towards
potentially more promising market types, and did not make the technolog-
ical advances which might have enabled them to do so. Rather, they conc-
entrated their attention on ridding themselves of their existing operation,
which did experience accelerating shrinkage, but not reconfiguration.
AMTRAK thus inherited dated equipment, and a dated concept. Given a
history of severe under-capitalisation throughout the Corporation's
history, the argument that sheer deficit of resources has directed the
pattern of AMTRAK operations merits consideration.
L. Fletcher Prouty, Senior Director, AMTRAK Public Affairs, is quite
direct about the service implication of equipment constraints. While he
agrees that it would have been logical to have started with corridor-type
services between centers of high population, he asserted that higher
utilisation could be obtained from the 1200 cars available by running
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them long-distance where "they're on the track for 24 hours." The 20 to
30 year old cars would not be suitable for corridor operations anyway.
The Shinkansen in Japan had 2336-cars, AMTRAK only 32 Metroliner vehicles,
Mr. Prouty pointed out: "That's why our system is running the way it is."
Later in the interview he stated that AMTRAK would like to make a profit
"but the means under which we operate preclude any profit because
maintaining antiques is too expensive."
Other AMTRAK staff echoed Mr. Prouty. Wilfred Leatherwood, Manager,
State and Local services, Government Affairs, for example, emphasised the
"burden of keeping older equipment running." AMTRAK lacked resources for
new cars; the need to refurbish old cars had diverted attention from
attempts to develop corridors in the beginning.
Ira Silverman, Director of Marketing, commented that:
the Northeast Corridor is the only investment supported by the
Federal Government as perhaps being justifuable... The problem
with the AMTRAK system is that other than the Northeast Corridor,
you have such a low proportion of business travellers that your
fares have ,to be relatively low. The fallacy is, there are very
few markets without substantiail investment that we can capture a
large number of business travellers. Anything over trip time 2i
hours - 150 miles. The problem is, there's been no willingness
to fund even getting up to 60 mph.
Some interviewees outside AMTRAK expressed like opinions. Said
Congressional staffer Mr. B: "It's a question of inheriting a system
that was run into the ground by the private railroads, and trying to do
the best you can in providing service while attempting to rebuild the
service." There are other perspectives, however, and this Theory is
best critiqued in the light of others, especially Theories C4 and C5.
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T H E O R Y C2
The railroads won't co-operate with AMTRAK, and take it with suffrance
as it is. Slow, long-distance schedules disrupt freight operations
less than short-distance, high-frequency, high-speed services.
Additionally, labor agreements make it more costly to operate short-
distance services, nullifying the advantages that might accrue to small
and lightweight self-propelled vehicles.
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AMTRAK does not own most of the track over which it operates, the major
exception being in the Northeast Corridor. Instead, it must contract
with private railroads to allow its equipment to run over their tracks
and, although service personnel are AMTRAK employees, train drivers and
conductors are employed by the railroads.
As a result, AMTRAK cannot act unilaterally to implement a plan; it has
to be accepted by the railroads concerned, and by the labor unions.
However near the ideal managements' proposals may be, they may have to
be adapted to conform to the desires of these two elements at the end
of the line of implementation.
AMTRAK management perceives the railroads as being obstructionist,
although opinion varies as to how justified this is. The railroads for
their part see AMTRAK service as a disruption to their money-making
activity: the provision of freight services.
The threat to the efficiency of freight operations varies, however,
according to the pattern of passenger service provided. One relatively
slow-moving train a day may cause few problems because in may ways it
has characteristics similar to the freight trains. Accelerating speeds
of passenger trains, however, has a drastic effect on reducing overall
track capacity, given that freight trains will continue to move slowly.
A multi-frequency, high-speed passenger service is, at heart,
incompatible with simultaneous freight operation.
As a result, the railroads have been particularly wary of allowing
corridor-type service to develop on their tracks, the condition of most
of which - without major capital improvements - would be wholly inadequate
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for such a venture in any case.
L. Fletcher Prouty, Senior Director, AMTRAK Public Affairs, said:
If they were selling Cadillacs with no tires for ten years,
you'd figure they were pretty sick in the head. But, to sell
trains with no tracks is exactly the same thing... 40 mph in a
corridor is no good. When you get up to 95 you begin to approach
door-to-door time for the airplane so that a train if it can move
to 115 can compete with aircraft - and put the automobile out of
business, at least to a degree. We have no capability to
increase speed on the track because the track is owned by others.
One example where there is a relatively fast right-of-way is on the Los
Angeles - San Diego corridor. But, the Southern Pacific Railroad,
owner of that route, has consistently opposed increases in frequency;
the litigation required to achieve it acts to worsen already poor
relations with the railroad, as well as to impede progress. As ex-
AMTRAK President, Paul Reistrup put it, because of this "there cannot
be quantum improvements that will make the corridor viable."
But, as William Gallagher, Senior Director, Route and Service Planning
at AMTRAK, said, "a multi-frequency service suitable for local
transportation would make freight service conform to AMTRAK provision."
And, Matthew Scocozza, Senior Counsel, House Commerce Committee, while
agreeing that the Los Angeles - San Diego service had been successful,
emphasised that this had been at the detriment of freight service:
"I find a great deal of problems in giving priority on a private rail
system to a passenger service which is really Federally-subsidised,
and it interferes with the operation of a private corporation," he said.
As Roy Neel, Legislative Assistant to Representative Gore (D, Tennessee),
put it:
At the root of the entire problem of passenger rail service in
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this country is the complete and unrestrained hostility of the
private railroads... and Congress, the ICC, and the Administration
has deferred to the private railroads... The only thing that
would allow AMTRAK to broaden its activities would be a more
favorable environment within the private railroads, and that's
not likely to ever happen.
But, while Tom Gillespie, AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer, would
like to see the government owning rights of way which, he felt, would
result in healthier operating conditions,. and the opportunity to reduce
Federal subsidy, Mr. Neel pointed out that there was a "very clear
reluctance to nationalise any more railroads."
In the awkward relations between AMTRAK and the railroads, can be
traced a basic principle of conservatism. The railroads on their part,
while largely stuck with existing AMTRAK service, can pose an effective
barrier to new service; AMTRAK, on the other hand, is constrained
from expanding by these barriers, and is discouraged from discontinuing
existing non-viable service because of the fear of losing the right to
reinstitute such service at a later date.
The whole problem is compounded by labor relations, over which AMTRAK
has only a limited influence. Firstly, the unions have been powerful
advocates of AMTRAK in Congress. Their support stems from a desire to
preotect members jobs and AMTRAK would be wary of risking the wrath of
a staunch supporter in moving towards rationalisation of the route
system. Such a shift might ultimately create more jobs, should new
service be successful, but the immediate impact would be one of job loss
as the system is dismembered, and this is something which would be
strongly resisted.
Secondly, AMTRAK has to negotiate labor agreements, with an operating
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workforce they inherited rather than picked, indirectly through the
unco-operative railroads who are unlikely to concern themselves with
the need for improving efficiency or effecting change. Gordy Peters,
Chief for Rail Marketing, New York State Department of Transportation,
explained that efforts had been made to eliminate a crew change between
Albany and New York: "AMTRAK had to approach Conrail to get the labor
agreements," he said.
And it's been lost for eighteen months. Nobody knows why we
haven't got a labor agreement on that yet... With so much of
their operation tied up in the operating railroads, they are
really perpetuating the status quo. Because the operating
railroads don't really care. They have been divested of
responsibility for operating passenger trains. The fact that
AMTRAK hasn't grasped some of these new concepts and tried to
apply them even on an experimental basis has been frustrated by
the institutional arrangements they have with the operating
railroads.
The General Accounting Office (1978b) commented that:
Unions usually require that two people be paid a full day's pay
to operate a locomotive for every 100 miles the train travels.
AMTRAK has demonstrated that a single engineer can operate high-
speed passenger service safely over considerable distances in the
Northeast Corridor, and bus companies use a single driver to
operate an express bus over the route from Detroit to Chicago,
a task at least as difficult as operating a train.. Yet, AMTRAK
pays a full days wages to at least four people just to operate
the locomotive on its 6-hour Detroit to Chicago train.
Such labor agreements constitute a major barrier to development of the
railbus concept, designed for two-man operation, but requiring a crew
of at least four under current agreements. If the actual employers, the
railroads, do not want the vehicle, they can block it by failing to
properly negotiate for appropriate manning levels. Thus labor and
railroads act together to bar technological and operational change.
Serious impediment though this is, however, it must be seen in the
context of AMTRAK's efforts (or lack thereof) to be innovative. See C4!
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T H E O R Y C3
Development of the route system has been beyond AMTRAK's control; under
the circumstances, AMTRAK has done the best it can.
They're told what to do. I think that left to their own devices,
and given the money, we could see some real good things out of
AMTRAK. They're some very top-notch people at AMTRAK going
completely crazy.
John Ingram, Federal Representative, California
Department of Transportation.
RICHMOND: Why did you leave AMTRAK?
REISTRUP: I didn't want to go there. Turned it down five times.
Did it as a public service. My I.Q. was getting too
high. I was just not that type of person. I'm more
inclined towards the freight business because it is
still private enterprise. You're dealing with private
enterprise exclusively. You see, that's what I really
enjoy. Much more satisfying; they're achieving. People
do what we suggest. Not just wasting time chattering.
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Since the original system was put in place by the Incorporators, there
has been only one major shift in the AMTRAK route structure, and that
was essentially a compromise between Congress and the Department of
Transportation.
As Tom Gillespie, AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer, told me: "to
eliminate one route you create such turmoil in the Congress that we
begin to realise that it's almost impossible to eliminate service no
matter how bad it is if you don't have political support." At the same
time, progress on Corridor development has been slow because "the
Congress has got to give us the direction to go, and I don't think
they're entirely convinced that the money is well-spent in this area yet."
Ira Silverman, Director of Marketing, stated as corporate goal
"maximising long-run revenues against costs," but this has acted in
the shadow of political control.
Any route that's been added has been forced on us by the
government; management has virtually -no discretion.
Of course, there is this Emerging Corridors legislation which
we've pushed quite heavily. I think it reflects the Company's
commitment to short-distance markets.
Within the management of the Corporation, 75 - 80 percent of the
decisions are made on a rational, economic basis, given the
constraint that we have to operate a certain route structure
and that we're committed to operating that wholesale structure,
and not develop one at the sacrifice of the other...
There would be more demand for us to run multiple frequencies
and shorter distances than longer distances... That's not the
mandate we have, to discontinue long-distance trains and operate
sub-markets within those.
AMTRAK was a pawn of its mandate, I suggested. "I'd say that's probably
right," answered Mr. Silverman. Howard Henry, Director, Market Planning
and Forecasting agreed, stating that any economic argument had to be
made by AMTRAK, and advanced "as far as it can against the wills of
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people that have more power than it does." However:
except when a cohesive issue arises, and usually initiated by
policy-makers on Capitol Hill, we don't talk of cutting back
on routes, chopping off pieces of route, or adding a frequency.
That's not one of the things we actually consider, because it's
not one of the things we'd have any power to change.
Many of the views given outside AMTRAK are well summed-up by the comment
of John Hoyt, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Devine (R, Ohio)
that: "as long as they're on the Federal dole, they have no choice."
Ross Capon, Executive Director, National Association of Railroad
Passengers, clearly felt that AMTRAK was doing as much as they could
to promote short-distance corridors, citing the 1979 restructuring in
which they "fought like hell" to have certain long-distance routes
discontinued.
AMTRAK, directed by Congress (US Congres.s, 1975) did set up discontinuance
criteria (NRPC, 1975, excerpted in APPENDIX G) based on economic, social
and environmental factors and, once they were approved by Congress, did
try to use them to discontinue The Floridian Chicago - Florida train, but
met with Congressional resistance. "So," said William Thornton, Manager,
Corporate Employment, "we were stuck with the Floridian. And we wasted
I don't know how many dollars in determining that it wasn't a viable
route. However, two years later, they took it off."
AMTRAK's 1977 - 81 5 Year Plan (NRPC, 1976), did suggest reducing train
mileage in low ridership areas and increasing operations in high ridership
areas. It also proposed a route study to be conducted jointly with DOT;
in the event, however, Congress directed DOT to carry out the route study
alone (resulting in DOT, 1979).
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Further, in reply to GAO's analysis of the 5 Year Plan (GAO, 1978a),
AMTRAK stated:
In recommending to the Congress that the AMTRAK route structure
be re-examined from a zero base, the Corporation believed that
the Corridors offer the most planning relative market potential.
We feel certain the independent DOT route structure study
directed by the Congress will bear this out... {in fact, it
did not}.
We have expressed our views to the Secretary of Transportation,
ie.. that intercity and commuter rail over the longer term
from a national perspective will have to be integrated as a
service and expanded to provide the American people a way to
reach their jobs, to reach their communities, families and
leisure-time travel needs - and especially in corridors where the
ridership densities can be attained which maximize the energy
and environmental advantages of the rail mode.
However, as William Druhan, Secretary, National Conference of State
Rail Officials, American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials pointed out, AMTRAK "don't make the basic overall
philosophical managerial decisions such as the extent of service and
so on... They should, because it should be market-oriented and not
politically-oriented." And, as Mr. Y. of the Federal Railroad
Administration put it: "AMTRAK right now is completely a servant of
the Congress. And, if you ever want to see AMTRAK change, that
will have to change. Congress has to put AMTRAK at arm's length."
We do therefore have some convincing evidence to suggest that AMTRAK
is indeed a pawn. Each of Theories Cl, C2 and C3 have assumed that
AMTRAK is at heart anieconomically-based maximiser, and we have seen
some evidence which suggests that it is striving as best it can against
the political obstacles in its path. There are other interpretations of
AMTRAK managegement behavior, and its relation to the environment, as
will become apparent below.
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T H E O R Y C4
AMTRAK has as goal survival, and the subservient objective to this,
growth. In order to best survive, it is in its interest to have the
support of as many Members of Congress as possible. This can best
be attained by providing service to as many of their Districts as
possible, and this implies a national system.
Provided this is done, efficiency is tangential. Political analysis
must take precedence over economic analysis.
We can't tell the government what to di until we know
ourselves... We've got people who don't understand rail-
roading, but they're very, very good at some things. The
problem is that the jobs we ask of our VPs and of our Board
of Directors who don't know a damn thing about railroads is
not what an ordinary corporation would expect of its people.
We've got members of the Board, magnificent people, but they
don't have the slightest idea of how to run a railroad...
and the few that do, because they come from the railroads,
are anti-AMTRAK.
AMTRAK employee during interview session.
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So far we have (at least implicitly) assumed that AMTRAK has been some
sort of maximiser. A maximiser of profits? Maybe not; more broadly
speaking it might be seen as a loss minimizer or possibly as a maximiser
of social utility subject to a loss minimisation constraint.
Theory C4, however, suggests that AMTRAK does have some discretion,
but rather than choosing to maximise anything in an output sense, it
prefers to keep as many people as possible happy in order to best stand
a chance of survival. Concentration is therefore focused on attending
to organisational security requirements at the expense of production
efficiency.
As Allison (1971) says in outlining his organisational model (Model II),
The operational goals of an organization are seldom revealed by
formal mandates. Rather, each organization's operational goals
emerge as a set of constraints defining acceptable performance.
Central among these constraints is organizational health, defined
usually in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated. The
set of constraints emerges from a mix of the expectations and
demands of other organizations in the government, statutory
authority, demands from citizens and special interest groups,
and bargaining within the organization.
And, according to Wilson (1973): "executives seek chiefly to minimize
organizational strain... They seek to avoid or escape situations in
which there is a serious discrepancy between the tasks to be performed
and the incentives available to induce that performance."
Whereas in Theory Bi, Members of Congress are seen as trying to
establish rail service for their Districts for political reasons, Theory
C4 suggests the opposite: that AMTRAK tries to run trains through as
many Congressional Districts as possible for security reasons.
As Kaufman (1971) points out, "the psychic risks of pressing for change
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are substantial." If change is attempted, "the proponents are likely
to be belaboured from all sides - often by people who never thought
about the issue before." Making a mistake may lead to negative sanctions,
while success may not lead to reward (Coates, 1979). Given Congressional
control over AMTRAK funding, it is easy to see how AMTRAK could regard
it as being desirable from a risk-minimisation stance to please as
many Members of Congress as possible, and safer to do this by focusing
on the political needs of particular Congressmen, rather than by trying
to win over the body as a corps through changes based on economic and
social arguments. There is nothing to be gained from innovation, and
much to be lost.
Said L. Fletcher Prouty, Senior Director, AMTRAK Public Affairs:
We figured that the basic goal of a corporation was existence,
and the second was profit. Our business at present is to keep.
rail passenger service in existence, and that's very nebulous...
We're trying to keep alive a very unusual business that was
absolutely dead when we took it over... You really have to have
service in as many places as you possibly can in order to
continue to exist.
And, commented Wilfred Leatherwood, Manager, State and Local Services,
AMTRAK Government Affairs:
Some Representatives have a little more clout than others, not
because of tne population necessarily, because of individuals.
Their territories may be less than desirable, but politically
expedient. It's important to consider the support that we must
give certain powers on the Hill. We have to know which side our
bread is buttered on.
William Gallagher, Senior Director, Route and Service Planning admitted
that "obviously we run some inefficient trains only because some Members
of Congress hold certain Chairmanships." Bruce Horowitz, also of Planning,
declared that "running short-distance trains will provide more opposition
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than support," and Howard Henry Director Market Planning and Forecasting
warned that were AMTRAK to advance a reconstructionist view "to the
point of making a public fight over it, we could cut our own throat."
If we look at AMTRAK's planning base, it appears to be poor. As early as
1972, the Michaels Report had called for "sophisticated analysis and
adequate data" to "make effective use of equipment, to plan more efficient
operating policies and procedures, and to analyze potential markets."
It recommended that "AMTRAK establish and allocate sufficient funds to
staff and support such a program on a continuing basis." By 1975,
however, such a program was not in operation. The 1977 - 81 5 Year Plan
(NRPC, 1976) nonetheless had the same objective in mind, and laid
particular emphasis on short-distance market research. It stressed the
importance of determining "the dimensions of the actual intercity travel
market" even though large resident populations might "suggest a probable
origin or destination for travel."
The relevant travel market, which should not be so narrowly
defined as to exclude intermodal and multi-mode travel, should
then be evaluated to determine service aspects such as fare,
schedule, travel time, and.frequencies. Existing rail service on
the route should be critically evaluated to determine competitive
weaknesses, and identify desirable changes or supplements.
Connectivity with the AMTRAK national system is an important
consideration, as regional routes can help and be helped by the
major routes. However, the specific requirements of the local or
regional market must be fully reflected in service plans if
corridor development is to be successful...
It is imperative to AMTRAK management to have the best
understanding of the market dynamics for each route situation
and in context with a systems perspective. GeneraL research,
beyond but including route research, will be needed to measure
the specific effectiveness of marketing programs including
advertising, promotion, and service. Also, new research must be
directed toward the identification of available new business
and the specification of policies to cost-effectively realise
the potential of new markets.
Brave words. But, in practice, wasted breath.
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Paul Reistrup, ex-President of AMTRAK told me that:
Trying to get people with the qualifications is tough in this
type of situation; it's not the place someone with a real
corporate role in mind is going to end up. It's dead end. You
don't see any railroad grabbing anybody from there, or any
transportation company... There's a lot of good railroad
people... Very difficult to get them. Some of them wouldn't
even talk to me... There's a feeling that the Government
doesn't wanc AMTRAK to exist. People are taking a great risk
to go there. You're throwing your career, your livelihood,
your family on the line.
Such analytic activity as does exist is primitive and in line with a
negative and cautious attitude of "there's nothing we can do," an
attitude that seems destined to ensure that nothing will ever get
done. The AMTRAK Route Forecasting Model (reprinted in Hilton, 1980)
is bizarrely inadequate (it is examined in APPENDIX C). But, as Bruce
Horowitz said:
Moderately sophisticated predictive demand models... play a
role in optimum procing. Not much role at all in route
selection... As long as we have no discontinuance authority,
it doesn't have much value. AMTRAK provides a role as contract
provider to Congress. It's not proper for us to be doing the
policy.
Ross Capon, Executive Director, National Association of Railroad Passengers
pointed out that "the good people who do the research are not in
abundance, and they have to do studies at the request of the states
that are interested in starting up 403b service." But, it is questionable
whether AMTRAK has lacked the resources to do such work, or has mis-
directed them. It has one of the largest Government Affairs departments
of any US corporation and, according to Baldwin (1979), has a
cumbersome and top-heavy management structure.
Further, the General Accounting Office (1978c) claimed that such power
as they did have at the time had not been used well. "AMTRAK has the
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authority to add or discontinue routes using Congressionally approved
procedures that consider economic, social, and environmental factors;
however, it has not used these procedures effectively to discontinue its
most unprofitable routes." AMTRAK's criteria for deciding route changes
had "taken too long to implement" and,
It has been reluctant to discontinue unprofitable routes...
Although AMTRAK developed and applied economic performance
standards to identify its worst performing routes for more,--
detailed study, those standards have not been used effectively
as criteria that a route must meet in order to be operated.
According to AMTRAK, a decision to discontinue a route is
based on substantial exercise of judgement. Under that approach,
a route can be a bad performer in all aspects but still be
continued if AMTRAK has adequate funding. This explains, in part,
why AMTRAK's application of the route procedures has not been
effective. Since the standards have not been used effectively
for discontinuing routes, AMTRAK has requested funding to
continue operating all routes in the system. Another example
of their ineffectiveness is the time required to implement
the procedures, as demonstrated by AMTRAK's 22-month study
of the Floridian.
Further, Charles Hilty, Administrative Assistant to Representative
Madigan (R, Illinois), felt that an analysis to examine the possibilites
for realignment towards shorter-distance service "would be very
relevant and they have not done enough of it" because of "lack of
initiative and political considerations." And Gordy Peters, Chief for
Rail Marketing, New York State Department of Transportation, criticised
AMTRAK for not trying to take the lead, and for failing to study its
own future. The recent F.R.A./AMTRAK (1980) corridors studt had been
mandated by Congress rather than inspired by AMTRAK "and AMTRAK
management is not managing as well as management from the outside as
far as I'm concerned."
Short-distance service that has developed since AMTRAK's inception has
been closely associated with State efforts, rather than the result of
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AMTRAK initiative. The prime example of this is the successful Los
Angeles - San Diego service, heavily subsidised and encouraged by the
State of California. The best short-distance equipment AMTRAK has -
the "Turboliners" is largely associated with State-subsidised programs.
And the only "railbus" type service, using Budd SPV 2000 units, is
operated by AMTRAK between New Haven and Springfield using cars
purchased by the State of Connecticut.
Back in 1972, the Michaels Report recommended that:
Given the low loadings on many AMTRAK routes, particularly the
shorter-haul routes, alternative equipment should be considered,
especially the rail diesel car. On many routes the average loads
are of the order of one or two cars per train and, at this
level of traffic, the savings from such a substitution would be
very substantial.
But, by 1979, the Senate Commerce Committee (US Congress, 1979c) still
had reason to be "concerned that AMTRAK has not adequately explored
the potential that presently available innovative rail technology offers
such as the recently developed self-propelled diesel railcar capacle
of intercity rail service."
Howard Henry commented on the difficulties of providing low-density
regional services when "our own level of service is 80 or 160 seats,
whereas the buses can provide the capacity in 40 passenger increments,"
and this seemed to be accepted as fact, rather than the start of s
search for a solution.
Mr. Y. of the Federal Railroad Administration tells of the following
episode:
AMTRAK were asked to look at the possibility of using the railbus
as a feeder. I jokingly said to one of the AMTRAK representatives,
"have you got your complete list of why this wouldn't work?" And,
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he didn't say anything, but when I arrived at the car, they
had four pages. They had sat up all night with officials of
the Norfolk & Western and developed a four page list of why
this prospect would not work.
In many other quarters, there was also clearly an air of mistrust and
frustration at AMTRAK management behavior. As Randy Mills, Press
Secretary and Legislative Aide to Representative Pat Williams (D,
Montana) told me: "you can never get a straight answer from them, and
you can never talk to the person who really knows what's going on."
And, it was widely felt that AMTRAK's concern with politics distracted
it from properly carrying out its job. Gordy Peters complained that
AMTRAK could not supply data on the effect discount fares were having
on individual markets: "the tools are there; they're just not using
them." He accused AMTRAK of "masking" the fact that "energy efficiencies
only lie in the short-distance services" because:
AMTRAK is out to perpetuate AMTRAK. What we're talking about is
the possibility of some regional compacts which would just blow
AMTRAK off the map. So, they're out to perpetuate this national
thing which keeps them in business - National Railroad Passenger
Corporation... I'd say their primary goal is survival.
Louis Rossi, Director, Rail Division, New York State Department of
Transportation felt similarly:
I really don't think they.know how to cost their services. They
gave us that first breakdown of the estimate of the Adirondack
subsidy five days after the point at which we would legally have
signed the contract; they could not provide us with an estimate.
Once we got the estimate, we challenged at least six of the cost
components and the reaction was, now we're breaking off negot-
iations... I think the record is one of unwillingness to deal
with the technical facts, which is true because they are a.
political organisation.
Mr. A., Staff Assistant to the House Appropriations Committee was yet
more violent: "any agency that gets 68% of its dough from the Federal
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till is a Federal agency, a Federal bureaucracy," he said:
They don't get littler; they get bigger. They protect what
they have. There's no incentive for innovation when there's
no reward for innovation... AMTRAK needs political muscle,
so it doesn't cut back...
AMTRAK is more interested in political services than they
ever were in economic sense. Most political interference is
invited by AMTRAK. It's easier to testify before a committee
and get millions of dollars than to go out to the market
place and get customers' money. As long as Congress happens,
AMTRAK will follow the line of least resistance to money...
There is no question that AMTRAK is going to take care of
those who hold the purse strings. The Senate was eager to go
along with route cutting. But, AMTRAK took care of the principal
player in the Senate by giving him the only new train added
to the system. They took care of Harley Staggers on our side,
and of Senator Byrd, the Majority leader, on the other side.
AMTRAK had not made efforts to defend logical development of rail
service, but had taken advantage of the political system to remain as
secure as possible. Thus, "when a powerful Member of Congress goes to
AMTRAK and says "I have your budget by the balls,"" AMTRAK goes along
with him:
They came up with all sorts of bizarre reasons to run those two
trains-through West Virginia and go along with this crazy idea
of continuing to run The Pioneer for Congressman Duncan and
Senator Church. Senator Church early on became one of the
proponents to freeze the system in place...
Politics is the name of the game. Economic analysis is tangential,
it's supplementary, it's academic. He who has the gold rules...
Rather than wasting resources all over the country, AMTRAK
should have said, let's find a corridor where the right of way
is decent, and let's take some equipment, and let's run a well-
disciplined, well-run service that's geared towards the market,
and let's see if it succeeds. But, AMTRAK has frittered away all
its money on its national system. I think it would have been well
served by corridors.
Matthew Scocozza, Senior Minority Counsel, Senate Commerce Committee,
said:
I have a great deal of problem with AMTRAK at times playing the
political game up here... I don't really think that if AMTRAK
was-more responsive to the attitudes of Congress in terms of
what its role should be, I think everybody would be a lot happier.
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But, unfortunately the two never meet... There is no co-operative
idea of getting rid of AMTRAK service where it wasn't viable. You
know, I'd love to see an Emerging Corridor in terms of getting
rid of a corresponding amount of dogs on the AMTRAK system, but
that was never the thing and what I see here, and what AMTRAK saw
and NARP saw was a complement, not necessarily a substitute. Now,
the House envisions this as we're doing everybody a favor because
we're moving to a Corridor-type operation as opposed to a national
system. But, an old dog like I am, who'se been around for five-years
of AMTRAK battles knows that we're not talking about a substitute;
we're talking about a complement. Their {AMTRAK's} commitment is to
railroad passenger service, and they would just think, it's just
even more people they reach.
There is therefore not a little evidence to suggest that AMTRAK has
primarily concerned itself with surviving, rather than with analysing
and improving the product it produces. However, while it does not appear
to have done all it might to resist political distortion, AMTRAK's
actions cannot be divorced from the environment within which it has had
to operate, one not conducuve to innovation, risk taking, change.
Charles Swinburn, Deputy Assitant Secretary for Policy, US Department
of Tranportation felt that AMTRAK management did :
a reasonably good job, given the constraints they operate under,
and the political pressures on their day-to-day operation. But,
unfortunately, no matter how good a management they are, there
is the overwhelming presence of up to $1 billion in Federal money
waiting there each year, and that's bound to diminish some efficiencies.
So, without being critical of the particular management, the
system is not structured to be a for-profit system.
This view will be taken up further under Theory Dl.
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T H E O R Y C4b
The Thoery C4 goal - survival - is pursued vigorously by only some
AMTRAK management, but reflects the organisational goal because,
through power relationships and group dynamics, the other management
have little choice but to tacitly acquiesce.
Madness is the exception in individuals, but the rule in groups.
- Nietzsche
-124-
There is a danger in regarding any organisation as a "black box," as
this may conceal subtle relationships within it which can be of use in
diagnosis and prescription for possible cure. Theory C4b is essentially
the same as Theory C4, except that here it is suggested that the net
effect of AMTRAK is to act in a protectionist, security-paranoid way.
This may be a reflection on which units within AMTRAK have control, and
how the various units are arranged and inter-related, rather than a
statement that everyone in AMTRAK behaves in that way.
Examination of management set-ups is revealing. A crucial factor is
differentiation of roles between departments, and their position in the
information processing/decision making conveyor belt. As AMTRAK
Congressional Affairs Officer Tom Gillespie told me: "Our operating
people tend to want to get the train from point A to point B on the
schedule that they think best. Our marketing people want to do it for
marketing reasons; this department would probably want to do it for
political reasons.
Operations is essentially given a service plan, and told to operate it.
John Baesch of AMTRAK Operations measures success in "turnstiles-
ridership growth." Ira Silverman, Director of Marketing, is very much
a Corporation man. Referring to AMTRAK often as "The Company," it was
clear what his objectives were: "In the marketing area, we try to put
the stress on services which have the best payout. Whether that's what
the company or DOT stresses is another question." Interestingly, Howard
Henry, Director, AMTRAK Market Planning and Forecasting, said that
AMTRAK's "internal goals don't recognise the non-economic, non-payable
needs of various communities around the country, and the only vehicle
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for funneling these goals, unless we develop some altruistic goals of
our own, the only vehicle than that is through Congress and the
Government." Thus, Operating strives to operate as efficiently as
possible the service they are ordered to produce, and Marketing strives
for most efficient service development.
The other side of the coin lies in Planning and Government Affairs.
While in Marketing on got the impression that they could, and would,
do better if granted greater freedom_-"new services which AMTRAK
management would designate... would clearly be short-distance corridor-
type services," said Mr. Silverman - there was an atmosphere of cautious
conservatism and self-preservation in Planning. Both William Gallagher
and Bruce Horowitz defended the continuance of the long-distance trains,
the purchase of the Superliners, and the need to keep a national system
open to provide for future transportation alternatives. Mr. Gallagher
did not feel that there was "evidence that AMTRAK, if unfetterd, would
serve the public any better." Mr. Horowitz stressed the revenue-
generating ability of long-distance trains (judged against short-distance
trains of similar frequency, not against corridors), and the problems of
serving isolated routes. He endorsed the validity of the "political
concept that a truly national system provide some benefits to each
region," and said that there were "mixed feelings in AMTRAK as to the
viability of corridors."
Finally, we have Government Affairs. As William Thornton, Manager,
Corporate Employment, told me, Government Affairs managers "must have
an extremely good background in government relations, a good knowledge
of the current Congress and the current Administration." I asked him
what they had to know about.running a railroad. "That's quite secondary
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to their ability to deal with the Government," he replied. As Tom
Gillespie said: "My experience is more in Government Affairs than it
is in running railroads." And, commented Louis Rossi, Director, Rail
Divison, New York State Department of Transportation: "I think you
may find internally in AMTRAK people who would say we ought to be
focusing on different corridors. But, thet're not a large number of
people... AMTRAK is essentially an agency that receives all its money
from Congress, and therefore it is in a sense a self-funding lobbying
agency."
But, the "lobbying agency" is concentrated in Government Affairs. They
are the people that give their allegiance to Congress, and do things
for Congressmen. They are the people that convinvce Congress to hand
over the dollars. And they are in a position to~send a message down to
the rest of the organisation as to what it must do in order to survive.
Government Affairs is organically linked to Planning, and the two lie
in contrast to Operating and Marketing. Government Affairs and Planning
essentially frame the scenario because together they work out the
politically expedient protocol. By the time this design reaches
Marketing, however efficient and innovative-minded they may be (and
there does appear to be somewhat of an "entrepreneurial" feel to the
department which I did not sense elsewhere), there is little they can
do because it is backed by power relationships (Government Affairs
backed by Planning and, having manipulated the political system, backed
by Congress) which it cannot resist. All it can do is perform its task
as efficiently as possible within the constraints facing it, and pass
the job down to Operating to do likewise.
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The effect of these power-relationships may be further reinforced by a
concept which Janis (1972) has termed "Groupthink":
A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action... A dominant characteristic
appears to be remaining loyal to the group by sticking with
the decisions to which the group has committed itself, even when
the policy is working badly and has unintended consequences that
disturb the conscience of the members. In a sense, members
consider loyalty to the group the highest form of morality.
That loyalty requires each member to avoid raising controversial
issues, questioning weak arguments, or calling a halt to
softheaded thinking.
Although it is somewhat speculative to suggest that "Groupthink" operates
in AMTRAK (there is more evidence from interviews to suggest the
importance of intra-organisational power), given that Government Affairs
and Planning are taking the lead, obtaining financial nutrition, and
steering AMTRAK down a path to survival, any attempted counter-action by
Marketing or Operations would seem not only inapptropriate, but also
disloyal. Especially given AMTRAK's highly unstable position, Marketing
and Operations are unlikely to be encouraged to challenge the tone-
setting position of Government Affairs and Planning. Insecurity will,
if anything, tend to breed togetherness.
Thus, organisational output tends towards the dominant mode suggested by
Theory C4, even if parts of the organisation would like to do differently.
If we are to bring about change, knowledge of any such differentiation
cannot but help tell us where to start.
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T H E O R Y C5
AMTRAK has inherited the philosophy and operating procedures of the old
railroads, and has perpetuated them.
What people call a corridor is not real railroad thinking. It's
a fact that you run your trains between your maintenance depots.
If it happens to be 300 miles, that's what you do.
- AMTRAK employee during interview session.
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Theory C4 put forward the notion that AMTRAK management primarily
concerned themselves with the preservation of the sanctity of their own
necks. Here, consideration is given to the possibility that, rather
than being willfully negligeant, due to faulty learning systems,
management had failed to advance beyond the operating procedures they
had inherited.
Sch8n (1971) comments that: "It -is- a negative but by no means entirely
inaccurate characterization of government agencies to say that they are
memorials to old problems." The Department of Agriculture thus continued
in existence past the solution of the problems of productivity it was
established to remedy. And, "The Small Business Administration is a
monument to Congressional nostalgia for the "little man who made it,"
even though his entrepreneurial role in American industry no longer
has the status or importance it once had."
Similarly, AMTRAK is a memorial to an old problem, the provision of a
comprehensive system of rail passenger services throughout the nation.
AMTRAK inherited not only a physical structure, but also a morasse of
operating procedures. AMTRAK was, in many ways, a continuation of what
had gone before. And, what had gone before included a recent period of
decline and lack of innovation or inspiration. Many railroad traditions
accumulated over past decades were bequeathed to AMTRAK; they would not
disappear overnight. Thus, if the standard wisdom required national
inter-connection, then the need for trains to meet and connect would
be reflected in routing and scheduling.
Given a starting point of of mostly long-distance, and none too healthy,
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routes, it was not surprising that this was seen as a foundation upon
which to build, rather than a dated monolith to be dismantled. The basis
of rail passenger operations had always been national trunk lines,
regional feeders joining at regional foci. Thus, no matter that the
emphasis of an efficient system had changed. The long decades of neglect
had left railway philosophy back in another age and the gap between the
is and the ought to be, and the dearth of experience save of what was,
helped mold what would happen: attempted improvement within an obsolete
design, rather than reshaping of the design itself. As Tom Gillespie,
AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer, said in explaining the lack of
corridor development: "Unfortunately, we don't have enough equipment
to run the service we're running now." The priority is on the now,
regardless of whether the now is good. Even L. Fletcher Prouty,
Senior Director of AMTRAK Public Affairs and staunch supporter of the
corridor concept, set his priorities for the deployment of new equipment
within this framework: "obviously, the first thing we would do is get
rid of our old cars." he said. "Then we would begin to get additional
cars that would go into frequency service."
There is a strong belief in some quarters at AMTRAK that major
improvements based on the current orthodoxy of operation could yield
substantial success, and there is a tendency for this to overshadow
'otentially greater success from a reconstitution of norms of operation.
Tom Gillespie thus felt that old equipment is unattractive to
passengers, and pointed to marked increases in patronage and decreases
in complaints resultant upon the introduction of new rolling stock.
Wilfred Leatherwood, Manager, State and Local Services, AMTRAK
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Government Affairs, concurred. The State of Ohio was planning 160 mph
rail service of their own but:
That's kind of speaking in a Star Wars type of setting. Our
biggest progress- this year has been because we have been able
to tighten our belts and run the system as we have been given
with better equipment. When we put on new service like the
Superliner service, or the refurbished conventional equipment,
our passenger complaints drop 85 percent."
Ohio had not subsidised 403b (ie, State-subsidised) AMTRAK service and
"we have had contacts with other people who want to be more realistic
about train service."
Mr-. A. Staff Assistant to the House Appropriations Committee took a
different perspective, blaming AMTRAK for continuously asking Congress
to fund refurbishment of a defunct concept, rather than the development
of a more relevant one: "AMTRAK would complain that they had 25 year-
old equipment, 50 year-old stations, and 150 year-old ticket clerks,"
and would aim at overall renewal and emulation of what had gone before,
rather than consolidation, rationalisation and development of growth
areas. And, Louis Rossi, Director, Rail Division, Nre York State
Department of Transportation agreed that:
There is a great emphasis within AMTRAK on the way it used to
be. I really think it gets down to the fact that in this instance
the Santa Fe was famous for running the "Super Chief" and the
"El Capitan" on certain schedules, and that's what AMTRAK's staff
is trying to mimic. And I use "mimic" because they can't
reproduce it, and no amount of resources can... The so-called
glamor trains day-by-day take their attention... and they will...
take the people who could do better at running corridor services,
and put them into why are our "Star Trains" running late?"
AMTRAK recently acquired luxury "Superliner" cars for operation on long-
distance services west of Chicago. These units consist of low-density
seating, sleeping accommodation, a buffet/lounge, restaurant car, dome
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cars and a baggage car.
Mr. Leatherwood justifies the purchase, saying:
It was one way to show that we were in good faith attempting to
serve the nation at large. I think it was probably an honorable
way to say well we would like in good faith to run clean,
comfortable, dependable and modern equipment across country,
and show what can be done.
Mr. Y. sees the Superliner purchase differently. Rather than choosing
to allocate resources from those which had been allocated to them:
They've taken the system as they found it, and preserved that.
And, they have not chosen, for example, to rid themselves of
some of the extremely high-cost long-distance service, and
concentrate on short-distance traffic.
AMTRAK had resisted Executive Branch efforts to encourage this:
"Probably the most outrageous example of that has been the institution-
alisation of long-distance trains by the purchase of the Superliners."
As William Druhan, Secretary, National Conference of State Rail
Officials, American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials explained: "The railroad industry in this country is plagued
with tradition, and the tradition was to run the long-distance train."
AMTRAK were:
Living under an anachronism that people wanted to go from New
York to California... It was based on the early days of
railroading when that was the only way to travel.
We're just now trying to getting into trying to push them with
the corridor concept; but, they don't really believe in it
because it's not old railroading. Their concept of modernising
railroads is to buy the new Pullman-type of equipment, the
Superliner, which is an absolute abortion; it's ill-conceived
and ill-designed. There's a basic concept of old-time rail-
roading, and the concept that the number 1 is the national
long-distance train.. With the long-distance trains, you're
going to need the Superliners. And that's what they thought
they were going to run; that's what they thought they had to buy.
Scrutiny of AMTRAK's present short-distance markets also leads to some
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interesting observations. The "Empire" service between New York and
Buffalo was established by the New York Central Railroad which had
reduced overnight services, and increased and speeded up daylight
service from New York to Albany and Buffalo with a view to capturing
business markets. Today, AMTRAK follows the pattern they established,
and New York - Albany is a thriving business market.
By comparison, although a consultant's study had found that a market
did exist west of Harrisburg and Buffalo on the Penn Central, but that
it was for short-distance daylight coach trains. "If Penn Central had
followed his advice" said Ross Capon, Executive Director, National
Association of Railroad Passengers, "what you would have across Ohio
and Indiana would be essentially what he recommended, because to such
a large extent AMTRAK is still a reflection of what was existing in 1971."
Argyris and Sch8n (1978) differentiate "single-loop learning" from
"double-loop learning." In the case of the former,
There is a single fee-dback loop which connects detected outcomes
of -actions. to organizationaLstrategies_ anl assumpt ions which
are modified so as to keep organizational performance within
the range set by organizational norms. The norms themselves -
for product quality, sales, or task performance - remain
unchanged...
Single-loop learning is suffucuent where error correction can
proceed by changing organizational strategies and assumptions
within a.constant framework of norms for performance. It is
conceived primarily with effectiveness - that is with how best
to keep organizational performance within the range specified by
existing norms. In some cases, however, error correction requires
an organizational learning system in which organizational norms
themselves are modified... There is in this sort of episode a
double feedback loop which connects the detection of error not
only to strategies and assumptions for effective performance but
to the very norms which define effective performance... We will
give the name "double-loop- learning" to those sorts of organ-
izational inquiry which resolve incompatible organizational
norms by setting new priorities and weightings of norms, or by
restructuring the norms themselves together with associated
strategies and assumptions.
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For organisational learning to occur, the material- in question "must
be embedded in organizational memory" and "encoded in the individual
images and the shared maps of organizational theory-in-use from which
individual members will subsequently act."
Thus, in the case of AMTRAK, the conception of the system as national,
long-distance, inter-connected, can be seen to have been embedded in
organisational memory as the framework on the basis of which tasks are
conceived. As a program dictates how a computer program performs a
particular operation, so this image of organizational role channels
activity within the organization, defines the job to be done, the,
questions to be asked. Thus, managers will try to improve on-time
performance, luxury, and service in general within the confines of the
encoded role of AMTRAK - a comprehensive, long-distance one.
To make the shift towards development of corridor services based on
regionalised markets, and away from the traditional role, demands a
different image; a different statement of norms and procedures is
needed, one which has eluded AMTRAK. AMTRAK learning has only been
single-loop learning. The double-loop learning necessary for it to
modify its encoded procedure base has not occurred; solutions sought
remain within an outdated frame, nothing more than a tired deus ex
machina.
Argyris and Sch8n"s explanation of failure to double-loop learn in terms
of the non-discussability of an issue has already been mentioned in the
context of Congressional action (see p. 74). In this context, however,
an alternative view, one which regards double-loop learning as
"revolutionary cognitive investment" is helpful. Allison (1971) regards
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"Standard Operating Procedures" as essential elements of organisational
repertoire. As he sees them, Standard Operating Procedures are grounded
in the "norms of the operation or the basic attitudes and operating
style of its members. The stronger the grounding, the more resistant
SOPs are to change." As we have seen, the traditional operating norms
for rail passenger service are exceptionally well embedded in AMTRAK.
Continues Allison: "Where situations cannot be constued as standard,
organizations engage in search. The style of search and its stopping
point'are largely determined by existing routines."
According to Steinbrunner (1974), when such search leads to apparent
success, this will reinforce the procedure's validity in the eyes of
the searcher:
If a decision maker attaches very general beliefs to the
information which he receives in the decision process,
intermittent success with specific decisions will tend to-
give strength to the general beliefs, quite apart from the
validity of the connection in strict logical terms. This
effect enables beliefs to become established and maintain
themselves despite weak connections to reality or even
contradictions of it.
Thus, success by AMTRAK in improving on-time performance of the San
Francisco Zephyr, in improving the dining facilities on the Empire
Builder, in lowering the number of customer complaints, will reassure
AMTRAK that they are doing the right thing, and encourage continued
operation within the established set of procedures; they will
contine to produce the wrong product. Unawares that they are doing so.
This has something in common with Simon's (1947) "satisficer" concept -
that search only takes place until a satisfactory solution is found.
But, it is more than that. Search for search procedures only continues
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until a satisfactory search procedure is found - one which produces
satisfactory results.
Change requires cognitive investment. You have to be aware of the need
for change. Investment implies short-run sacrifice of output (within
the existing frame) to realise longer-run gains. You not only have to
be aware of the need for change, but interrupt what you are doing now
in order to search for it.
To combine these two concepts, we can see what might happen to someone
who has lived all his life in a small town. If he is happy with his
current job and lifestyle, he will likely as not stay put. If he is
not completely happy, he will tend to search for alternatives within
the same region, and if he finds a satisfactory one, he will tend to
adopt that, quite innocent of the possibility that something consider-
ably more to his liking exists in another region. His localised search
procedure produces good enough results. It does not occur to him to
do otherwise.
So it is with AMTRAK. Less people are complaining. More trains are on
time more often; there is no trigger:to cognitive investment. Planning
continues within the same frame. And double-loop learning is further
discouraged by the frying pan within which AMTRAK management find
themselves. Investment is inpracticable when there is no pause for
breath. As Paul Molloy, Minority Counsel, Senate Commerce Committee,
declared:
AMTRAK's management for the first ten years of AMTRAK's existence
has been primarily concerned with -keeping the system going, so
they spend most of their time putting out fires, and not doing
any strategic planning. It has done a number of studies, but has
never had resources, or done any strategic planning that meant
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that any of these studies are of any value... It's tactically
oriented. In a sinking ship you bale water.
And so, only a partial and predictable attack is made on the problem.
As Steinbrunner summarises:
Cognitive modes of thinking are not likely to produce the
laterally and upwardly expanding process of causal learning
which the analytic paradigm expects. All of the cognitive
syndromes dissect the complex problem and operate on segments
of it, and the learning process produced by the operation
of these syndromes is limited as a consequence. The strong
tendency for the segmental patterns to stabilize themselves
means that after some period of time of operating in a certain
issue area both individuals and organizational entities will
have learned to structure their decisions in a particular way,
and changes in the established structure will be unlikely
short of substantial changes in personnel.
Well, you ask, what about AMTRAK's forward-looking 1977 - 81 5 Year
Plan (NRPC, 1976) and its urges towards corridor development and away.
from less than viable long-distance services? What about AMTRAK's
'forward-looking 1975 discontinuance procedures (NRPC, 1975) which took
account of not only economic, but also social and environmental criteria?
What about Alan Boyd's bold statements about the path to progress? Was
it not he that declared that "AMTRAK's future is linked with corridor
development, commuter service, intermodalism and the revitalization of
the city center... One train a day anywhere can be little more than a
costly curiosity, like the circus which comes to town each year?" (1980).
Doesn't this prove that AMTRAK has learned what to do? Doesn't this
prove Theory C4 - that it's all a conspiracy, that AMTRAK really
doesn't care what it does so long as it is? Not so.
Alan Boyd's statement suggests that he has learned. The 5 Year Plan
suggests that the senior management personnel that dreampt it up have
learned. It does not, however, imply that the organisation has learned.
-138-
As Argyris and Sch8n (1978) point out, there are cases where organisations
know less than their members.
Nor does it help to think of organizational learning as the
prerogative of a man at the top who learns for the-organization;
on large and complex organizations bosses succeed one another
while the organization remains very much itself, and learns or
fails to learn in ways that often have little to do with the boss.
As William Thornton told me:
Upper management, to be quite frank, I think they see it as short
term, because as a government administration changes, you'll
frequently find our administrative officer changes who then
changes his staff. As far as upper management is concerned, there
is management turnover that is more political than it is
performance related.
It is the management below that maintain continuity, maintain continuity
of encoding. It is their procedures and power arrangements that determine
how information is really processed. And, although every single one
of them may sincerely be doing his utmost to do his job as well as
possible, with total honesty and complete integrity, the way in which
organisational norms program them may prevent the organisation from
learning.
Overcoming such deeply ingrained norms requires crisis according to
Sch8n (1971). And:
At the root of most innovations significant enough to precipitate
a change of state, there are individuals who display irrational
commitment, extraordinary energy, a combattiveness which enables
them to battle with established interests over long periods of
time, and a remarkable skill at guerilla warfare.
As we have seen in many earlier conservative quotations from AMTRAK
management, especially in Planning, the conceivers of the 1977 - 81
5 Year Plan did not manage to educate the organisation towards adoption
of the new norms it espoused; Mr. Boyd's brave statements cannot of
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themselves slacken the momentum of a well-oiled machine. The real question
is whether Mr. Boyd can innoculate the organisation with a new image.
That is why I used the term revolutionary cognitive investment. Whether
he can do so remains to be seen.
Theory C5 does not invalidate Theory C4. Theory C4b is certainly
helpful in itself in identifying those parts of the organisation which
are most capable of learning. But, if these parts remain in a sub-
servient power position, then the organisation as a whole will not
learn.
Theory C4 if anything reinforces Theory C5. And yet, there is a middle
ground which we must not ignore. Individuals may all be well-intentioned,
and committed to doing good; the way they are led astray may be, as
suggested in Theory C5, because of the failure of learning systems. That
failure is not unconnected with the fear so prevalent in Theory C4. It
is a fear of loss of identity, a fear of the unknown. What people do
defines what people are. There is understan'able terror at the thought
of its loss.
As Sch8n (1971) says:
Dynamic conservatism is by no means always attributable to the
stupidity of individuals within social systems, although their
stupidity is frequently invoked by those seeking to introduce
change. But why, then, should systems fail to reflect the
intelligence of their members? The power of social systems over
individuals becomes understandable, I think, only if we see that
social.systems provide for their members not only sources of
livelihood, protection against outside threat and the promise of
economic security, but a framework of theory, values and related
teohnology which enables individuals to make sense of their
lives. Threats to the social system threaten this framework.
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T H E O R I E S D
Although some earlier Theories have at least contained the idea that
inter-agency relationships have not been what they might have been,
they have tended to espouse the at least implicit assumption that
solutions might be found within the existing framework; dealing
generally on the level of individuals and individual organisational
units, the implication has been that if these individuals or units
could do their jobs better, solutions could be found.
Theirues D, however, go beyond examination of components within
the institutional structure, and show that the institutional structure
itself has an imprint which programs interaction: ad outputs within
the system towards -an undesirable outcome. In Theory Dl, the question
of role definition and accountability is discussed; in Theory D2, in
a more radical approach, the effects of centralisation of management
and funding on the- route and service structure is considered.
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T H E O R Y Dl
AMTRAK neither has the lines of accountability of a private corporation,
nor the Executive Branch supervision of a public agency. In the absence
of such direction (which the Legislative Branch has not provided),
AMTRAK has not been able to properly identify with any particular goals
and, confused, has had to muddle through, adjusting according to the
"environment" of the day. This has not been conducive to reform.
The relationship of agencies to one another is best characterized
as a conflict of rival baronies, each jealously guarding its own
territory and seeking to expand that territory at the expense of
other agencies. No new program moves into the Federal Government
as into a neutral space but always into a field of force built
opt of the territorial fears and ambitions of the agencies... As
a result, it sometimes appears to an outside observer that the
Federal Government contains many extremely intelligent,- highly
dedicated, experienced individuals who work long hours over long
periods of time cancelling one another out.
- Sch8n (1971)
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The implication of Theory Bl is that if Congressmen were more altruistic
and self-sacrificing, all could be well. That of B2 was that if they
could learn effectively, problems might be cured. Theories C4 and C5
treated the position of management in similar vein and could suggest
like needs for remedy. It is suggested here, however, that such
selfishness, fear or ignorance are consequences of institutional
structure, which latter must become the subject of discussion if the
situation is to be properly understood.
AMTRAK is a confused organisation. Is it private? Is it public? Should
it seek to maximise "profits?" To minimis-e losses? Should it provide
as many trains as possible? Everywhere? Only where most efficient?
Only where the most powerful Congressmen live? Should it lead? Be led?
By whom?
Private operations must remain financially solvent, and strike out for
profits, or risk going out of business. AMTRAK has, on paper, been
set up to operate on this basis, but in reality has had to function in
quite a different domain. AMTRAK was designated a corporation, yet has
lacked corporate freedom. Yet, while lacking corporate identity, neither
has it been subject to Executive Branch supervision. A failure to clearly
establish what AMTRAK's goals are to be, and to set up an institutional
structure capable of achieving them, has led to confusion, lack of
direction, supervision, accountability. A stalemate in which the only
way to go is with today's wind.
Both within AMTRAK and without, there is uncertainty as to what its
purpose and goals are. Commented Ira Silverman, Director of Marketing:
"I don't think there's a role that's clear cut. I think there's a role
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that has come out to develop inter-city passenger aervice at some level...
If you ask what's best for the country, or what's best for AMTRAK, I
really don't know. I don't think that's ever been clearly stated." He
feels that it is for AMTRAK, while advocating short-distance routes,
to operate on a "business-like basis" within the politically-defined
route structure, meeting financial targets.
Howard Henry, Director Market Planning and Forecasting, while feeling
that AMTRAK was "a sort of social service," saw its definition as a
corporation as a "perfectly reasonable organisational entity" where "the
need for profit translates into a need to minimise losses." Revenue/
expense ratios "gives us some framework for decision-making, and some
goal for optimisation internally." John Baesch of Operations, though,
felt that apart from profit, it was the "public good" which motivated
management, given that "public acceptance must be our measurement," and
William Thornton, Manager, Corporate Employment, claimed that motivation
lay in "seeing a passenger getting off a train smiling... We're not
organisaed to make money; we're organised first to serve the passenger."
Outside of AMTRAK, there were a variety of interpretations of its goals,
ranging in most cases from the ill-at-ease to the cynical. Deborah
Swartz, Special Assistant to the House Transportation sub-committee,
while stressing the lack of clarity in objectives implied by the
original law, saw AMTRAK decisions as "oriented towards balancing profit
maximisation with serving the public." A number of others shared this
ground. Several interviewees, however, cited combinations of ridership
levels, reduction in number of complaints and, above all, ability to
secure appropriations from Congress, as AMTRAK's performance measure.
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Mr. A, Staff Assistant to the House Appropriations Committee, was
particularly assertive that AMTRAK did not respond to signals of profit:
"When the bills are paid, AMTRAK knows they've succeeded," he said.
"As long as you have that appropriations dope in your veins, you won't
have to sober up." Mr. Y. of the F.R.A. told me that AMTRAK "knows
it's succeeded by periodically saying it's succeeded. There's no measure
of success or failure." For a sardonic ex-President of AMTRAK, Paul
Reistrup, AMTRAK "knows it's succeeded by surviving another year."
Risk is an important element of corporate life. But, although Charles
Hilty, AdministratiVe Assistant to Representative Madigan (R, Illinois)
told me that AMTRAK "risks going broke politically," Charles Swinburn,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, US Department of Transportation,
maintained that "there's always that Federal cushion behind them. If
they screw up, then they have no bottom line to worry about." Many
commentators agreed that AMTRAK risked "nothing."
Thus, AMTRAK as a profit-seeking corporation is a pretty unusual entity.
Though Tom Gillespie, AMTRAK Congressional Affairs Officer, said that
"Congress created us to be operated for profit because they wanted to
keep the politics out of it," this has been far from true. But, although
Larry Sabbath, Legislative Aide to Representative Santini (D, Nevada),
felt that AMTRAK "the corporation" was a "facade," Amy Dunbar,
Legislative Aide to Senator Tsongas (D, Massachusetts), felt that
"the more they stay around the idea of the private corporation, the more
efficient they can try to be, and Mr. B., House Commerce Committee
staffer, balked at the idea of having AMTRAK as a government department:
"I think we want to get the incentive in there to manage it as
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efficiently as we can." Paul Molloy, Minority Counsel, Senate Commerce
Committee, on the other hand, insisted that there could not be management
initiative from within AMTRAK "because of the dependence that is caused
by subsidy."
It is to be doubted, however, whether it is the subsidy per se that is
causing the trouble, or whether responsibility lies in the way in which
it is administered, coupled with only a vague conception of purpose,
bereft of any connection to reality, and a severe identity crisis. It
is not necessary to look very far to find evidence of that.
The original AMTRAK law, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (US
Congress, 1970), stated that:
If at any time after July 1, 1973, the Corporation determined
that any train or trains in the basic system in whole or in part
are not required by public convenience and necessity, or will
impair the ability of the Corporation to adequately provide
other services, such train or trains may be discontinued under
the procedures of Section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act.
When AMTRAK, at the behest of the Congress (US Congress, 1975) developed
and sought to apply criteria for discontinuance of routes, in 1975,
they clearly thought that in accord with the independent corporate
identity Congress had prescribed for them, and in line with the precepts
of the original Act, it would be for them to reach decisions on such
affairs. As the Criteria report (NRPC, 1975) declared:
AMTRAK's Board of Directors will provide the guidance to be
used by AMTRAK's management in carrying out route and service
evaluations, and will have authority for final route and service
decisions-
AMTRAK's President will suggest route and service evaluation
guidance to the Board, will lead AMTRAK's staff in analyses,
and will develop recommendations on routes and services for
Board approval. AMTRAK's staff will carry out the fact-gathering
and analyses necessary to develop route and service evaluations
and will implement the Board's recommendations.
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The public will offer information and comment on proposed route
and service decisions to be considered by the Board in making its
decisions.
This is as clear a statement as one is likely to find that the ball was
in AMTRAK's camp. But, the reality is that the AMTRAK Board has been
irrelevant because, although on paper, it is the controlling instrument
for AMTRAK, in actuality, it has not had the necessary powers to maintain
control. As a result, it cannot be held accountable for errors.
In its final report on the route restructuring (DOT, 1979), DOT stated
that"
The Executive Branch and the Congress, together, with expert
advice from AMTRAK and input from the public, should designate
which basic intercity rail passenger services AMTRAK should
provide and the amount of public resources that are to be made
available to support them. AMTRAK, on the other hand, should
concentrate principally on operating the designated intercity
rail passenger system as efficiently and cost-effectively as
possible. Within budget ceilings, AMTRAK should be able to make
incremental changes to the designated system of routes and
services that make the system more efficient.
By 1979, AMTRAK for its part had been disabtL&ed of any idea that it
could act unilaterally, and had changed its stance. Although Alan Boyd
still insisted, as he testified before the House Transportation sub-
committee Hearings (US Congress, 1979b) that "We are not a government
agency; we are a private corporation, supported to a very large degree
by public funds," he continued: "We are acting under the behest of the
Congress and the Administration and we want to provide whatever service -
we will provide whatever service the Congress and Administration ask us
to provide." Notice that he refers to provision of service rather than
satisfaction of goals - a degree of direction clearly at odds with the
notion of private corporate identity.
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Also, while back in 1975 the AMTRAK criteria had included social
criteria, in 1979 Boyd was to state that: "It is not our function,
and we don't have the basis for establishing the relative values of
the social criteria." Another about-turn.
PL 97-73, The AMTRAK Reorganization Act of 1979 (US Congress, 1979d),
acknowledged that:
(1) Inadequatly defined goals for the Corporation have denied its
board of directors an effective role in guiding the Corporation
or in promoting and increasing the number of intercity rail
passengers;
(2) Uncertain goals and financial commitments have discouraged
the development of effective corporate management;
(3) Uncertainty arising from the lack of specific goals has made
the achievement of high employee morale difficult.
Having diagnosed the disease as such, specific goals were set. They
included improvement of on-time performance by at least 50 percent
within three years, implementation of schedules which provide a
systemwide average speed of 55 mph, and improvement of the ratios of
revenues to operating expenses, with the goal of coverage of at least
44 percent of operating expenses, exclusing depreciation, from revenues
by the end of fiscal year 1982, and 50 percent by the end of fiscal
year 1985. Performance standards in terms of passenger miles per train
mile (150 minimum for long-distance, 80 for short-distance) and
avoidable loss per passenger mile (7e maximum for short-distance, 9q
for short-distance) were also set.
Alan Boyd had strongly urged that "the resources be made available
for the obligations that are imposed on us," (US Congress, 1979b).
Requirements had been designated, nonetheless, quite independently
of the financial requirements - notably investment - necessary to
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achieve them. They were also somewhat arbitrary - the 55 mph minimum,
for example, was selected merely because it happened to be the maximim
highway speed limit, and not because it had anything to do with the
problems of rail passenger service, or with the setting of realistic
targets to be aimed at in their elimination. Indeed,. because the
new goals set treat AMTRAK in a global sense (other than distinguishing
broadly between long-distance and short-distance in the "criteria"),
they make it more difficult to hold AMTRAK accountable.
Costing of particular services and negotiation of an arrangement
"whereby the Government would purchase a stated amount of service at
a stated price, and the Company would be obligated to provide that
service at that price" (Alan Boyd in US Congress, 1979b) might have
clarified accountability. It lessens AMTRAK's viability as a corporation
when it knows it will be blamed for failing to meet unrealisitc standards.
A private corporation is controlled by its Board of Directors which is
responsible to its shareholders. In the case of AMTRAK, it has been the
Congress - as a private company's "shareholders" - that has made the
decisions (or perhaps, one might more aptly say, the non-decisions).
It is analagous to a situation in which all the individual shareholders
of, say, General Electric, were to directly instruct management on
their task; quite simply, an unworkable proposition.
Without a defined role, unrealistic, sometimes conflicting, frequently
changing directions and direction by the Congress, it is hard to
classify AMTRAK as a corporation. However, it is also different from
any other public transportation agency in that it is not under proper
Executive Branch supervision.
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The Secretary was supposedly to designate the Basic System, and keep
tabs on it thereafter but, due to Congressional intervention, this has
not happened.
DOT is regarded with suspicion, if not fear, by AMTRAK. L. Fletcher
Prouty, Senior Director, AMTRAK Public Affairs, reflected other
management feelings in stating that:
The Administration has viewed AMTRAK ever since its beginning
as a necessary evil. Congress, being a little closer to the
people... has generously supported AMTRAK even to the point of
almost over-riding the Administration at times... Last year we
darn near went bust because the Secretary of Transportation
decided to put us out of business... I would cut it {AMTRAK}
completely from the interface with DOT. That's nothing but
a drag.
Several non-AMTRAK interviewees also criticised DOT for its hostile
attitudes.
To move to the other side of the ring, however, there was no shortage
of bile to be had from the F.R.A.'s Mr. Y; "I often think that the best
thing for the Department to do would be to take a position that all
AMTRAK services ought to operate trans-continentally with the highest
possible level of luxury," he said.
And, since they always do precisely the opposite of what we
recommend, they might do something rational... The Executive
has been schizophrenic with AMTRAK. Internally, it has for the
most part been anti-AMTRAK. I think part of that has been a
reaction to the role AMTRAK has taken.
The interface between AMTRAK and DOT was described by Mr. Y. as:
Conducted largely by lobbing bombs at each other. AMTRAK refuses
even to come here for the budget process. The Department makes
up the budget numbers for AMTRAK to put in the President's
budget' they don't come from AMTRAK.
All those interviewed were asked to whom AMTRAK was reponsible, and most
replied that it was to Congress. As Howard Henry. Director AMTRAK Market
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Planning and Forecasting, said: "it's responsible to its customers.
And its biggest customer of all is the Congress which provides % to 2/3
of its revenues. And, to a much lesser extent the Administration, or
anyone else who might be interested."
Weren't they responsible to DOT, I asked Mr. Y? "They claim not to be,"
he replied,
But we claim they are, and that's the conflict. AMTRAK has made
it clear for quite some time that they would prefer to be
responsible to the Congress which has a great deal less staff,
and a great deal less expertise to oversee them, than to us...
AMTRAK has been very jealous in guarding its route selection
from the Executive Branch; well, it's been very jealous in
guarding all its operations from the Executive Branch because
they fancy themselves to be a private corporation...
I don't think it should be our job to do the AMTRAK route system
for them. AMTRAK ought to determine the route system, and they
ought to come to us and justify a budget. The Department has no
interest at all in getting involved in selecting routes...
The organisation chart very clearly mimics a corporation. They
behave as a typical government entity: make sure it spends its
budget; get more next year.
While Ross Capon, Executive Director, National Association of Railroad
Passengers, feels that "the Corporate structure is a good thing"
because it "has given it a certain degree of independence from the
Department" which is "violently opposed to inter-city passenger service,
except in the Northeast Corridor," Charles Swinburn felt that "as long
as they've got Federal funds, I think they've got to be responsible to
someone who's worried primarily about the integrity of spending those
Federal funds... There should be more control of the Corporation's
activities than there has been."
As Bruce Horowitz, AMTRAK Planning, said: "F.R.A. is nominally an
oversight organisation, but they have no direct control. F.R.A.'s role is
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spurious, and they're very frustrated as such." And, commented Roy Neel,
Legislative Assistant to Representative Gore (D, Tennessee): "It's a
power struggle between the Executive and Legislative Branches; there's
no doubt about that." But, it is a power struggle in which the Legislative
Branch has the upper hand. Representative Florio (D, New Jersey),
Chairman, House Transportation sub-committee, said: "What we've done
is try to intrude ourselves, specifically my committee, as kind of
mediator between those two parties, and I think it's an appropriate role."
It is essentially a relationship, though, that gets between AMTRAK and
DOT, and which has had the effect of leaving the latter impotent.
Feeling very much like a jilted suitor, it tries to exercise authority
in the only way it can to achieve what it sees as desirable results..
Nat Simon, Executive Director, Ohio Rail Transportation Authority,
criticised the 1979 DOT restructuring report because "the relative
efficiency of long-distance versus short-distance routes was not
evaluated," (US Congress, 1979b). Gerald Pieri, Massachusetts Assistant
Secretary of-Transportation was similarly unimpressed by the report's
failure to "even look at" the potential for new short-distance routes.
Rather, the DOT report right now merely keeps us with a skeleton
of the strddture- which was designed in another age, 7 or 8 years
ago, and it merely postpones by perhaps three years, the
inevitable of AMTRAK's budget becomming so high that you people
will not be able to fund it. (US Congress, 1979b).
However, although DOT might support the corridor concept in secret,
there would be no point in advocating it, as funding for corridors might
go through without any assurance that such new (good) develpments
would be accompanied by parallel reductions in less efficient services;
it is difficult for DOT to reallocate without increasing costs. Thus,
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DOT is pushed into the opposite corner from AMTRAK, and enters an
adversarial relationship in which the prime effort is to prune.
This the restructuring proposal from DOT (1979) was purely the work
of the axeman - a 43 percent reduction was demanded; a little under
half of this was eventually won after Congressional debate.
DOT has thus had some effect in getting reductions in long-distance
mileage, but not promoted corridor service other than in the Northeast.
It has taken an openly offensive stance but has been on the edge of the
arena, rather than center-stage. DOT's relationship with AMTRAK has
promoted the status-quo,. or perhaps gone for reduction of a poor
pattern, but not for its reappraisal and revision.
A failure to establish goals and supervision has led to chaos. Because
AMTRAK was seen as a corporation, it was given independent status and
was clearly not understood to be a sub-unit of DOT. Yet, when it became
more than obvious that profitability was hors du camp, it remained - in
name only - independent, real direct control passing to the Congress,
a highly fragmented legislative body clearly incapable of maintaining
continuous and consistent effective supervision. While the Congress
carried on the pretence of "AMTRAK the corporation," it gave it no
corporate freedom, nor allowed it to develop corporate identity. Congress
has never been able to tell AMTRAK what it wants of it, nor set
realistic targets for its achievement.
In the meantime, an emasculated DOT has been struggling to maintain a
role which the other parties do not acknowledge it to have. Seeing itself
as the only body capable of supervising, it tries to supervise, but
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is rejected. Knowing that it cannot be positive and effective, it piles
on the negative attack as the only way to reduce fat. Conflict results;
little is achieved.
In Britain and Japan, Paul Reistrup pointed out, "you have a
parliamentary form of government where the Parliament and the Minister
are headed in the same direction. Here, I don't know where they're
headed. But I've never seen them headed in the same direction." In the
British and Japanese case, the unison of Legislature and Executive
has enabled a clear definition of goals to be formulated and,
paradoxically, the stricter control thus made possible, has allowed
management more independence, opportunities to show initiative and the
spirit of the entrepreneur.
In the case of AMTRAK, failure to define realistic goals and establish
firm lines of accountability has left the organisation muddled and,
unable to identify with any particular goals; it has had to follow the
wind, basing its task definition on whatever today's environment allows.
Up until now, the environment has allowed little other than the
status quo.
As Theory D1 sees it, the problem is not selfish Congressmen or
weak management per se, but a system of inter-organisational
relationships which permits the former to interfere and the latter
ignorant, subversive, or selectively sycophantic. We take one vital
step further along this road in Theory E.
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T H E O R Y D2
AMTRAK's centralised management and funding base orients it towards
provision of a "national"-type system. All planning occurs in Washington,
and there is little contact with state or local government bodies save
over 403b service which is itself regarded as supplementary to, rather
than part of AMTRAK's main task. This leads to priority being accorded
to inter-state long-distance services over more regionalised short-
distance service.
The very fact that I am working for the Federal Government
clearly influences my feeling that the Federal Government
should have more say over the state. And I've never even
considered breaking up the passenger rail system into state
or regional management systems, and I would think that would
be very hard for Congressmen and Congressional staff to deal
with the idea of giving up all this partying.
- Michael Gessel, Legislative Assistant to
Representative Matsui (D, California)
Government cannot play the role of "experimenter for the nation,"
seeking first to identify the correct solution, then to train
society at large in its adoption. The opportunity for learning
is primarily in discovered systems at the periphery, not in the
nexus of official policies at the center. Central's role is to
detect significant shifts at the periphery, to pay explicit
attention to the emergence of ideas in good currency, and to
derive theories of policy by induction... Central comes to
runction as facilitator of society's learning, rather than as
society's trainer.
Sch8n (1971)
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AMTRAK is very much a centralised organisation. Its main funding base
is Federal, and reporting responsibilities are to Federal bodies. And,
although there is a move towards delegation of some operational functions
to regional offices, planning is concentrated in Washington, D.C., a
city with a quintessentially national perspective.
The centralised management approach gives rise to a total systems
perspective that sees AMTRAK in its totality as a "symbiotically" inter-
connecting nationwide system. This pervades the whole operation.
Advertising, for example, has tended to be nationally based, rather than
tailored towards specific corridors.."As a result, AMTRAK has not been
able to fully exploit the ridership potential in the corridors." (GAO,
1978b).
AMTRAK's dependence on Congress means that its daily contact is with
this body rather than with State agencies. And, while. Members of
Congress may be contented simply by the fact that some service is going
-through--their -Distric-ts-, it will be the local-level organisations
that will be concerned most with the promotion of regional needs. And
yet, AMTRAK has little responsibility towards them. They rarely form
part of the decision-making process unless their state is part-funding
service under Section 403b of the Rail Passenger Service Act
(US Congress, 1970 - see APPENDIX D), and even then, complained New
York State officials, the requirements of regional services have been
regarded as subservient to the needs of "Basic" long-distance trains.
State officials are made to realise that such provision is in addition
to the "Basic System," supplemental rather than integrally a part of
the main AMTRAK brief. The effect of both centralised control and
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accountability, then, is to put regional priorities beneath those which
are either perceived to be in the public interest, or seen as most
likely to satisfy AMTRAK's paymaster.
As Ira Silverman, AMTRAK Director of Marketing told me, state enthusiasm
for encouraging trains varies. "California is very aggressive," he said.
"Unfortunately, the States for which it would be nice to have more
service to, like Ohio, are very non-committed." Participation in 403b
service has been restricted to 8 States, though on 13 routes. The most
successful of these has been from Los Angeles to San Diego on which half
of the six daily round-trip trains are paid for by the State of
California (see p.37). California also subsidises two daily round-trips
between Oakland and Bakersfield.
A second major effort is in New York State's New York - Niagara Falls
"Empire Corridor" where, in addition to funding particular trains, the
state has involved itself in a $43 million track improvement program.
Michigan adds a daily train each way between Chicago and Port Huron,
and between Jackson and Detroit, to the Chicago - Detroit service,
and Illinois subsidises five trains in each direction on routes radiating
from Chicago. Other 403b service operates in Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
amd Oregon. All 403b service together accounts for less than 8% of
AMTRAK's total ridership, however, and only Los Angleles to San Diego
and New York to Albany could be described as approaching corridor
service. 403b service has not resulted in any massive reorientation in
rail passenger service because it seeks to supplement rather than to
replace.
Roy Neel, Legislative Assistant to Representative Gore (D, Tennessee),
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describes Tennessee's position as being "typical of many States which
do not have much passenger service; it's complacent. It's we would love
to have it, but not to the point where we would make any funds available
to it." And Wisconsin produced a study which concluded, said Doug Haist,
Administrator, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, that "some were
better than others, but none wer-e worth the investment of State funds."
If Tennessee's attitude is "complacent" though, Wisconsin's is hard-
headed and represents a notewothy departure from basic AMTRAK philosophy.
While the primary goal of AMTRAK may be to provide some--rail service to
as many places as possible, the task from the Wisconsin vantage is
simply to provide for the most efficient transportation system, whatever
modes form a part of it. Thus, while AMTRAK finds it justified to
provide at least some minimum level of service to the State under
its rationale, Wisconsin feels that, having considered the worth of
rail relative to other modes, transportation resources are better spent
elsewhere. As the report (Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 1975)
declares:
The problems of intercity passenger transport cannot be solved
by dealing with only one mode at a time. It is precisely this
narrow approach that led to the present problems... The benefits
of increased reliance on intercity rail come to society only when
large numbers of travelers find reason to rely on that mode {note
the similarity to Alan Boyd's statement onp.38} Merely providing
rail service, without simultaneously dealing with the underlying
preferences of the traveling public will not necessarily produce
any social benefits.
It would be all to easy to conclude here that various short-distance
corridors have not been developed because the states involved have not
felt that the benefits would justify the costs but, when pitting some
non-served routes against parts of the existing "Basic System" network,
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a curious paradox emerges.
The result of the dichotomy in attitudes and responsibilities has been
that several markets which might have been good for rail passenger
service, but which are of solely regional significance and which the
States have not felt valued funding themselves, have not been exploited
at all. At the same time, other less good markets in those very
states have been served because they form part of the "Basic Syatem."
In Ohio, the effects of non-involvement by the State are clear: AMTRAK
currently provides daily long-distance service across the top and bottom
of the State, neither of which provide regional service because they do
not link the major centers, are infrequent, slow, inconvenient, and
unreliable. Columbus, through which the now defunct National Limited
used to pass at 3 in the morning, currently has no service; Ohio's major
cities, some of the largest in the country, and'in a State where
population density averages 261 persons per square mile (greater than
the figure of 252 for France where high-speed passenger rail is in an
advanced stage of development), are not in any real sense connected
by rail.
The situation derives in part from Ohio's constitutional provision prohib-
iting the subsidisation of private enterprise (of which AMTRAK is,
ironically, considered a part); two attempts to amend the restriction
were rejected by Ohio voters. But, it equally derives from an impression
that AMTRAK cannot best serve the State's inter-city rail transportation
needs because this is not where the AMTRAK organisation's focus of
attention lies. Said Mark Randell of the Ohio Rail Transportation
Authority (ORTA): "they basically provide service on a national basis,
-159-
and we want to make sure the efforts, the expertise, is concentrated
here in Ohio if Ohio's going to be paying money to foot the bill."
An article by Vranich (1980) reports that:
While Ohio has a number. of strategically placed railroad routas
connecting major population centers, there is no evidence
AMTRAK service would be forthcoming any time soon.
Several AMTRAK five-year plans have called for more service
or new routes, but none has ever been fully approved or
implemented. Officials in the Buckeye State say AMTRAK's
goals for Ohio, even if approved, were so modest that a good
train system still would not have resulted. Many in Ohio are
not optimistic about AMTRAK's "emerging corridors" proposal,
another study of AMTRAK's potential.
Ohio's skepticism may not be unreasonable. AMTRAK's board of
directors has never championed a high-speed system for that
populous state as they have done for the Northeast.
Accordingly, Ohio has set in motion its own studies in what promises to
be the most adventurous: approach. to inter-city rail passenger service
in the US yet. Three major corridors were identified as having greatest
potential for development: Cleveland - Columbus - Cincinatti; Toledo -
Cleveland - Youngstown; and Toledo - Columbus (See MAP 1). Other
possibilities include extensions to Pittsburgy, Detroit and Louisville.
The Ohio plan includes the construction of dedicated right-of-way for
the passenger trains, and speeds of 150 mph. The service, projected to
carry between 9 and 12 million passengers by 2000 (depending on whether
inter-state connections are included or not), would be operated by
ORTA, and not by AMTRAK.
Arthur Wilkowski, a State representative from Toledo conceived the
high-speed rail concept during the first energy crisis, and has been a
heavy promoter of the ORTA plan. He wants nothing to do with AMTRAK.
Quoted in the November, 1979, issue of Ohio Magazine, he said:
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Three High-Speed Corridors Identified
Proposed High-Speed Rail Corridors
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The AMTRAK system would not work in Ohio. We will build this
system on the ashes of AMTRAK. We must build a system designed
for the year 2000, not try to reestablish a system that died
in the Forties.
There does, however, remain some support for further co-operation with
AMTRAK, particularly from the traditional railroad lobby. As Vranich
put it:
Some NARP members would share an AMTRAK concern that a potentially
superior system would make AMTRAK look antiquated. They believe
their strength lies in a unified national system run by AMTRAK,
and would worry that independent programs would weaken an already
frail political base in Congress.
AMTRAK, in short, is not serving the regional needs of Ohio, and the
moves being made in that state suggest that for this to happen finance
and control need to be at the state level.
AMTRAK's organisation is itself very centralised in comparison to the
bus industry which differs from it in a number of important ways. The
bus industry is dominated by Greyhound and Trailways, but also contains
a plethora of smaller operators, serving mainly intra-regional markets.
Harold Morgan, Manager of Revenue Economics, American Bus Association
felt that a decentralised operation was necessary to properly serve the
regions. It "wouldn' t work out" if all planning were to be done in
Washington "because you wouldn't know what the local needs are."
The bus giants depend heavily on regional inputs for decision making.
E. W. Simmons, Director of Transportation, Greyhound Lines, Phoenix,
explained how Greyhound was broken down into regional territories and
regional Vice Presidents, District Managers reporting to these latter
at yet one level beneath. Technical co-ordination was carried out in
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Phoenix based on input from field officers at regional, district, and
even individual city level.
Charles Loman, Assistant to Regional Vice-President, New York, further
confirmed the importance of regional influence:
Within New York each area is broken down under the supervision
of another person. All their ideas are gathered, and each one
is familiar with his region whereas a man say in Phoenix wouldn't
know some of the smaller towns and how the scedules are and,
depending on the type of competition, the people you have. So,
the input is given from the New York region. It is taken, more
or less,. by Phoenix; the decisions are made here, in the region.
Superimposed on this already regionally-responsive system are the small
operators who, with lean overhead and high area identification, can meet
intra-regional needs. As Mr. Morgan said: "I think the smaller regional
companies do offer a service that the national companies don't offer, in
terms of localised service, more personalised service." Mr. Simmons did
"think it's healthy that we do have a lot of independents," while Ted
Knappen, Senior Vice-President, Continental Trailways, felt that their
existence was in the interests of providing good regional service.
Walter Scrobat., Vice-President and Comptroller, Peter Pan Bus Lines,
a small and mainly in-state Massachusetts carrier maintained that his
company was doing a better job on the-routes they served than Greyhound
or Trailways would:
An advantage that comes to mind is the ability of the smaller
company to be more familiar with its market because of its
direct association with it, whereas when you're dealing with a
national company... that company is not really in a position.
to be as close to the market in a small geographic area such
as this, and therefore is not as readily able to meet the needs
and changing requirements of that particular market... Certain
broad policies can be implemented in a central location, but in
order to fine-tune and adapt those policies, a certain amount
of decentralisation is necessary.
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Further, it should not be overlooked that the bus industry is regulated
at both Federal and state levels. State control varies, but in general
sets out to ensure that adequate bus service is provided for that state.
This mechanism provides for direct state-level influence over both
routes and fares. AMTRAK, by contrast, is not subject to any state-
level regulation other than as may be contained in contractural
agreements for 403b service.
Although it is perhaps not fair to make too direct a comparison between
AMTRAK and the bus industry because of basic differences in size, scope
and role, it is clear that the bus industry is organisationally well-
structured to meet regional needs while AMTRAK, with its entirely
centralised planning function, is more distant from purely local concerns.
The scheme under discussion in Ohio, and efforts on the scale of New York
State and California's suggest that an alternative, regionally-based
configuration of AMTRAK might have been more successful in exploiting
the inherent advantage of rail passenger service and serving regional
needs. Consideration of some alternative helps further evaluate the
effects of the present centralisation.
One possibility might be the operation of AMTRAK on a "federated" basis -
regional AMTRAK territories would report to a central body whose main
function would be co-ordination and broad policy setting. To reinforce
this, funding might be channeled through the states, rather than through
the Congress, to ensure greater regional accountability.
Greisman (1980) strongly favors a re-organisation of AMTRAK's territorial
arrangements: "To succeed, AMTRAK cannot administer the entire country.
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Rather, it should enter into partnerships with state, city and regional
transportation agencies." Mr. A., Staff Assistant to the House Approp-
riations Committee, felt likewise: "AMTRAK only makes sense in a
regional context," he said,
It is easier for the regional governing body to see growth and
development possibilities of rail where all transportation modes
are getting clogged, easier to look at rail and say here's an
alternative at an opportunity cost cheaper than a new jetport.
It is easier for them to see than Congress... I'd organise AMTRAK
into about 15 separate companies... A federal structure of AMTRAK
would clearly be better than now. It would be a way of achieving
the inherent advantages associated with the corridor idea. The
states are more qualified to think of the relationships of rail
to road to air than we are here in Washington.
Louis Rossi, Director, Rail Division, New York State Department of
Transportation, strongly favors devolution of planning to the regions.
Though he would prefer operation by a regional transportation authority
over provision of service by AMTRAK, he was not unenthusiastic about
regionalising the existing management structure:
I think the Washington AMTRAK office in the future should be much,
much smaller... They should do only the things that need doing at
the corporate level which is the ultimate financing and
reservation systems... The first thing that I would try to do
would be to create at the executive level a regional V.P. Have
a V.P. for three different territories, maybe four... He in a
sense should be a full-blown President in effect of his own
territory.
Meanwhile, Barbara Beatty, Legislative Assistant to Representative
Rousselot (R, California) said: "we feel states can more efficiently
and without as much abuse or waste handle Federal funding, so if there
is going to be Federal subsidy give a block grant to the states, and let
the states handle it."
Opposition to decentralisation was evident amongst many of the AMTRAK
management questioned, and from several Congressional staff. Wilfred
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Leatherwood, Manager State and Local Services, AMTRAK Government Affairs,
regarded centralised control as being most efficient; in his view,
decentralisation would merely add superfluous layers of bureaucracy.
Representative Florio (D, New Jersey) Chairman, House Transportation
sub-committee, "would just be apprehensive of regional planning being
done without an appreciation of the whole." And while some Congressional
staff did favor greater devolution of control, others felt that state
participation should be increased through expansion of the 403b program.
Some of them feared that if the states were to be given greater power,
the system would become so fragmented that even short-distance services
which should logically cross state lines would fail to do so. Said Ira
Silverman: "Let's take, for instance, Pittsburgh to Cleveland. It's
short-distance, very high-density; however, the fact that-there are two
states involved decreases the probability of it ever happening." And
Howard Henry, Director, AMTRAK Market Planning and Forecasting,
commented that Ohio would be more likely to provide only in-state
service than to link up with other states.
This, however, goes against the evidence of the ORTA plans which include
proposed links to three other states, and against the enthusiasm shown
by neighboring states to join ORTA in a compact. The Pennsylvania
Legislature has already indicated its approval; Michigan has already
signed an agreement with Ohio. Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia
and Missouri have also shown interest. Elsewhere, the New England
Regional Commission is studying Boston to Portland and Montreal-rbutes.
Other states are considering providing service without AMTRAK. Michigan
has begun a $350,000 study of ways to provide rail service between
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Detroit, Lansing and Grand Rapids; Japanese National Railways has
proposed that Shinkansen-type service be established between Dallas
and Houston, and the French Compagnie Generale d'Electricit' has suggested
that 125 mph trains link Atlantic City with Philadelphia.
There are really two questions here. The first concerns what AMTRAK
would look like given a decentralised management structure, but the same
accountability - to Congress in effect - as at present. The second
concerns what would happen were control over the funding mechanism to
also be sent down to the states. To answer the first, it could be argued
that decentralised management alone would change little if Congress
continued to wield the whip. It would, however, inevitably lead to
greater contact with state-level interests and greatex exposure to
regional environment. As Charles Hilty, Administrative Assistant to
Representative Madigan (R, Illinois), pointed out, such decentralisation
would almost certainly increase "local and regional service because
local and regional political pressures could be put into play." This
could in turn influence Congressional regional delegations, and changed
constituency-level perceptions, attitudes and support could filter back
to Members of Congress, and influence them. Above all, to the regionally-
based planner the policy domain, the job identification, would be
centered on his region, and the pressure on him to maximise service for
that region. Were the sort of management plan suggested by Mr. Rossi to
be pursued, were the power base to be truly devolved, then AMTRAK's
orientation would very likely be less nationalistic than under the
present organisational regime.
The second question begs a third. Suppose that the funding mechanism
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were sent down to state-level, would the states wish to continue with
AMTRAK? John Ingram, Federal Representative, California Department of
Transportation, would favor a national tax allocated to state treasuries
for Transportation. And, as Roy Neel said: "if the money were to be
turned over to the states, they would have natural provincial interests
in serving cities within their states" but possibly "states would say we
don't need the luxury of rail passenger service; what we need is to be
able to but more buses." As seen above,' Wisconsin has already demonstrated
this thinking. And, should states opt for rail, they might opt for an
ORTA-type arrangement, rather than use AMTRAK. This could lead to a rad-
ical change in AMTRAK's function and even, as Clarence Siegler, Supervisor
Auditor, US General Accounting Office, suggested, destroy it. But, in the
process, a more efficient and relevant transportation system could be
provided.
The present centralised management and funding base does lead to a
national identity, rather than regional identities one which may,
moreover, be meaningless in the context of meeting the transporation
needs of the nation. Structure of organisation and funding align task
definition towards some "national" vision, which is further enhanced by
the exclusion of regional political and information bases. The 403b
program, being regarded as additional to, rather than part of the main
task, has not stimulated a change in overall orientation which remains
towards provision of a nationally-conceived whole which is inevitably
less than the sum of the parts.
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T H E O R Y E
There has never been any examination of the values which underlie the
concept of AMTRAK. When created, it simply perpetuated the mores of
a dated concept, but these became deeply entrenched, and have
programmed AMTRAK ever since.
The more fundamental a law is to our conceptual scheme, the
less likely we are to choose it for revision. When some
revision of our system of statements is called for, we prefer,
other things being equal, a revision which disturbs the
system least.
- Quine (1950)
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Included in Parkinson's Law (1957) is the "Law of Triviality" which
"means that the time spent on any item on the agenda will be in inverse
proportion to the sum involved." It is illustrated by observation of a
committee in action. The committee first approves a £10 million nuclear
reactor in only two and a half minutes since most members of the
committee neither know what a reactor is, nor what it is for.
A bicycle shed, cost of £350 comes up next for consideration. "A sum of
E350 is well within everybody's comprehension. Everyone can visualise a
bicycle shed. Discussion goes on, therefore, for forty-five minutes, with
the possible result of saving some E50. Members at length sit back with
a feeling of achievement."
The final discussion revolves around the monthly expenditure of £1.75 on
coffee for meetings of the Joint Welfare Committee. This leads to "an
even more acrimonious debate. There may be members of the Committee who
fail to distinguish between asbestos and galvanised iron, but everfy man
there knows about coffee - what it is, how it should be made, where it
should be bought - and whether indeed it should be bought at all." The
item occupies an hour and a half, after which it is still not resolved.
The world of AMTRAK is not so different; the bigger questions are more
abstract, more difficult to confront and analyse, and therefore often
receive little attention, or are ignored altogether. Everyone can
visualise a train entering his home town; it is quite another matter to
conceive of inter-organisational relationships, yet another to start
thinking in terms of "nationalism" versus "regionalism" or to go to
basic values such as "mobility" and "equality of opportunity" in
attaining it.
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Theory E is the theory of the Original Sin. It suggests that the long-
distance route structure is a result of failure to identify values and
provide for their satisfaction in the initial plan. That initial plan
then became a blueprint for AMTRAK which has been reinforced by
subsequent change only seen within the bounds of the given design.
The steady rate of decline of rail passenger service, a continuing trend
broken only by the 1942-45 war years, continued intothe 1960s. Mild
optimism by some railroads, notably the Penn Central which became
involved in upgrading Northeast Corridor service, proved to be false and
short-lived. Regulation obliged the private railroads to continue
operating unless the Interstate Commerce Commission permitted termination;
such discontinuances were permitted at a liberal rate. It had become
apparent that it was no longer feasible for private railroads to provide
passenger service under the existing circumstances, and that some changes
in policy would be necessary if the pattern of decline in service was to
be halted. As Ira Silverman, Director of AMTRAK Marketing, put it:
"without government intervention, the rail passenger train would
disappear completely by 1980."
There are different interpretations of why the government needed to act.
An argument in wide circulation at the time was that the railroads had
deliberately discouraged passenger operation. As Ross Capon, Executive
Director, National Association of Railroad Passengers, said:
There was a widespread belief that the train had been mismanaged
by the private companies; there were some rather dramatic
examples such as the Southern Pacific where they'd do things like
close the ticket window an hour before train departure. If it
was run by a company which believed in its mission to carry
passengers, things would be better.
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Conversely, the "free-market" argument stated that rail passenger service
was on the decline because it was unprofitable, and could not become
financially viable. As Bruce Horowitz of the AMTRAK Planning department
said, there was a "recognition of the necessary extinction under free-
market forces of virtually all long-distance services." A staff member
of the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. A., agreed with this
explanation: "our experience over the previous ten years showed that
railroads wanted to get rid of rail passenger service because it was
losing them money," he said. While recognising the premise that "private
railroads were not interested in providing rail passenger service;"
he is sharply critical of the "myth that this could be done at break-
even or profit."
A crisis was occurring; the crash of the Penn Central, a major carrier
of passengers in the east, did not inspire confidance, and the plight
of the passenger train came into the public limelight.
Congress was under, pressure. It was under pressure from the railroads
which wanted to be relieved of the duty of operating passenger trains.
It was under pressure from the rail passenger lobby which sought to keep
things as they were. And labor, anxious to minimise job losses, was also
keen to preserve the status quo. At the same time, the anti-government
spending lobby talked in generalisations rather than specifics, and had
little constituence support.
The resulting legislation (US Congress, 1970) was very much a compromise.
It brought relief to the railroads, though perhaps not as much as they
would have liked. It satisfied a nationwide rail passenger lobby. It
preserved many jobs (and, as the railroads would continue to operate the
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service, existing contract agreements on manning levels and pay would be
retained). It also aimed at appeasing the "free-market" adherents but it
did this, strangely enough, by implicitly proceding under the assumptions
of the "discouragement" hypothesis which the free-marketeers so strongly
contested. It established AMTRAK as a "for profit" corporation; it was to
be government-aided for an initial two year period; if it proved to be
unsuccessful (financially), the theory was that the project would then
be scrapped. With hindsight, the final twinge of irony was the feeling
that the corporate structure being given to AMTRAK would help give it
an independent identity, and free it from Congressional interference.
Secretary of Transportation John Volpe had the job of designating the
end-points that were to be served. His initial plan consisted of a
pattern of routes emanating from New York and Chicago which, though they
radiated through the country, were criticised for failing to constitute
a complete netwcrk. In line with provision of a full nationwide system,
futher routes were therefore added between Seattle and San Diego, Los
Angeles and New Orleans, and Norfolk and Cincinatti. Many trains were
justified on the basis of inadequacy of other public transport, rather
than on the grounds that, compared to the potential of other modes,
they could provide the best service to the areas concerned.
Once the end-points had been designated, it fell to the Incorporators of
the Corporation to map out the precise line of the routes. As Roy Neel,
Legislative Assistant to Representative Gore (D, Tennessee), put it:
The AMTRAK:-scheme was put together in a couple of nights in a
hotel room. They just took out a route map and figured out where
they could go, where they'd have the fewest political and legal
problems with the railroads and with Congressmen, and that was
the system, and that remained intact for almost eight years.
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How we understand a problem depends largely on how we analyse it; yet,
how we analyse a problem depends on how we define it. The wrong questions
have been asked about AMTRAK since before its birth, the misconduct of
inquiry perpetuating the Original Sin; the real issues have never been
confronted.
As Simon (1957) said: "the capacity of the human mind for formulating
and solving complex problems is very small compared to the size -of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior
in the real world - or even for a reasonable approximation to such
objective rationality." Despite this - maybe because of it - people are
prone to simplify, yet to feel that on such a basis they have an
"objective" and considered opinion.
As Coates (1979) sees the situation, however, the fact that "any
significant public policy matter is an interlocking and nesting
collection of subissues" makes it difficult to "come to grips" with the
key issue, which is not usually:
Presented in a clear, cogent or neutral way by any of the parties
concerned...
Most people operate in ordinary discourse under the general
assumption that they understand the issues, and that the people
with public responsibilities also understand the issues. It is
important to test that hypothesis. It is my belief that quite to
the contrary, even those most intimately associated with issues,
public officials, bureaucrats, public interest groups, lobbyists,
various stakeholders often find it to their advantage not to
confront the issues, not to define them, not to state them clearly,
and not to use them as a basis for discourse, analysis, evaluation
and decision making. Take for example any of the current favorite
- areas of public concern, "oil spills in the Atlantic," "crime in
the streets," "housing policy," "energy policy" or whatever, and
make the following Gendanken (thought) experiment. State the
issue as you understand it. The chances are, from my experience,
that what you come up with is a phrase, or a question or a
platitude. It is unlikely that your issue statement will
explicitly be framed in terms of structural conflict. Getting it
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right is a challenge to one's perspicacity, accuracy, precision,
and judgement. It is easier to be vague. Most-issues definition
is conducted at the level of a teenager, whose favorite recourse
in the face of his imprecise and vague understanding is "like,
you know."
In the emotion-inspired, uninformed generalisations of many Members of
Congress we have already seen in earlier Theories, we have seen may
platitudes, many vaguenesses, many failures to define central issues.
A look into any book of Congressional discussion gives a vivid impression
of how problems are actually tackled. Maybe the point is most firmly
brought home by quoting this typical statement before a Congressional
committee, in this case Representative Marlenee (D, Montana) before
the 1979 House Transportation sub-committee Hearings. "Mr. Chairman,"
he said:
I have personally slept in pullmans so filthy that I could not
get my son to undress and go to bed in that pullman car. Of
course, I think this points up something about the ridership.
People will not patronise a flophouse. Of course, people will
not put up with waiting in a depot that resembles the corner
hangout in the slums where the muggers and pimps hang out...
Mr. Chairman, only the funeral industry can be allowed the luxury
of making sure its customers don't come back.
Actually, buried in the rhetoric, the old "discouragement" hypothesis
yet once more emerges. Not that the speaker thinks of what he is saying
specifically in such terms. Not that he has reflected on alternative
reasons why AMTRAK was not being so well used. Not that he has asked
himself whether there should be an AMTRAK and if so, what is should look
like. We are caught in the world of Parkinson where the trivial is the
talking point. Not only do dirty Pullman cars atract Congressional
attention; there seems to be a particular fascination with malfunctioning
toilets, a problem more easily contemplated than one questioning the
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ancestral privilege of the mobile sanitary appliance - along with the
train transporting it - to be in existence at all.
Hart (1976) cogently criticises the idea of "policy-making as a product
of rational analysis," his definition of which, on p-31, introduced
Theories A:
In fact on closer examination imagination and intuition often play
a larger role than rational analysis as it is described above.
Rather than systematically considering alternatives many plans
are based on a single concept, or in Sir Geoffrey Vicker's phrase,
"appreciation" of the city. Applied imagination therefore is an
extremely important, if often little mentioned, method underlying
plan making and policy formulation.
This does indeed nicely describe the "system" of "visionary" Congressmen
who have transported images of AMTRAK to their psyche as a revered idde
fixe, who have an "appreciation" of the problem, rather than an
"understanding."
Lindblom (1980) attacks the reality of the rational ideal from a
different direction: "because policies follow from political interaction
rather than from analytical conclusions, the process does not correspond
to conventionally conceived rational problem solving, which is an
intellectual process." We have here, in essence, the "political" argument
which has surfaced so often above. Yet, in many ways, political and
learning theories are not disparate, but symbiotic. The immediacy of a
particular political situation may cloud the information field and
inhibit full concept formulation and learning processes. On the other
hand, a poor and biased information base may make the holder more
susceptible to an attractive political argument in line with its tenets
which, though unsubstantiated in an information sense, can then gain the
political hallmark of approval; in this way ideas conceived in a
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visionary sense may gain validation.
The vision thus gains in definition, and leads to what Kaplan (1964)
refers to as the "premature closure of our ideas," a result of
convincing ourselves that a situation is well-structured when, in fact
it indeed is not.
Given this view, it is somewhat disturbing to hear John Hoyt, Legislative
Assistant to Congressman Devine (R, Ohio) say that: "It appeared the
Congress felt that {AMTRAK} was the best alternative at the time." It
is yet more worrying to think of the implications of the statement of
Matthew Scocozza, Senior Minority Counsel, Senate Commerce Committee, to
the effect that: "Congress made the policy decision that passenger
ridership was in the public interest; it provided an important
alternative." This implies that Congress had evaluated the whole range
of possible plans in light of stated goals which, as we are discovering,
is rather far removed from the reality of the affair.
As Simon (1958) suggested, decision making often reduces to a choice
between "doing x" or "not doing x." Comments Rondinelli (1973): " "not
doing x" may represent the whole set of possible alternatives that
decision makers lack the resources,. interest, information, or power to
evaluate... If "doing x" is considered satisfactory to the participating
interest groups, alternatives may never be explicated."
To take Roy Neel's encapsulation of the mood of the day, this appears
to be just what happened. The question was "whether to retain what had
become bankrupt passenger service, or allow the market place to take its
toll and let the passenger train go the way of the trolley car," and the
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answer having been the selection of the former.
Notice how the problem becomes defined in terms of an already existing
service, rather than in terms of user needs, a point taken up by Levine
(1978) who points out that questions have been generated by:
Carrier financial instability (eg. bankrupt railroads, insolvent
airlines, deficit transit operators etc.), and focus on ilternative
means of federal assistance to "solve" the problem... Carrier
desires become synonymous with transportation problems, issues
and/or national interest. Obviously, since carriers cannot
alleviate their own problems (that is why they have needs), the
federal government is viewed as the logical candidate for
rescuing the various modes.
In effect, the carrier need is seen in concrete terms, but allieviating
it is seen in relation to providing for transportation needs. The
information base relates to the problems of the carriers, and is enhanced
by the enactment of a politically-distributive "solution," which, though
only satisfactory to the "user" constituency (which functions as a
"constraint" and is, essentially, served as a by-product) may mistakenly,
in the absence of further consideration, be regarded as "optimal."
Once established, the danger is great that such a solution carries
forward because, though it is only the result of a partial view, it has
the appearance of solidity - of structure. Thenceforth, as Sch8n (1971)
suggests, "the issues around which policy and program must be shaped"
are accepted "as mysteriously given." The frame is not challenged, only
the sub-units within it. Rein (1976) elucidates further:
Man is, after all, interested not only in controlling, manipulating
and predicting the consequences for his environment so that it
falls in with his purposes, but also in creating and maintaining
a sense of order, continuity and meaning in life. Our concern for
order, both in nature and in human affairs, derives from a
fundamental inability to tolerate too much confusion and disarray.
Structure and meaning are essential to our existence. Therefore,
when objective facts threaten the orderly framework which assigns
meaning to events, we tend to repudiate the facts rather than
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abandon the framework. In fact, the quest for order and meaning
may be more compelling than the search for truth, which can
threaten the order we have created.
Authors such as Zwerling (1974) and Hart (1976) have criticised
prescriptive policies which mold the future and leave little scope for
change. The BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) system was the target for
Zwerling's analysis, while Hart looked at road-building policies in
London. The subjects of both works reflect hugely expensive and
controversial immovable physical structures.
Zwerling contrasts the "comprehensive" strategy which creates such
immortal monuments to an "incremental" strategy "suitable to a situation
in which the future is uncertain and the appropriate method of coping
with it is trial-and-error... Lacking a commitment to a specific vision
of the future," the decision-maker "attempts to maximise his chances of
being able to meet whatever possibilities the future may hold. Tactically,
the decision-maker tries to avoid restrictive commitments, to minimise
the risk of being wrong."
AMTRAK could technically be said to have been intended as an example
of this latter strategy, set up only as an experiment, to be terminated
should it fail. As Arthur Lewis, President of the American Bus Association,
and one of the Incorporators of AMTRAK, said in 1979 (US Congress, 1979b):
As an incorporator, we took on the position of putting in some
long-haul trains that were mandated in the Act the idea being
that after 2 years and 2 months AMTRAK if it was not able to
generate a profit on those long haul routes, that AMTRAK would
be able to discontinue that service.
I frankly took a very active role as an incorporator, one,
believing that I was making a major contribution to this country
and trying to do something about rail service. But at that time I
did not expect the long-haul trains to survive July 1, 1973. I
fully expected the the corridors to survive, and I expected
the corridor to be made possible.
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Yet, as we have seen, this was not to happen, and the AMTRAK scheme
became a prescription to mold the future, not by creating an immovable
physical structure, nor necessarily by creating sunken capital
investment, but by creating above all a system of perception of worth
and evaluation - a value frame if you will - which caused future
valuations to occur only under the assumption of a creation which already
was.
In Theory B2, cognitive learning processes which acted to reinforce
existing information bases or ideologies or interests of concern to
Members of Congress were examined. Yet, above individual perceptions,
there widely exists a yet more deeply rooted conceptual framework
setting up norms as to what AMTRAK is here to do, and that framework
not only leads to filtering of information received, but also to selection
of only certain processes of learning in accord with, and which will
reinforce the framework.
With the establishment of AMTRAK in 1970, the concept of the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation became firmly embedded in the minds of
many Members of Congress, interpreted as meaning that AMTRAK should serve
all the nation. It is thus easy to see the logic of concluding that as
their District is part of the nation, it should be served. It also paved
the way for political pressures to further reinforce such beliefs.
Learning only occurred selectively in accord with the dictates of the
original plan. Ideas involving "regionalism" and "inter-modalism" for
example, have not been developed because they do not form a part of it.
As Rein suggests might happen, signals of changed purpose are ignored as
noise if they don't accord with it, not necessarily deliberately, but
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as a sub-conscious cognitive selection process further encouraged by the
political milieu.
Thus, as Charles Hilty, Administrative Assistant to Representative
Madigan (R, Illinois) said, there was a "perception that a national
system should continue to be provided. I think there is a strong desire
to maintain a system such as it was when AMTRAK started." And Michael
Gessel, Legislative Assistant to Representative Matsui (D, California)
implicitly referred to the inhibiting effect of the original frame. As
he sees it, trains are symbols of the past, and when Congressmen:
Think of passenger railroads they think of the long-distance
trains, and they think of those old codgers because they're
trying to relive the joys of their youth, and they don't think of
rail corridors, and if they do think of rail corridors, they
think of them in the same terms that they think of the long-
distance passenger routes.
Perhaps the best example of how the original conception of AMTRAK, ill-
attuned to today's needs though it may be, continues to program policy,
concerns the criteria for evaluating service improvements set up under
the AMTRAK Reorganization Act of 1979 (US Congress, 1979d). The standards
set were in terms of Passenger Miles per Train Mile (150 minimum for
long-distance, 80 for short-distance) and Avoidable Loss per Passenger
Mile (7. maximum for long-distance, 9e for short-distance).
Said Representative James Florio (D, New Jersey), Chairman House
Transportation sub-committee:
Political benefits should have really no consideration, and
that's in fact what we've done in this last legislation. We
have provided for an objective determination - it's 150 PM/TM
and then a cost ratio, and a train or a route has to fit
within that criteria, or it goes.
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"Objective" though this measure may seem, however, it effectively
dictates the continuance of the present system, for it merely sets a
minimal standard which a large part of the present network can meet.
Instead of directing attention to how assets might be reallocated
towards a more relevant and efficient system, the criteria simply
perpetuate an imperfect and dated original conception. Because the
criteria appear to be respectable and objective, Members of Congress
will tendto conclude that any train which meets them, meets a certain
and legitimate s'tandard, and this will deflect attention away from
the consideration of possible alternative arrangements. The criteria
thus reinforce the existing image of AMTRAK as a "national" system,
and form part of the conceptual filtering system through which
information - albeit unknowingly - is channeled and learning conducted.
A useful way of putting this problem in perspective is through the type
of "value-hierarchy" developed by Wachs and Schofer (1969). In this
structure, they define five levels. At the top are values "extremely
high-level abstractions," beneath which are goals:
Idealized end-states of the environment... Goals are generalised
statements which broadly relate the physical environment to
values but to which, because they are also high-level
abstractions, no test for fulfilment may readily be applied...
An "objective" is a specific statement which is the outgrowth
of a goal, and which is truly attainable because of its reference
to the physical world. In addition, an objective is stated in
such a way as to allow some form of measurement of the degree
to which it has been attained.
"Criteria" are the specific measures or tests which reflect the
degree of attainment of particular objectives... The minimum
acceptable level of the criterion... is known as a "standard."...
The existence of meaningful standards and criteria... implies the
existence of objectives. Objectives, in turn, are valid, if they
are an outgrowth of goals, which depend upon the values of society.
The Lower- levels of the hierarchy are, however, easiest to grapple with
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and, as Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) say, decision-makers "often rule
out of bounds the uninteresting (to them), the remote, the imponderable,
and the poorly understood, no matter how important." Higher level
abstractions thus tend to get ignored, as lower-order ones are more
readily accessible. As Wachs and Schofer comment:
The evaluation of alternative transportation plans has seldom,
if ever, been based upon a rational inquiry into appropriate
goals, meaningful objectives, and logical criteria which result
from the chain of dependence relating these to the societal
values. Objectives and criteria, rather, have been narrow in
scope and have reflected the intuition and biases of planners
who usually did not have explicit statements of goals and
objectives toward which to work.
In executing lower level work, however, implied weights are given to
the higher level orders, and these may well be different from were
goals or values to be considered directly - in other words, the results
may not meet the needs of society. "Many current planning efforts have
not established comprehensive and specific objectives, and, consequently
plan design has become the process of merely extending and expanding
existing physical facilities." (Wachs and Schofer).
This is, indeed, the story of the 1979 "restructuring" which merely set
narrowly defined criteria and standards which made no reference to
goals and values. By failing to look goals and values head-on - and
hence address the central question of the transportation wants of
society - the past was allowed to continue programming the future. The
imputed values and goals implied by the "criteria" were not consonant
with best meeting the transportation needs of society, but on minimising
the cost of an existing bate noir, the value of which had not been
considered.
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We see as typical symptoms of the malaise, a failure to define the
values of particular services. In Theory Dl it was suggested that a
failure to properly consider costs of particular routes made it
extremely difficult to meaningfully evaluate AMTRAK management
performance. More important, however, is that no attention was paid
to the other side of the equation - benefits. With social benefits
ignored, a train producing no social benefits may continue if it
meets the criteria set; conversely, a worthwhile service would
technically (though not necessarily politically) be inviable if it fails
to meet them.
In an interview with US News and World Report in February, 1972 (USNWR,
1972), then AMTRAK President Roger Lewis cited the British subsidy
scheme as a good one. This system specifically identifies socially
desirable service and,. if the social value is greater than the loss,
pays a "social fare" on loss-making services, a payment for which the
railroad agrees to operate the service. Lewis clearly felt that American
socially desirable services would be identified, evaluated and subsidised
accordingly, but this was not to happen.-
If we trace the criteria back, we come to the Department of Transportation,
The Rail Services Planning Office of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC, 1978) had criticised DOT's preliminary report (US DOT, 1978) and
said that: "The Secretary's final route structure recommendations should
be based on the social criteria set forth in the AMTRAK Improvement Act
of 1978, rather than on the criteria used in the development of the
preliminary recommendations."
The DOT had retorted that:
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The statute manifestly did not require nor favor replacement of
quantitative financial performance factors with the abstract
notion of social needs. Instead, the Congress expressly declared
that AMTRAK should be operated and managed as though it were a
profit making business. (US DOT, 1979).
We once more come back to the faults of the original conception.
It would be mistaken, though, to assume that we would be confronting the
top of the "value-hierarchy" by merely carrying out a cost-benefit
analysis, and retaining those routes for which benefits were seen to
exceed costs. The value-hierarchy implies starting at the top with a
value, and working down to a result. Looking for meeting needs. And
not at necessarily using a particular mode.
Such an approach might have started by the definition of values such as
"mobility" and "equity." Search for information and goal setting might
then have proceded directed by such concepts, and possible solutions
(by which - as will be explained in greater depth later - I mean both
outputs and processes which produce them) tested in the light of their
ability to reflect, the values to be espoused. Such an approach would have
required the devotion of thought to consideration of what the role of
passenger service in the modern economy might be in the light of all its
attributes, its virtues, its disadvantages, and all these in the light of
those pertaining to other forms of transportation. Thus, evaluation would
have started with a wide net, and worked down to the solution to be
adopted.
But all this should have been done back in 1969 and 1970, before AMTRAK
was ever born. At that time, the real issues of values and consequent
wants were ignored. Discussion did not center around how those wants
might be satisfied, around which piece of machinery in which situation
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might best enable us to achieve our desires. Instead, it started with
the machinery itself; in beginning discussion having already blindly
progressed far up the decision tree, many alternative branches were
inevitably ignored.
Such mistakes then made it likely that in 1979 the same errors would
be repeated, given that they had become enshrined as accepted orthodoxy.
The structure of AMTRAK routes had become, in the terms of the Quine
(1950) quotation which headed this section, a "fundamental law."
Under such circumstances it was the yet more essential that a return to
basic values be made. Yet, the false path already established, it was
the yet more unlikely that steps would be re-trod, thinking started anew.
The Original Sin had been committed; now the consequences had to be
borne.
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A N A L Y S I S 0 F A N A L Y S I S
There are those who think these sorts of things {eg. economic
evelopment of the central city, pollution, problems of the
handicapped} can be quantified and there are consultants more
than willing to try. No doubt the effort should be made, and it
may help sharpen the choices. No one can argue against
rationality. But it may be doubted that any problem that is as
complicated a mixture as America's total transportation system,
embedded in and integral to an even more complicated society,
can ever be made to fit in a two-pan balance.
- NRPC (1976)
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As indicated in the introduction, this work not only sets out to explain
the existence of a certain structure - a long-distance, inter-connected,
rail-passenger network; it also seeks to examine the way we are prone to
understand phenomena, and critique it. This section focuses on the work
of the analyst, particularly the supposedly value-neutral "outside"
observer, and shows that similar problems to those distroting the output
of decision-makers afflict his work.
Levine (1978) is strongly critical of six "national" transportation
studies which, though purporting to be comprehensive and value-neutral,
were in fact narrow and partial. He finds that:
Government studies have tended to ask all the wrong questions
so that even "good" and responsive answers result in obvious
and somewhat irrelevant conclusions. Wrong questions are ones
which do not consider the role of government in planning,
organising and controlling the transportation system.
He is particularly critical of the studies for ignoring:
The ubiquitous problem of national versus regional needs...
Assuming the need for national policy in all areas of trans-
portation is a disservice to national goals and public interest.
Ignoring the possibility that regional policy might be the
best form of national policy undermines research, and limits
the options available to policymakers...
What may be most disturbing about the subject of issue class-
ification is that past research efforts have not attempted to
organise and interrelate alleged transportation problems...
Determination of trade-offs among various goals cannot be
undertaken unless all national objectives, contradictory as they
may be, are identified and assigned relative priorities...
A classification scheme which locates issues within a comprehen-
sive and interrelated network (that is, system) is prerequisite
to meaningful transportation research and the development of
effective national transportation policy...
The sample, as with the universe it represents, is characterised
by a list of issues where identification required little research.
Identified issues tended to be those questions raising from the
criteria (or lack of criteria) the federal government applied to
regulate or promote transportation, as well as carrier needs
relative to the availablility of subsequent public aid...
In conclusion, a review of historic research studies indicates that
much research is not research in its precise and technical
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interpretation. Rather, it is unimaginative, similarly structured,
predictably formed, and redundant discussion of popular issues,
begging the root problem which is causing increased federal
involvement in transportation.
How then soes this come about? My feeling is that it is related to the
search for structure and the basic desire for accomplishment. The most
obvious, the least abstract, are the easiest to tackle because they
are the most sharply defined. It is easier to be concl-isive when every-
thing is laid before you. The temptation is to take everything that can
be readily perceived, but erroneously assume that it represents the
total field of inquiry.
Such error is closely allied with a misconceived desire for a "rational"
analysis. The idea of rationality forms the mainstay of classical
economics, for it provides a clean framework of analysis. As Harsanyi
(1966) said:
The concept of rational behavior is often a very powerful explan-
atory principle, because it can account for a very large amount
of empirical facts about people's behavior in terms of a few
simple assumptions about the goals (or ends) people are trying
to achieve.
It provides for solidity and clarity, avoids the confusion of allowing
for every little variable, provides explanation, prediction, and sure
standards against which to compare reality. The results of "rational"
analysis exude confidance and make it an ideal for the professional; it
is seen as the means to the objective, value-neutral analysis it is for
him to produce, The concept of rationality is thus a warm and welcome
Linus blanket: it gives us faith in organisations; it gives us a feeling
of being in control because of the powerful and certain analytic ability
it engenders.
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There are, herein, two crucial aspects. The first is that we are assuming
rational behavior on the part of the actors, the product of whose
behavior we are analysing. But, the second is that we ourselves are torn
towards executing our analysis in what we conceive of as a "rational"
frame, one in which we see the world as an equation calibrated according
to our understanding of goals and objectives, and solved through the
introduction of the measurable inputs and outputs which we perceive to
act in furtherance of them. In doing this, we tend to neglect the
unmeasurable, although it may be just such phenomena which contain the
encoding which, like the DNA of organic life, must be identified if a
real understanding of cause is to be had, and if the analysis is to
have any meaning.
Often actual outcomes do not match the analyst's ideal predicted outcome
(narrowly defined and the result of partial analysis that it is). When
this happens, the natural inclination is to recommend additions or
subtractions of components from the faulty system, rather than consider
the need for modifications to the framework supplying those parts. Thus,
in the case of AMTRAK, the analyst will first assume that there are
actual goals (without necessarily defining them) and that the actors at
play are attempting to maximise their achievement. Having done this, if
he finds a fault, the question will not be so much one of the need to
understand concepts behind network development, and reconfigure political,
managerial, or other "infrastructural" components; rather, it will be for
the analyst to find that certain routes are not energy efficient, and
others lose too much money, Surgery can then be recommended.
But this will only be a partial view, and herein lies the danger. For,
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it may be used to falsely present a particular view as fully justified
and explained by analysis. As Greenberger et al (1976) point out, while:
The growth in the useful application of policy models to the
problems facing government decision makers is not keeping up
with the increase in either the number or complexity of these
problems... at the same time, the use of models to dramatize or
publicise particular points of view is overshadowing their use
for the enlightenment of policy makers.
Kramer (1975) neatly explains how this happens:
Although public policy analysis is only partial, not comprehensive,
analysis, the techniques used and the emphasis on quantification
give the results of analysis a "scientific" appearance - an
appearance of value-free rationality at work. Non-analysts, whether
administrative generalists, Congressmen, or ordinary citizens,
disregard these scientific results of analysis at their peril.
How can people in this "post-industrial age" disregard science?
If they do, they must be acting on ideological, not scientific
grounds. Nonanalysts who wish to set aside a given piece of
analytic work must be able to raise the questions that are of
necessity, left out of partial analysis. To avoid the castigation
of the analyst, who has staked out the claim to science, the
nonanalyst decision maker must be able to see that the scientific
results of analysis are in fact the results of an ideology. This
ideology leads the analyst to direct his or her inquiry to certain
sources and ignore others, or alter the weights of various factors
according to perceptions of reality reflected in his or her models.
The dangers of the partial appearing scientific are most immediate in
the CBO (1979) energy report, used as evidence during House Appropriations
Committee Hearings (US Congress, 1979a), yet which - as is shown in
APPENDIX B - is a worthless document constructed on brash and unjustified
assumptions.
GAO studies have invariably been cost oriented, and have once more
possessed an ability to blind based on hard numbers although, as Levine
points out, even costing is really an art, rather than a science.
DOT, as we have seen in bounty, also has a remarkable penchant to use
science to its own end. The Secretary's 1979 study was a particularly
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insidious example, reflecting as it did a pure reductionist effort.
It is interesting that Nat Simon, Executive Director, Ohio Rail
Transportation Authority, reached the conclusion that "the US DOT
assumed that AMTRAK should provide long-distance service" because
"the report ignored the value of regional rail corridors outside the
Northeast." (US Congress, 1979b). This is certainly not the view of the
DOT, but became imputed as a goal because, in failing to confront
values and goals directly, the existing framework became automatically
perpetuated.
While, however, the average cynic will not be too surprised to find
such phenomena in government agency output, it is particularly sickening
to find it in the apparently objective analysis of an academic. Coates
(1979) however, is not surprised:
The academic tends to divide the problem along disciplinary
categories rather than treat it holistically. After all, to
undertake a holistic treatment of any subject whether it be crime,
public transportation, war, or forest management, would require
the expert to step outside his expertise and make himself
vulnerable personally, psychologically, and intellectually. That
learning experience hits very hard at the ego of a forty-five
year old senior professor who is used to guaranteed accomplishment
in a narrow area sustained and supported by a covey of graduate
students often treating him as a minor deity.
The academic tends to opt for repeating the narrow,. the prosaic,
the certifiable, the pedestrian, and the safe rather than
engaging the policy issue and going past the fact to generate
public wisdom... The conflict between being right and being useful
is not a conflict of right and wrong, but one of vanity and self-
interest versus vulnerability and public service... The bureaucrat
and the expert also has a penchant for wanting to convert issues
into problems since that provides something he can safely sink
his teeth into.
The purpose of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, we are told inside the cover of Hilton (1980) "is to assist
policy makers, scholars, businessmen, the press, and the public by
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providing objective analysis of national and international issues."
Yet, the Hilton analysis, "rational" though it may appear, is anything
but objective. It is nothing but an attempt to validate - in a quant-
itative cookbook style - a firmly pre-established opinion (see, for
example, Hilton, 1958) by the use of a series of carefully selected
and narrow facts. Although Hilton makes the good point that the
"discouragement" hypothesis upon which AMTRAK was based was fallacious,
his "analysis" is entirely conceived within the assumption of this
faulty framework. Performance is thus judged in the light of the present
system, rather than under some possibly better arrangement. The results
of this partial analysis are then used to form the general conclusion
that AMTRAK serves no -useful function in the national transport network,
and should be dissolved. Because he, by default, imputes a dated image
into the concept of the passenger train, it is not surprising that it
is beyond him to see a modern role-for passenger service, and for him
to confidantly arrive at his findings.
Hilton's approach is, moreover, entirely "black-box" failing to give
consideration to political and management processes, let alone to the
original AMTRAK conceptualisation. As such, it is incapable of leading
us to cause, diagnosis and possible cure. In total, the work contains no
more than the twisted statement of a self-evident half-truth, and is
really of no use to anyone.
Mulvey (1978) is also confidant about his conclusion. He declares that
his report "has examined the AMTRAK experiment in light of the trans-
portation objectives that it was designed to fulfil," finds that
"long-haul trains make little sense except for limited amounts of
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recreational travel," and recommends that such service be reduced or
eliminated, such as remains being priced at cost, and that short-
distance markets be re-examined.
Mulvey's is certainly a more worthwhile contribution to the subject than
Hilton's. He does discuss different kinds of rail passenger routes and
service, and he does recommend change. But, although he discusses
problems in the early AMTRAK legislation, this is not developed with
respect to change scenarios and his product, lacking discussion of the
processes at work causing the problems he identifies, is more description
than analysis.
His recommendations may have validity but, because he ignores the value,
political and organisational frameworks within which AMTRAK operates, the
given frameworks are implicitly assumed to be capable of providing for
the change he suggests. By ignoring this base, credence is given~- in
effect tacitly and unknowingly - to the idea of rationality as being
built into the machine that has produced the outputs. Which we know by
now is unfortunately untrue. It is like trying to solve a problem on a
computer which has the wrong program in. You can try feeding in the data
as may times as you like, but you will not get an answer unless the
program is changed. In similar fashion, the wrong values have been
inputed into the system; a new arrangement whicn itself has (different)
inputed values is recommended, but no connection is made between the
two sets of inputed values which lie behind the goals, and between the
inputed values and the processes they signify and induce.
A useful metaphor for the analyst's thought processes lies in the
working of an electromagnet. Imagine such a device, and an object in its
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field which is attracted when the current flows. We cannot see the
magnetic field which attracts the object, and we therefore tend to
think of the magnet itself attracting the object, rather than the field.
Yet, that field is the essential medium through which the force of
attraction is exercised, unseen though it may be. Finally, there is the
electricity without which the unit cannot function at all. Though we
cannot see it, the power of the electricity determines, through the
magnetic field, the degree of attraction. Though it may be thought of
as external to the magnet-attraction-object system, it is always present
when the system is operating, and in fact completely controls it.
Similarly, a value system (the electricity) creates a visible object
such as AMTRAK (the magnet) through which organisational and political
structures (the magnetic field) implied by the value system, act to create
the output of a structure of routes and services thereupon (the object).
Rein (1976) looks for an alternative.
If we wish to reject the value-decisionistic view of the
positivists, which holds that values must be accepted as given
since they are established by the will or by passion; that we
must distinguish between grounded fact statements and ungrounded
value statements; and that the gulf between goals and value
judgements and the universe of facts can be best bridged by an
applied science model.
He suggests as competing framework a:
value critical approach. According to this view, pure science
requires analytic procedures that cannot be applied to the
study of society. Moreover, we are not even interested in "pure"
social science - a social science divorced from action - since the
meaning of social events is inextricably bound up with the values
we attach to them...
A primary function of analysis is to submit goals to critical
review rather than merely treating them as given... The value-
critical approach takes the line that values are not simply
wishes and desires but are grounded in a fundamental structure
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which is central to real processes, and they can therefore become
a meaningful subject of debate...
When I affirm equality as a value, I want further to inquire what
this means and why it is worthwhile, and not simply how one can
reach this end or how one can catalogue the views of those who
support, repudiate or are indifferent to it... End-values, societal
goals, etc., are inherently- controversial. They cannot be treated
"scientifically" along positivist lines.
A value-critical approach tries to understand the logic, meaning
and consistency of ends, and it attempts to make a critique of
values at every stage of analysis. Every F{act} statement can be
regarded as demonstrating some truth within a framework of values
and assumptions. Analytic procedures themselves imply values. For
example, it is the very nature of measurement that we agree to
neglect factors which may be of major importance but are not
susceptible to measurement...
Policy analysis is not invalidated by the close relationship
between values and modes of analysis, but it does seem that there
will never be one "true analysis." We cannot conclude- that every
analysis must simply be judged good or bad within the framework
of its value assumptions. On the contrary, the study of policy can
be most perceptive when it examines afresh the critical values
assumption on which action proceeds. And the assumption about the
context within which the analysis is framed is often most important,
including the definition.and the choices between constraints and
options which are typically based on belief or opportunity or both.
Rein is recommending going straight to the electricity. Yet that
electricity is so invisible, so unfathomable that it is almost beyond
our grasp.
It is easiest, most obvious, to ignore the process altogether and to
concentrate on the output itself and, on the basis of its perceived
benefits (or lack thereof) conclude that more or less of it is needed.
Under such circumstances value systems are ignored, as are the processes
which translate them into the output. Yet this is the way Hilton (and
much of Congress) conceives the problem.
It is one up to examine the outputs and, in the light of their nature,
to recommend their reconfiguration. Yet, there is the temptation to base
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such analysis on existing outputs, rather than returning to basic values,
and proceding down the value-hierarchy to the end result which the
values-to-be-espoused imply. Without such soul-searching, the new result
produced may itself fail to reflect the desired value structure.
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C 0 N C L U S I O N - T H A T T H 0 U S H A L T
N O L 0 N G E R
The terrible responsibility of the planner is that... he
creates monuments that survive.
- Hall (1970)
Please could you tell me how I might recognise a moral good
when I see one on the shelf.
- Harvard Business School student
during class on "Ethical Aspects
of Corporate Policy."
S I N
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This final section reviews the theories put forward in this text,
particularly in the light of the previous section, and presents the
conclusions of the work as a whole.
This inquiry started by asking the seemingly innocent question as to
why AMTRAK was dominated by a long-distance inter-connected national
network, rather than a series of short-distance regional rail systems.
Theories A consisted of a series of propositions as to why the observed
pattern was most logical. Each proposition nested in the theory that the
pattern had been arrived at as a result of "rational" analysis targetted
at best addressing the-value, be it mobility, equity, energy saving, or
even nostalgia satisfaction, implied by the goals assumed by the
proposition. It would be fair to say that the overall value frame within
which I worked in testing Theories A was one which implied that AMTRAK's
job was to provide transportation services where it had the greatest
relative inherent advantage with respect to the total transportation
needs of the community and to the total transportation system, comprised
as it is of the various modes. The precepts of Theories A were found to
be deficient on these and on their particular counts,.
I shall not pretend that Theories A were in any way an attempt to find
"the answer:" they were at best a critique of the response to a certain
set of goals (with associated imputed values) in the light of a certain
value frame. It would be pointless to simply declare: "ALL CHANGE!"
(as Mulvey does), because we have not done a full value-critical
appraisal: particularly because, at this stage, we have no concept of
"process" (a concept Mulvey does not develop) - of what to change.
This work was not intended to find a solution, but to gain an
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understanding of the processes at work; accordingly, output evaluation
does not continue past Theories A, the emphasis being placed on process.
It is at this stage that I must mention what I consider to be a rather
significant omission from Rein (1976)'s otherwise impressive value-
critical scheme. It is, at heart, a scheme that focuses on output, but
tends. to ignore process. Yet value-critical analysis of process is
essential to provide explanation of a result which we may not like and
is equally, if not more, important in developing the means by which a
value-critically approved output may be obtained.
Theory BI (a tale of philandering, risk-averse Congressmen) is a very
attractive theory because it is readily understandable, and because
there is so much immediate evidence of the Theory-in-operation. We may
learn something of poor political process, We see how - to our mind -
Members of Congress pervert the process by each automatically demanding
service through his District. Such analysis (which in effect compares
the "magnetic field" to the "object") will, however, give little power
to explain or effect change by itself. An exhortation to the effect that
Congressmen should become more "moral" is unlikely to achieve much if
the environment and structuring of component units within it remain
unaltered.
Theory B2 goes more deeply into the micro-structure of cause and effect.
It helps demonstrate how Members of Congress learn, and shows how
information sources are not randomly searched, but tapped in a way likely
to create a biased picture. From such knowledge, the normative
investigator might set about looking for ways to improve learning
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processes. But he will not get very far if he considers such processes
in a vacuum, for the basis of learning is not merely the information
received on a day-to-day basis, important though it can be in preventing
learning, but the underlying value frame which serves as the information
base for that learning, often quite sub-consciously. As was shown in
Theory E, it is that frame which defines the environment within which
learning takes place. It is only by seeking out the encoded values that
we can understand why, for example, the 1979 criteria cannot generate
change, even though they may have been genuinely designed for that
purpose.
The first section of Theory B2 is in many ways a bridge between Theories
B1 and B2. It helps tell us why constituents are likely to be pleased
by Members of Congress voting for AMTRAK routes through their home town;
it helps expose their misconceived value-frame which in turn "informs"
Congressmen as to the action they must take in order to satisfy their
constituency.
The actions of Members seen through the self-preservationist B1 process
are equally consistent with a value program which encodes in the process
the notion that all the nation should have rail passenger service except,
in this case, it is the constituents mis-programmed value frame which
acts on the risk-averse Congressmen who accept it not because they
believe in it, but because it is a risk-minimising strategy. Constituency
expectations which Members try to satisfy, whether efficient or not, are
in turn based upon a basis of entitlement of the 1970 Act, the Original
Sin.
Theories C, like Theories B. are also useful, but are only of real
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explanatory ability when referred to the underlying value program.
Further, they are in many ways filtrates of Theories B, D and ultimately
E in that it is the political process, and its reaction to value
programming that generates the milieu in which the subject of Theories
C - management - operates. This is most obvious in the cases of
Theories Cl, C2 and C3, but is so in all cases.
C3 is included, although it may appear to be a restatment of B1, because
it demonstrates a different approach; it is subtly different. B1 and B2
assume that Members of Congress behave in a risk-averse or misinformed
way; they do not necessarily hold that they over-rule management.
It is important to differentiate between Theories C3, C4, C5 and Dl. C3
claims that management has no power, and simply has to obey Congressional
instruction; C4 maintains that AMTRAK does have some discretion, but
abuses it, C5 also that a degree of discretion exists, but organisational
norms and learning processes are inadequate. All three assume that there
is some identification of role and purpose. Theory D1, however, proposes
that confusion arises from non-definition of goals and objectives: it is
not, in this case, that AMTRAK is necessarily powerless or evil or stupid.
It is that they don't know what to do.
An easy trap into which the unwary may fall is to relate but a black-
box view of the institutions which represent process (the "magnet")
directly to output. In this way, there is great danger in misinterpreting
a theory such as Theory C4, and "blaming" management for doing a "bad
job" without considering the constraints under which they must operate,
and the implicit value frame imposed by both their organisational
configuration and relationship.to the (and within the) political system.
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Effect is often easy to discuss, and an excellent base for fascile
scapegoating. For real understanding - and the possibility for change -
to be on the agenda, we must go beyond effect to cause.
Theory C5 does consider the historic railroad procedures and implied
values which it suggests AMTRAK has perpetuated, and so is perhaps
more directly linked to the Original Sin value frame theory than the
other C theories. However, it does not go beyond the visible perspective
to trace the source of implantation of the value mis-program. It
certainly has some useful insight into learning processes, but any
remedies that might therefrom result would be a case of "necessary" but
not "suffucient" change.
C5 discusses a value mis-program and inadequate associated learning
processes, as it afflicts one organisation; the inference is that if the
organisation could, should it so choose, "learn to learn" in a more
relevant way, all might be well. But the organisational structure - both
the supposed "corporate" existence of AMTRAK itself, and its institutional
links to other bodies, mitigates against change as becomes apparent in
Theories D.
Theories DI and D2 are theories of organisational and authority structure.
Responsibility is seen to lie not simply with wilful mismanagement, or
alternatively poor management processes, nor with Congressional mis-
behavior or ignorance per se, but with an institutional structure - both
intra (in AMTRAK) and inter-organisational, which symbolises and directs
such phenomena.
Theories D, however, beg the question of values. Root cause lies not
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simply in the presence of structure. Beyond such knowledge, we must know
why such structure is there. To know this, we must ultimately go to the
value mis-programming which created the structure in the first place,
itself consequent on non-reference to values at AMTRAK's start. This is
only discussed in Theory E. It is only by doing this that we can step
outside'the value frame within which the lower-level theories operate,
and see the whole perspective, and the place of the features we observe
within it. Thus we go beyond, for example, the D2 observation that
centralisation is a bad thing and appreciate that such organisation
does not exist in a vaccuum, but reflects the particular brand of
"national" image unwittingly imputed into the AMTRAK scheme.
Knowledge gained from DI or D2 may lead to ideas for installing a
new structure. However, without reference to values, that creation might
be equally at fault. A more efficient structure or process is not enough.
Value-critical analysis of process (in which I include "structure" and
sub-processes) is required, and a process installed consonant of
implementation of targets to meet defined goals reflective of values-to-
be-espoused.
Many of Theories B, C and D are convincing in themselves. But danger lies
in accepting a partial explanation as a whole one. The "truth" in any
one of these theories is less important in itself than how it is
perceived, ordered and acted upon. It is perhaps most helpful to regard
Theories B, C and D as a system of conditions relating to each other
through the value structure in a hierarchy of stimuli and reactions.
It is a complex system, because it is not a system without feedback.
Once the system is energised (by the Original Sin value frame)
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reinforcing consequent processes come into play (elements of Theories
B through D). They in turn are related to each other, the one triggering
another, and so on which, like an irrepressible energy trapped within
the original frame fortifies it. The links between the theories:
access to decoding the puzzle, only becomes possible when seen in relation
to values. The truth of any one theory can only be established (or
disproved) when put in place on the cause-effect chain in relation to
the other theories, and when the whole is set against values.
Some limited explanatory power may be derived from study of consequent
processes, but real understanding requires a trek back to the Original
Sin value frame to make visible the boundaries of the all-encompassing
Original Sin value frame "action space." Management distortion, for
example, may occur as a result of the impact of the political system,
but this latter itself operates in a value frame action space resultant
upon the value frame implied by the original conception. Moves towards
change based on lower-order consequent processes alone will be largely
ineffective. The "critiera" of the 1979 AMTRAK Reorganization Act, for
example, supposedly act on BI and C4 problems, but fail to effect real
change because value mis-programming is ignored.
The importance of the Theory E approach is that once the value-program
is understood, it is as if in a mathematical proof by induction - we
have proved up to n = o; it is then not necessary to have the proof of
lower-order theories. We have, by definition, found the "whole" truth.
But, from this infinite quantity, a vista without horizon is opened.
Through it, we can work down lower-order concepts, processes, identities,
objects - all manner of eminences grises, to gain understanding of their
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existence and plan on their improvement. He have penetrated to the
essential encoding; now we may undertake genetic engineering.
In order to gain understanding that will allow the analyst access to the
encoding at the heart of the process, and not merely to non-controlling
(though likely reinforcing) co-variables, it is necessary to seek out
the values associated with output, and the value program commanding
the process that produces that output. We must study the effect of the
electricity acting through the magnet to create a magnetic field and
attract the object. Having done this, desired outputs must be established
with respect to values-to-be-espoused, and the necessary process to
produce those outputs must be developed so as to be imprinted with a
value program which will permit those outputs to be produced.
The clarity in evaluation for planning that becomes possible with this
approach is readily evident. Long-distance trains may not be found to be
in line with the satisfaction of transportation needs reflected in the
values "mobility" and "equality of opportunity in having access to
mobility. These values may imply goals which produce outcomes other than
the provision of long-distance trains. In value-critically appraising
the current system, the latent value "travel" as consumption, heretofore
muddled with transportation "mobility" and "equity" values might be
discovered, and separately identified.
Under ideal circumstances, having separated out the "travel" item, the
value-hierarchy could be descended, formulating goals to create processes
capable of delivering outputs more in line with the need. Thus, long-
distance :trains, while no longer seen as transportation services, might
be seen as satisfying a desire for "travel." They could then be
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restructured accordingly - perhaps concentrated onto a few particularly
scenic routes - and operated as "train cruises" perhaps under the
auspices of a body such as the National Parks Service, or as a separately-
funded item, reflecting the value to society of travel as consumption.
Decision-makers would have to decide how much resources should be
allocated, dependent on this value. The value of "travel" would be
explicitly identified, and provided for accordingly instead of acting
under the pretence that transportation was in question.
Of course, circumstances are by no means ideal; we are not in a vacuum
from which a "rational" process to satisfy our fondest desires is to be
started. We should be aware of the need for a great deal of sensitivity
in the use of a value-critical approach, and use it not only to generate
"ideal" outputs and "ideal" processes, but ones which can realistically
be achieved with regard to current outputs and processes, themselves
value-critically analysed.
If we both recognise and understand why value mis-programming has
occurred and how, for example, individuals and their representatives
have come to wrongly accept that long-distance trains do provide for
transportation needs, we should also realise that, overnight conversion
from such fundamental beliefs is impossible. Taking this into account,
the railbus, for example, might be found to be a desirable (at least
interim) measure for low-density rural areas because, although such areas
might be still better served by bus, a railbus might initially be more
acceptable because it implies some rail service to the area concerned,
and satisfies the (mis)understood notion that rail passenger service
should reach each location. It is a change which the values imputed into
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the current processes might allow: a base for subsequent iterations.
The railbus would attract transportation users, not novelty users, and
evaluation of its performance, unclouded by "consumption" benefits,
would be on a transportation basis. Such subsequent examination would of
itself be more likely to ask the right questions even were later
evaluators to (unfortunately) ignore values, because the imputed values
of the railbus would already be the transportation values-to-be-espoused
and the correct test would now indeed be to establish the extent to
which they are being maximised rather than as to whether imputed values
should be changed. The value frame action space would have already been
transformed so as to allow subsequent moves towards desired outcomes
within its bounds.
I take issue with Rein that the "value-critical" approach is an
alternative to what he refers to as the positivist "value-decisionistic."
Rather, I see the latter as carrying out lower-order functions which have
their place where such analysis is appropriate, but risk abuse if put
forward in supposed solution of problems which require higher-level
approaches. The "positivist" approach can in this way be seen as being
under the umbrella of the value-critical. The problem is to make abusers
of sub-level approaches realise that the umbrella is there.
It should be stressed that there are many things which can be properly
understood at low levels of abstraction, as long as we understand that
we are operating within a given framework. It is thus not necessary for
a train conductor to ask himself whether his train should exist at all
in deciding whether to collect tickets from left to right, or vice-
versa. In criminal justice, a judge will tend to pass sentence according
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to the dictates of the law (subject to any discretion which the law
may allow him), and will not ask himself at every particular trial whether
the law in question is a good law. If it is indeed a good law, then
there is no need to go further. If over time, however, there is a growing
feeling in society that sentencing is unjust, it may be necessary for
law-makers to go beyond the sentencing pattern of judges and investigate -
and if necessary change - the laws upon which they are based. A value-
frame functions as a regulator save that it is far more elusive a
concept than a law. If it is a good value frame, then many routine
functions (eg. marketing, train scheduling) may be properly organised,
evaluated, altered underneath its umbrella and without explicit reference
to it, maybe without perception of its very existence. The problem is
to know when the value frame is a good one, and to make this judgement
it is necessary to be aware that that frame exists. Which implies that
perception of its existence is important on a continuous basis, if only
to validate the further execution of routine processes without further
reference to it.
In a story as complex as the route system of AMTRAK, it is essential to
be aware that a value frame exists, to identify it, and examine how,
through control of process, it affects output. Discussion centering
around outputs, or around process alone, is not enough. Outputs and
processes must be examined in the light of the values which program.
This work has two principal conclusions. The one is that ultimately,
AMTRAK's route structure is attributable to a failure, at AMTRAK's
conception, to start with values, and proceed down the value-hierarchy
from there. Instead, planning was started well up the decision tree,
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and an imputed value frame was introduced not reflective of real
transportation needs. That frame has programmed AMTRAK ever since, and
has been reinforced by organisational, political and learning processes.
The second conclusion concerns the analyst. It is that in complex
situations such as this, the only way to gain real understanding is
with reference to imputed values and resultant goals, processes and
outputs which may (in a normative sense) be compared against the values
to be espoused, and the goals, processes and outputs which they suggest.
Despite this, the analyst is drawn to only low levels of abstraction,
not only because he feels less exposed and can produce a more "concrete"
product, but also because he doesn't know any better. As a result, few
analyses are of any significant value in paving the way for real change.
There is a need for greater awareness among decision-makers and analysts
alike of the need to plan in relation to values or - to put it in a
nutshell - to plan for what society really wants. This involves defining
what society wants, and applying a value-critical approach is designing
for implementation.
But, for this to happen, there is a need for a change in attitudes
amongst decision-makers and analysts. And the myriad political and
learning, processes mitigate against it. Value mis-programmed norms of
the AMTRAK scheme have become so deeply entrenched that the barriers to
go through in attempting real change become almost insurmountable. But,
if the AMTRAK norms are entrenched, so also are those of the decision-
makers and analysts.
It would be rather glib and pointless to suggest that once you have
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identified the misconceptions afflicting your value frame, you should
simply choose a new one. I somehow doubt that if you were to try to buy
a new value frame in Woolworth's, they would immediately be able to take
one off the shelf for you. Values are abstract phenomena, but they do
only have meaning with respect to goals, processes and outputs. On the
other hand, the material we have seen in Theories A - D is important -
therein lie the vital building-blocks for both understanding and
resolution, but only if seen in the right value-critical context.
There are many barriers to a value-critical form of thinking; it is more
abstract but because, as I see it, it is set in the reality of goals,
processes and outputs, it is not impossible. We must work towards a
greater awareness of its possibilities, and learn to make it a part
of our evaluative norms. How this is to be done, I shall not desist
from admitting, in a whole other story.
I end with a question: how can we achieve change? This work was not
intended to prescribe any particular path for rail passenger service,
but to help come to an understanding of what actually accounts for the
patterns we observe, and of how we understand them. The path ahead is
complicated, but at least if the right questions are asked, there is a
fighting chance of finding our way through the maze to the right
answers.
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A P P E N D I X A
Historical developments in the nature of the inherent advantage of
rail passenger service; a theoretical approach.
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Theory Al claims that since the more complete a network, the greater
its overall efficiency, the more a network inter-connects, the greater
the number of potential journeys that can be made. This assertion is
tested below using a gravity model approach. No precise applicability
is here claimed for the gravity model. It is, nonetheless, a simple and
classical tool which serves well to illustrate the argument which follows.
The gravity model divides forces into two groups: those which cause
generation and attraction, and those which act as friction to impede
it. In the case of interaction between cities, the former forces can
be approximated to the size of the cities in question as measured by
population. Friction can be equated to a number of factors such as
distance, time, cost and intervening opportunity (ie. there being other
potentially attractive centers between the cities in question). If
distance is used as variable, a possible specification of the gravity
model is:
k pip.
Iij~ =
dX ij
where Iij is the interaction between two cities, i and j;
pip, is the product of the populations of i and j;
d.. is the distance between i and j;
x is an exponent relating to the frictional effects of distance;
and, k is an empirically-derived constant.
If inter-city rail is the only mode to exist, then demand for
services between two cities will be a function of their populations
and inversely of the distance between them to the power of x, a
coefficient related to level of service characteristics.
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If cities are pictured as being organised in some sort of nested
hierarchy system, and according to a "traffic" principle (ie. a
system of organisation of cities which facilitates transportation
between them; Christaller's (1933 ) k = 4 design is an example of
this), as a high-level city is left, smaller cities are likely to be
included on -the route of the railway line at intermediate distances to
the next high-level city. Interaction with the nearest small city
will be greater than with one of similar size further away (the
difference will be still more if the third city is yet smaller in
size); in sum, there will be a distance-decay effect. Interaction will
suddenly rise, however, for the next major center because of its size,
attenuated though the effect may be by the distance. Interaction between
New York and Chicago might, therefore, be greater than that between
New York and any of the intervening cities because of the importsnce of
Chicago. The same may be true between Chicago and Los Angeles or San
Francisco.
Under such a scenario, two systems of rail route might be developed,
according to the two central concepts of the gravity model: the one
would be a regional system of routes emanating mainly from the major
centers, routes which only reach out as far as demand will permit
service to be supported; the distance-decay effect restricts service
to operation within the region. The other system would, however, be
oriented to the very large centers, no matter how far apart, which can
sustain demand for service because of their great importance in the urban
system. Trains on this inter-regional system would also pass through
intervening smaller centers on the way, the demand generated by the
major points allowing for a good frequency of operation for the servicing
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of these smaller cities as well. In some cases, then, the inter-regional
system would also perform regional functions.
The inter-regional system would act to canalise major flows, and would
be organically linked to, and fed by, the regional system (where the
two were not one and the same anyway). With rail being the only mode, it
will clearly be advantageous to connect as many points as possible,
thus maximising potential interaction. Connections will therefore be
arranged at the intersection of the inter-regional "main streets,"
and the route system will take the form of an inter-connected network.
At this stage, let us drop the assumption that rail is the only mode
available for inter-city passenger transportation. Let us suppose
that inter-regional airline service is started between major points.
The Janelle (1969) model can be used to illustrate what the effect
on the urban system might be, and the implications for rail passenger
service can then be considered. According to the Janelle model, demand
for accessibility leads through development of technology to
transportation innovations. These stimulate reductions in travel time
and cost and lead to what he refers to as "time-space convergence" or,
to put it another way, the distance measured in travel time between the
the places served by the innovation decreases, and they therefore seem
to become closer to each other.
This leads to spatial adaptation, involving centralisation and
specialisation in the places brought closer together. Interaction
between those places increases, leading to new demands for accessibility,
and more transportation innovation, and so on.
Threshold minimum distances for efficient operation will tend to be
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greater for the airline than for the railway. Time-space convergence is
therefore likely to have rather greater impact above this threshold
than below it (see DIAG 1). Demand for travel is thus likely to receive
0
U
DISTANCE (MILES) DIAG. 1
a general stimulus between those points receiving air service that are
greater than the air service efficiency threshold apart.
Increased overall demand for interaction might have some positive impact
on the railway as well as on the airline through an "income" effect.
But, the "substitution" effect from rail to air is likely to outweigh
the "income" effect between above-threshold points served by the airline,
though this will depend on time versus cost sensitivity of the travellers
involved.
If we re-examine the gravity model once more, from the perspective of
the train, ie. we are interested in interaction between two points by
*In fact this is more likely to be a zone than a point because each curve
as shown is an aggregation of the scatter of curves as determined by
elasticities of demand of the individual users. Break-even for a time-
conscious businessman will therefore be at an earlier Doint, and for a
low-income leisure traveller at a higher point, than indicated.
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train, these effects can be clearly seen. First of all, the "masses" of
the cities involved will be increased (the increased interaction
stimulated by the commencement of airline service leads to urban
concentration). But, secondly, the existence of airline service will
increase the relative friction of distance effect on the railway as
against the airline. It is likely that the value of the exponent x
will increase for interaction between points served by the new airline
service. But, some increased value of x will also affect interaction
between either of the major centers and smaller intermediate points.
Because major points, reachable by airline service, are now so much
"nearer" they will in effect present an intervening opportunity, even
though they are at greater absolute distance than the intermediate
points.
One effect that will be to the benefit of the railroads will be
increased demand for interaction between intermediate points and
distant major centers. But, whereas before airline service existed,
interaction between such points would be by the most direct available
rail route, it may now be substituted by a train ride to the nearest
major center, and onward continuation of journey to destination by air.
We see here a force towards regional polarisation of rail passenger
services.
But, this is only part of the story. One of the effects of the
increased interaction between the major centers will be congestion there,
and increased demand for space. One of the side effects of this will be
decentralisation; functions will spill out into the immediate suburban
areas, but there will also be a "trickling-down" effect into the region
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as a whole: a regional multiplier effect will operate. This will lead to
increased demand for intra-regional interaction, at distances below the
threshold efficient maximum for airline operation. The railway will be
in a better position relative to the airline to provide this service,
and should respond by adopting a firmer regional orientation: feeding
major centers above minimum airline efficiency threshold distances
rather than connecting them, and connecting smaller centers within
regions, that do not have access to airline service.
This demands certain basic changes in service characteristics. Former
routings will become redundant because the base-line demand upon which
they were designated will have evaporated. End-point traffic is lost,
and intermediate points which lack the attractive power of the larger
centers to offset the effects of distance-decay, and which were served
initially as a by-product of end-point trunking, can no longer retain
the previous level of service. If frequency is reduced, but the route
unchanged, then the benefits of any regional-type service that was
provided as a consequence of inter-regional service (because the
frequency of the long-distance service was adequate to generate short-
distance demand) will be lost.
To adjust to rail's changed inherent advantage, it would be necessary to
dissect and reconfigure routes, timetabling the train to best serve
those intra-regional sectors over which their greatest potential demand
now lies.
The reasoning used above can also be applied in consideration of the
impact of the automobile. Because of its continuous availability and
flexibility and the avoidance of time lost in reaching an airport or
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train station, the automobile will have an especially profound impact
over shorter distances.
This constrains rail to competing over mid-range distances - perhaps
80 - 300 miles - in high-density markets where it can be a viable
alternative to air and automobile if it can emulate or improve on
those characteristics which make these latter modes attractive. This
implies speed, availability and reliability. Fast, frequent service can
compete with air over short distances; depending on the location of
airports and rail stations relative to origin and ultimate destination,
total journey time by rail may even be less than by air under such
circumstances. Speed and frequency can also offset access-to-terminal
times in competing with the automobile.
It is no longer necessary for the rail network to maintain an inter-
connected structure across the country. In response to the onslaught of
other modes, rail's rational response is to reconfigure into a series
of non-connected high-density regional systems within each of which it
competes over distance ranges where its service characteristics now
give it an advantage over air and automobile travel.
-219-
A P P E N D I X B
The AMTRAK Energy Stakes - a Study of Studies.
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Appendix B reviews the studies carried out on the subject of AMTRAK
energy efficiency. Such work as has been done includes simple modal
comparisons in the aggregate, and more in-depth studies by the
Congressional Budget Office, SRI International and Northeastern
University Professor, Frank Mulvey.
TABLE 1 presents a summary of the results of the above-mentioned work,
omitting that of SRI which made comparisons in a different way from
the other studies.
To ease comparison, TABLE 2 is an indexed version of TABLE 1, with
rail set at 100 throughout. Where there is more than one category for
rail, each one is put at 100 in different columns. Where results were
given in British Thermal Units per Passenger Mile (BTU/PM) in TABLE 1,
they are presented as 1/BTU/PM in TABLE 2 to make them comparable to the
other results which are expressed in terms of Passenger Miles per Gallon
(PM/g). A quick perusal is adequate to show that there are serious
disagreements between studies.
There is unfortunately little basis for scrutinising the results of
Hirst (1973), GAO (1978b) or Hilton (1980). Both GAO and Hilton simply
state the results as fact. We are not told the source of the GAO results;
those of Hilton come from the Senate Report to Accompany S.712, AMTRAK
Improvement Act of 1979. All three fail to contrast rail to other modes
under different market conditions; it is highly questionable whether
aggregations of the type shown here really mean anything at all when,
as will become apparent later, there is a great deal of variance in
performance characteristics, and the comparative advantage of rail
relative to other modes is by no means constant.
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Hilton must have realised this, for 7 out of an astonishingly brief
27 lines given over to the treatment of energy implications are devoted
to the following quotation which he mis-attributes to AMTRAK, (a
careless error, characteristic of the poor level of scholarship of
the work as a whole), but which was in fact submitted by the Federal
Railroad Administration to Hearings before the House Appropriations
Transportation sub-committee (US Congress, 1979a):
With existing conditions, rail is far from a favorable comparison
with intircity bus from the standpoint of energy efficiency. While
new lightweight equipment, and emphasis on short-haul corridor
operations, and greater use of electric trains in the Northeast
Corridor will surely increase AMTRAK's overall energy efficiency,
equality with bus will seldom be achieved, if ever, on long
distance routes, barring a technological breakthrough in
railroading.
Despite his obvious awareness of energy efficiency differentials,
Hilton fails to consider corridor operations separately from long-
distance services, and reaches the meaningless general conclusion that:
The passenger train is a large, heavy vehicle, which requires
continued acceleration and deceleration and therefore heavy
energy inputs. As TABLE 15 (summarised here in TABLES 3 & 4}
demonstrates, inter-city passenger trains require just over
half the fuel per passenger mile of aircraft, slightly more
than automobiles, and nearly triple that of buses.
If we move now to the report of Boeing (1975) which, though providing
a range of results is possibly less generous with AMTRAK than with
other modes. In a comment on the data, Mulvey (1978) points out that
Boeing had assumed an average rail distance between cities of 1135
miles and "some city-pairs in the Boeing study are so circuitous that
it is unlikely anyone would ever travel between them by train."
If Boeing is hard on the iron horse, AMTRAK (cited in Mulvey (1978)
TABLE 2.7, p.68) errs on the gentle side. AMTRAK does not take account
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of route circuity - the fact that the actual distance travelled by
rail is greater than the distance "as the crow flies." According to the
American Trucking Association (1974), perhaps not the most enthusiastic
exponents of rail service, AMTRAK circuity lies in the range of 20 - 50
percent on top of "crow flies" distance. There will be some circuity
also attributable to the other modes, though due to their more complete
and direct networks, it will be significantly less.
Another factor which AMTRAK neglects is that trains on grades need
more energy than on the flat. The load factors quoted are also all
unreasonably high - not that this makes much difference when the equally
unlikely assumption is that load factor is constant amongst all modes.
If the cynical reader has already noted how well the results obtained
fit the goals of the respective organisations, he had better be warned
that there is worse to come. An infamous case in point is a study
carried out by the Congressional Budget Office in 1979 entitled:
The Current and Future Savings of Energy Attributable to AMTRAK.
The report estimates savings in fuel attributable to three possible
rail systems: the current one; the reduced system proposed by the
Secretary of Transportation (DOT, 1979); and one including only the
Northeast Corridor. This is unfortunate because neither of the first two
of these systems possess uniform characteristics, and the aggregated
results may cover up significant variance in performance within each
system.
The estimate of propulsion energy for Northeast Corridor rail service -
1019 BTU/seat mile - was based on "computer simulation of Metroliner
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equipment, assuming current operating conditions along the Washington -
New York City segment of the track." The Northeast Corridor Improvement
Project had estimated that Metroliners use between 982 and 1615 BTU/
seat mile.
The report does recognise that "the make-up of trains outside the
Northeast Corridor is probably far more variable than within the
Corridor because of the greater variation in the amount of patronage
and in trip distance that are likely outside the corridor." It
gives the following example in illustration:
A long-distance train with four coach cars, four sleeper cars,
one dining car, one baggage car, and one.observation car has
about the same passenger carrying capacity as a train with
five coach cars. Assuming that the energy required per car is
roughly the same on either train, the long-distance train
in this illustration requires more than twice the energy per
seat-mile as a train with five coach cars.
Given this realisation, it is amazing that far from attempting to
analyse the different situations, the study makes a sweeping aggregation.
To estimate energy requirements outside the Northeast Corridor, it
subtracts energy attributable to the Northeast Corridor service from an
estimate of the average use of energy by trains throughout AMTRAK. It
is worth noting that the Northeast Corridor estimate is rather generous
in comparison to the range found by the Northeast Corridor Improvement
Project. The consequence of subtracting this possibly understated
result from the total is to overstate fuel consumption outside the
Northeast Corridor.
The study thus produces two sets of data: "Northeast Corridor," and
"Non-Northeast Corridor." Auto and bus propulsion energy is held to
be constant in both cases, but air is found to use more energy within
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the Northeast Corridor than outside it, thus further polarising the
results. This happens because it is assumed that smaller aircraft are
used in a more energy-intensive way, on the relatively short distances
of the Northeast Corridor (take-off and landing energy has to be
spread over less mileage) than outside it. We, in essence, once more
have a case of aggregation masking a considerable variance in performance.
There are several short-distance air markets outside the Northeast
Corridor for which energy consumption is similar to that within it,
and where the relative performance of rail is rather better than might
be assumed from the study data. The best example - the Los Angeles -
San Diego corridor - will be examined later.
Adjustment is made for circuity (actual distance minus Great Circle
distance), and favors Northeast Corridor rail once more because,
while routing is relatively direct within the Corridor (circuity =
1.100), it is relatively indirect outside it (circuity = 1.405). Once
more, in taking an aggregate for non-Northeast Corridor routings,
significant variance is concealed.
Of particular interest is the finding that within the Northeast
Corridor rail is about 14 percent more efficient than auto, whilst
outside of it, it is about 14 percent less efficient than auto.
There is an assumption here of a 2.2 person per car occupancy. The
study does, however, recognise that "single person parties make up
about 40 to 60 percent of travel on air, bus, or rail while less
than 20 percent of auto travel is by single-person parties." Transfer
(of some passengers) to auto resulting from discontinuance of AMTRAK
service might thus lead to a lower car occupancy amongst the transferees
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than is suggested by the report. In comparing AMTRAK to the averages
for other modes, the assumption is made that AMTRAK passengers come
from the same statistical populations as travellers on the other modes,
an assumption which is partially invalidated by the very fact that they
are using AMTRAK in the first place.
The analysis does not gauge the true energy opportunity costs of
eliminating AMTRAK service because it simply compares rail to averages
for other modes, rather than taking the necessary marginal approach of
examining how much extra energy would be consumed in practice were
AMTRAK services to cease to exist. This is unfortunately a flaw which
afflicts many studies of this type, a misdemeanor against the most basic
of economic principles.
In calculating "program energy" - that is, the net energy gained or lost
per passenger mile attracted to rail - reflection was made of the mode
passengers would use were AMTRAK not to be available, as deduced from
the AMTRAK Passenger Assessment Survey of 1979 (NRPC, 1979), a summary
of which is contained in TABLE 5 below:
T A B L E 5
Mode that would be used Northeast Non-Northeast
in the absence of rail Corridor % Corridor %
Auto 48.0 45.8
Bus 32.2 25.0
Air 16.1 23.6
No Trip 3.7 5.6
It is worth noting, in passing, the diversion modal splits found in a
July, 1977 AMTRAK study of the Floridian Chicago - Florida service
(cited in Mulvey (1978) TABLE 2.2, p.58), and in the case of the
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Chicago - Milwaukee corridor as found in a Wisconsin Department of
Transportation (1975) survey carried out in August, 1974 (TABLE 6)".
T A B L E 6
Mode that would be used Floridian % Chicago -
in the absence of rail Milwaukee %
Auto 19 74
Bus 26 11
Air 41 15
No trip 7 -
Both these services would fall within the "Non-Northeast Corridor"
category of the CBO study, although the diversion modal splits of neither
in any way corresponds to the aggregate figures employed by the CBO.
Based on the diversion modal split used by the CBO, and assuming general
population diversion load factors, the end result according to the study,
is that rail saves 544 BTU/PM in the Northeast Corridor, but wastes
1267 BTU/PM outside it. "That is," the study concludes:
without AMTRAK service in the Northeast Corridor, each current
rail user would use 17 percent more energy, on average, per
passenger mile than at present. But outside the corridor, each
current rail user would need 24 percent less energy, on average,
if rail service were not provided.
If the statistics are reworked with an assumption if an auto load factor
of 1.5, it is worth noting that rail savings in the Northeast Corridor
increase to 1461 BTU/PM, and losses from use of rail outside the Corridor
decrease to 279 BTU/PM. I am not claiming here that there is actually
any more hard evidence to show that a load factor of 1.5 would result,
rather than one of 2.2. But this little demonstration does show that
minor variations in assumptions can have major impacts upon results.
*Also note "Empire Builder" results TABLE 2, p.
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A further point is that the results do not adjust for length of trip;
the make-up of diversion factors to other modes will likely vary with
trip lengths, and this should be taken into account. Equally omitted
is allowance for differential performance of rail over long and short
distances outside the Northeast Corridor.
"Potential savings or losses of energy" are considered next. In doing
this, "across the board" adjustments are made to results developed
earlier. Thus, "technological efficiency" of rail is assumed to increase
20 percent by the mid-1980s, and load factor is assumed to increase to
55 percent, but current configurations and operating procedures are
assumed.
Thus, when adjustments are made for other modes, it is found that
AMTRAK operations in the Northeast Corridor could result in 1162 BTU/PM
savings while- operation outside the Corridor is projected to lose
537 BTtU/PM. "Under both current operating conditions and assumed future
improvements," the study declares,
the Northeast Corridor rail service results in energy savings
while the current AMTRAK network wastes energy. The assumed
future improvements in rail energy efficiency could be enough
to change the rail system proposed by DOT from an energy loser
to a small energy saver. If only the Northeast Corridor was
saved, the energy savings would be more substantial.
This report is unfortunate because of its narrowness, its sweeping and
brash assumptions, and lack of foresight. In the conclusion it does state
that:
Other corridor-type services offered by AMTRAK may resemble the
Northeast Corridor in their energy use, and no attempt has been
made to isolate them. The fact that rail service in the Northeast
Corridor is electrified drives the conclusions about petroleum
savings.While these conclusions may apply to other electrified
corridor service, they would not be applicable to nonelectrified
ones.
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It is surely of the utmost importance to look at the full range of
alternatives in a study of this type, an effort which would require a
rather higher degree of diasaggregation and sophistication than is
shown here. It is quite possible that some non-Northeast Corridor
service performs considerably better than might be suggested by the
aggregated results presented here;it is also conceivable that others
might do better were operating conditions to be changed. A case in point
is the Los Angeles - San Diego corridor, examined in a 1980 study for
the California Department of Transportation by SRI International
(Henderson and Ellis, 1980).
During FY 1979, average trip length on this corridor was 80.7 miles
over the 128 mile route, and a load factor of 43 percent was estimated
for the six daily round trip services. Direct energy was estimated at
1460 BTU/PM for diesel fuel; an extra 20 percent was then added to allow
for fuel consumed in non-revenue service, to bring this to 1750 BU/PM.
While the CBO study had used as basis simulation results of the
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, SRI conducted field observations
on the operation of nine San Diegan trains, to estimate an average
fuel efficiency of 248 gross ton miles per gallon which was then
transformed into a BTU/PM estimate by taking account of actual train
weights and passenger miles travelled. While the SRI study increases
its estimates to allow for non-revenue service fuel consumption, the
CBO report does not. The nearest match, for purposes of comparison,
would thus seem to be between the SRI direct energy estimate excluding
non-revenue service fuel consumption and the CBO "Operating Energy"
results. SRI's 1460 BTU/PM is clearly significantly less than either
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the CBO estimate of 2762 BTU/PM for the Northeast Corridor, or
3680 BTU/PM outside it. However, even using the SRI result of 1750
BTU/PM (which includes the 20 percent non-revenue allowance), the
ranking scores remain the same.
Comparison with the CBO results using this latter SRI estimate is
provided in TABLE 7. For purposes of comparison, results have been
interpolated to reflect the load factors considered in both documents.
Similarly, SRI data has been adjusted to reflect the CBO 18 miles per
gallon auto fuel consumption as well as the 12.5 miles per gallon
consumption of the SRI study.
On the SRI Direct Energy basis, rail is seen to outperform auto at
all respective load factors considered, and at both auto fuel consumption
levels. If the SRI assumed train load factor of 43.4 percent is taken,
the direct energy shown for rail represents 71 passenger miles per gallon.
CBO Operating Energy statistics for the Northeast Corridor indicate a
much narrower difference between auto and rail, with auto outperforming
rail at the 3.3 passenger per auto level. Outside the Northeast Corridor,
rail fares very poorly against auto, outperforming the latter at only the
1 and 1.5 passenger per auto load factors (with rail load factor at
47.2 percent).
Indirect energy allocated in the reports has not so far been taken into
account because radically different methods were used for its derivation.
CBO included an allowance for "Vehicle Manufacturing Energy," while
SRI allowed for indirect energy in the widest sense to include energy
consumed in associated goods and services required for rail passenger
service and for auto operation, using techniques developed at the
MODiE A U T 0n
LOAD FACTOR (# of pass., auto, %, train) 1 1.5 2.0 2.2 3.3
SRI DIRECT ENERGY (12.5 m/g auto assumption) 4545
(18 m/g auto assumption) 6875 4583 3472 3156 2083
CBO Operating Energy (Northeast Corridor) 6945 4630 3473 (3157 2105'
(Non-Northeast Corridor) 6945 4630 3473 C3157 2105
SRI INDIRECT ENERGY (6 (0 (ED 2818
CBO VEHICLE MANUFACTURING ENERGY (Northeast Corridor) 2057 1372 1028 935 623
(Non-Northeast Corridor) 3223 2149 1611 1465 976
SRI TOTALS (12.5 m/g auto assumption) (6o o 7364
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purposes of comparison.
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University of Illinois (Bullard et al., 1976). As this involves
allocating energy according to financial cost, this tends to over-
estimate rail requirements because, for example, energy will be allocated
in respect of salaries paid to AMTRAK employees but, because the
auto driver receives no money remuneration, a similar allowance is not
made for him.
The effect of the different methodologies is to improve the relative
performance of rail in the final result of the CBO study, but to do
the reverse in the case of SRI. Rail then appears to do relatively badly
against auto in the final analysis in both the CBO non-Northeast Corridor
and SRI study of the Los Angeles - San Diego route, and relatively well
in the case of the CBO Northeast Corridor results.
It is clearly up to the reader to decide whether the relevant comparisons
should include the indirect energy estimate here, but there does seem
to be little doubt that these are more unreliable (but not for this -reason
insignificant) than those for direct consumption.
An earlier SRI study (Henderson et al., 1979), estimated all AMTRAK
performance for 1975, and came out with a result of 2300 BTU/seat mile,
and 4200 BTU/PM. The study then broke these figures down according to
equipment types, choosing three examples for illustration. The first
example consisted of old equipment on long-distance service with 8
coaches, 2 sleepers, 1 bedroom car, 2 baggage cars, a diner and a lounge
car. Assuming the 1975 system load factor of 54 percent, the result
came out at 2500 BTU/PM. At the CBO 47.2 percent load factor, however,
this becomes 2860 BTU/PM. The second example looks at new long-distance
equipment with 7 bi-level coaches, 3 sleepers, 2 baggage cars and a
I
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diner. At 54 percent load factor, 1500 BTU/PM was estimated in result;
at 47.2 percent this becomes 1716 BTU/PM. Finally, new short-distance
equipment with 5 Amcoaches and an Amcafe were examined and found to use
1100 BTU/PH at 54 percent load factor, 1610 BTU/PM at the CBO Northeast
Corridor estimated load factor of 36.9 percent. For more direct
comparison, the results are listed below in terms of seat-miles (TABLE 8).
T A B L E 8
BTU/seat-mile
Long-distance (old equipment) 1350
(new equipment) 810
Short-distance (new equipment) 594
The report procedes to detail the results for five particular routes,
although they are not terribly helpfully chosen in terms of illustrating
the extremes of AMTRAK performance. This study, incidentally, only
considered direct energy consumed, and made no allowance for circuity.
The only major study of AMTRAK to come from the academic world is that
of Mulvey (1978). He is critical of the tendency to over-rate the
performance of rail because of a failure to take into account the effect
of circuity which he finds is much less on short-distance than on long-
distance trips. Additionally, measures of rail energy efficiency were
often determined in an idealised laboaratory setting, he claims:
For example, the Empire Builder would be expected to burn 1700
gallons between Seattle, Washington, and Havre, Montana according
to laboratory performance results. In fact, the train uses 3975
gallons to make the journey due to the influence of grades.
He proceeds to derive his own results, bearing the abovementioned
points in mind. His assumptions are yet different from either those
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of the CBO or SRI studies. He assumes 50 percent load factor for air
and bus, and varies the load factor for auto according to distance,
putting it at 2 passengers per vehicle for short distances and 2.5 for
longer trips. He assumes 38 percent load factor for conventional short-
haul trains, and 50 percent for Metroliner and long-distance trains.
His diversion factors (see TABLE 9) are rather more complex than those
of the CBO report.
T A B L E 9
Mode that would be used Long- Short Metroliner
in the absence of rail Distance Distance
Air 50 15 50
Bus 25 10 10
Auto 25 75 40
Rail performance is reduced 10 percent on short-distance trips, and 25
percent on long-distance trips to account for circuity. The results are
shown in TABLE 10 (see also TABLES 3 & 4).
The most dramatic contrast can be seen to be that between Metroliers
and other short-distance trains on the one hand, and long-distance
trains on the other. The latter are shown to use more than twice as much
energy as either former category. Consistent with other studies (except
AMTRAK's), bus outperforms all other modes in all cases. Rail ranks
above auto in each category, but is at a much greater advantage in the
short-distance than in the long-distance markets. Of particular note is
that short-distance passengers using trains designed to cover short
distances save much more energy than passengers covering similar
distances on the much less efficient long-distance services. As Mulvey
puts it:
-236-
T A B L E 1 0 (TABLE 2.9 in Mulvey, 1978)
Energy Savings Due to Intercity Rail Passenger Service
Type of Service
and Diversion
Passenger
Miles (000)
Passenger
Miles/Gallon
Fuel Consumed
(Gallons)
Diverted and
Net Savings
Metroliner
Diverted from:
Air
Bus
Auto
324,190
162,095
32,419
129,675
100
20
120
30
97
44
Short-distance
Travelers on:
Short-distance trains 1,150,545
Long-distance trains 1,227,273
Diverted from
Air
Bus
Auto
356,678
237,782
1,783,368
20
120.
30
3,241,900
8,104,750
270,075
4,322,500
Net savings 9,453,258
11,861,288
27,892,568
39,753,856
17,833,900
1,981,517
59,445,600
79,261,017
Long-dis tance 39,507,161
Travelers on:
Short-distance trains
Long-distance trains
Diverted from
Air
Bus
Auto
60,561
1,227,273
643,914
321,957
321,957
97
44
624,340
28,516,908
21,463,800
2,682,975
8,472,553
32,619,328
30
120
38
Net savings 4,102,420
Total System Savings 53,062,839
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AMTRAK's long-haul train services presently consume nearly as
much fuel as would have been used by the riders' second choice
alternative. AMTRAK's contribution to fuel conservation is
effectively zero for long-distance travel. If appropriate
short-distance rail passenger services could be provided to meet
the needs of short-distance travellers on long-haul trains, the
energy savings would be much larger, other things being equal.
Mulvey develops projections for 1990 energy savings from AMTRAK
diversion, and finds that similar results hold. He once more emphasises
the relationship between short and long-haul:
Note that an intercity rail passenger system designed to meet
the specific needs of relatively short-distance trip-makers
would generate more fuel savings than the projected system,
he comments.
Short-distance trains of Amfleet coaches with high seating
density are more efficient than long-distance trains with non-
revenue cars, sleepers, and other first-class cars,
he affirms, as had the CBO, the difference being that he had considered
this in his study, while the CBO had avoided the issue. Mulvey does not
get an altogether clean bill-of-health all the same. His auto load
factors suffer the same problems as that of the CBO - they may not
reflect the actual (possibly lower) load factors of diverted traffic.
His diversion factors, though more sensitively constructed than those
of the CBO are also, nonetheless, somewhat speculative in nature.
A report by the General Accounting Office (1978c) comes down even
harder on long-distance trains than does Mulvey. "Our analysis
indicated that the trains on the 11 routes reviewed consumed more
energy in fiscal year 1977 than would have been consumed if every
passenher had used an automobile," it declares (see DIAG. 2). These
were mostly long-distance routes, the exceptions being low-density
short-distance routes having similar service characteristics to the
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long-distance routes, and generally using old equipment. Auto load
factor was assumed to be 2.5, possibly inappropriately high, for
the reasons discussed above.
There is disappointingly little on the possible energy savings of new
corridor-type operations currently under consideration, or accruing
from the use of different types of equipment. The Recent "Rail
Passenger Corridors" by FRA and AMTRAK (1980) made surprisingly little
reference to energy. "Within the time constraints of this study," it
states:
DOT and AMTRAK have not been able to take into account the
special energy implications of improved rail service in each
corridor market such as the physical profile of the route itself.
Given the very approximate nature of the demand estimates in this
report, the calculation of fuel use was based on broad assumptions
about load factors and average figures for fuel consumption per
seat mile for each mode.
The study estimated fuel efficiency in excess of 110 passenger miles per
gallon for 79mph maximum speed operations, having taken into account
improved operating conditions. It estimated. 33 PM/g for auto - having
assumed a load factor of only 1.5 for the very reasons discussed
earlier. Air is estimated at 24 PM/g and bus at 129 PM/g.
The earlier GAO (1978b) report (whose results are given in TABLES 3 & 4)
does not adjust for the specifics of corridor operation and demonstrates
its narrowness and lack of foresight with statements such as that:
If AMTRAK ran longer trains with more of its seats filled, it
could undoubtedly do better in these characteristics, but,
as we have noted, the passenger demand that would be needed
to permit such operations does not exist.
There is generally poor coverage in all reports of what improvements in
technology or operating procedures could do to improve performance.
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Mulvey does indeed mention the advantages that might accrue from
putting short-distance passengers currently using long-distance trains
onto their own dedicated short-distance services. He does not, however,
discuss the demand conditions pertaining to those particular markets
which, outside of densely populated corridors, simply might not be
able to sustain such service. There might be the possibility for energy
savings were new equipment, perhaps in the form of "railbuses" to be
adopted. The recent railbus developed by British Rail Engineering and
British Leyland, for example, is literally a bus fitted with rail
bogies. Its fuel consumption is that of the bus, but in perfromance
it shows many of the advantages of a fixed guidance system. Thr Budd
Company has, in addition, developed a single vehicle railcar, the SPV
2000, for which it claims better than inter-city bus fuel efficiency on
a seat-mile basis (US Congress, 1979b). The railbus/car appears to be
a promising concept in terms of providing energy-efficient rail passenger
service for short-distance segments of route in relatively low populated
areas.
The relevance of reports which seek to evaluate potential energy savings
based only on a currently installed and possibly inappropriate
technology must be called into question. Other aspects which the analysts
have overlooked include the feasibility of electrifying and upgrading
short-distance corridors, something which would generally be out of
the question on long-distance routes. Drawing on from this, one must
ask whether direct comparison in terms of BTUs is really the only
appropriate criterion. Electrical power can be derived from sources
other than petroleum, and given that this latter fuel is the one most
likely to be unpredictable in supply, perhaps a mode running on other
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fuels shouldbe given greater weighted favorable emphasis.
This problem forms just one small part of the conceptual difficulties
which plague this whole area of study. As we have seen, studies have
varied widely in approaches to attacking the issue, and variations in
often dubious assumptions have been enough to invalidate the results.
If we put aside the rather unusual and all-encompassing method of
allocating indirect energy used by the SRI Los Angeles - San Diego study,
this latter report does appear to be the cleanest and crispest in both
its direct field-study approach, and its relatively smaller reliance
on the somewhat cookbook assumptions of the other documents. The fact
that this route is given a lower energy consumption-rating than either
the CBO Northeast Corridor or non-Northeast Corridor findings underlines
the speciousness of the CBO design of dividing everything according to
whether it is in the Northeast Corridor or not. Although the Los
Angeles - San Diego corridor is the most successful corridor service
outside the Northeast, the SRI Direct Energy finding may be taken to
suggest that similar conditions might apply to other corridor-type
services, provided they emulate the service characteristics of the
Northeast Corridor, and that the aggregated way in which the CBO
considers everything outside the Northeast Corridor is misleading.
A more weighty matter concerns what should be done about Indirect Energy,
assessment of which in all cases is very far from satisfactory. It is
because of this, and also because the SRI California study is small and
does not deal fully with opportunity costs, that rather more evidence
is needed to back up this point.
Such evidence comes from two directions. The first is the undeniably
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far less fuel-efficient performance of long-distance trains than of
short-distance trains with only coach cars or raibuses/cars. If rail
cannot be compared against other modes with full confidence, then at
least the variance in performance within rail can be noted with better
surety.
Secondly, there is the matter of market share, a subject largely
ignored in the literature. Hilton does not spare much breath in
pointing out that rail only accounts for 0.3% of total intercity
passenger miles, while auto, air and bus accounted for 87.2 percent,
11.2 percent and 1.3 percent respectively in 1976. In other words, any
savings in energy attributable to rail on a national scale are nothing
more than a drop in the ocean. As Mulvey puts it, while he estimates
AMTRAK saves 53 million gallons of fuel a year, 100 percent compliance
with the 55 mph road speed limit would save 2.5 billion gallons.
However, because AMTRAK's impact is far from constant across all
markets it serves, while it could make little national-scale
contribution, within certain high-density regional markets it could
make a significant impact. Rail, for example, accounts for 16 percent
of New York - Washington traffic, and 40 percent of air and train traffic
along that route. Also relevant is the point that in the event of an
energy contingency, a regional system already carrying say 30 percent
of the market at 50 percent load factor, could readily accommodate
an extra 30 percent of the total market - 43 percent of the normally
non-rail market. A long-distance route carrying 0.3 percent of the
market under normal conditions, at 50 percent load factor, could only
accommodate an extra 0.3 percent of the total market (0.31 percent of
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the normally non-rail market), providing insignificant relief.
Consideration of market share also prompts further questioning of the
diversion factors used in the CBO and Mulvey studies. Because rail
passenger traffic on long-distance routes represents such a small share
of total traffic in those particular markets, it seems unlikely that
discontinuance of AMTRAK service would lead to more than a slight
increase in vehicle miles for either buses or airlines, and maybe not
even that.
The way the diversion factors are used assumes that if x more passenger
miles are transferred to air or bus, then this will imply an increase
in fuel consumption in proportion to x. It is vehicle miles, and not
passenger miles which determine actual energy use, however, and this
misconception may well have badly biased the results for common carrier
diversion, if not for automobile. On the long-distance routes, the
insignificant number of passengers transferring to air or bus may
simply marginally increase load factors or, to put it another way, the
existence of AMTRAK service on long-distance routes may have little or
no effect on reducing vehicle miles by air or bus. Far from the
diverted passengers using less energy than if they had flown, the
existence of the train might mean that more energy is consumed.
In contrast, where AMTRAK has a significant market share, discontinuance
of its services could result in the need for large increases in capacity
on other carriers. As DIAG.3 (from Winestone, 1979) shows, improvements
in the competitive position of AMTRAK in the market share significant
New York - Washington market were accompanied by a decline in air
shuttle patronage. There is also a distance effect backing up the market
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share effect - that is to say that an increase of y passenger miles
over a short distance is more likely to affect the total number of
vehicle miles of an alternative common carrier than over a long-distance
trip because it represents a larger proportion of vehicle miles.
To put it bluntly, whereas short-haul corridor-type services may have
significant results in reducing other carriers' energy consumption, long-
haul services may have little, or no, similar effect. This must be
evaluated in relation to automobile traffic diversion.
The misunderstanding, amongst public and Congressmen alike, about
rail's real contribution, actual and potential, to the energy cause has
not been helped by trivial aggregate comparisons or misconceived studies
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that, sophisticated though they may appear at first glance, are little
more than superficial and biased in reality.
This said, such evidence as might be reliably obtained from the
literature, together with evidence developed in critiquing it, can be
taken to read that short-distance corridor services can be of far
greater importance in energy terms than long-distance trains, and that
a long-distance inter-connected network is certainly not justified on
energy grounds alone. The existence of some long-distance services may
even result in greater energy use than were they not to exist, though I
am not satisfied that the quality *of evidence available relating to
this is high enough to prove this latter point conclusively.
If energy conservation is top priority, there would therefore be a
case for concentration on development of corridor potential. Other short-
distance routes may continue to do rather less well than corridors
if they continue to use conventional equipment, although the fact
that the equipment can carry more trips than were it to be operating
a long-haul route (because distance before turn-round is so much less)
means that it can carry a greater market share and thus be more
effective in reducing vehicle miles on other modes.
Outsied of high-density corridors, there may however be a case for
developing an alternative railbus-type technology for short-distance
services which, were it to cause diversion from auto, could be a
useful,. if slight, energy saver, and which would certainly be more
efficient than use of long-haul or other conventional equipment.
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A P P .E N D I X C
Critique of AMTRAK's Route Forecasting Model (Model reprinted in
Hilton, 1980).
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The almost bizarre inadequacies of AMTRAK's route forecasting model
become quickly apparent. The model is stated as follows:
R% = -0.38 + 1.09F% + 0.319E + 0.073T% + 4.944P% - 18.325ED
where: R% = Percentage change of ridership on any route in a year;
F% = Percentage change of frequency on any route in a year,
where frequency is expressed as train-mile days/ (route
miles times 365 days);
E = Absolute change in the percentage of train days having
new equipment (Amfleet and Turboliner);
T% = Percentage change of AMTRAK on-time performance on any
route in a year;
P% = Percentage change in population in states along the routes;
ED = 1 for recovery from energy shortage (1970 - 1975),
0 for no shortage in either year (1975 - 1976).
Changes in ridership are related to a very small number of variables,
and the whole equation is calibrated so as to only apply under very
specific conditions. There is little evidence that ridership is
linearly related to changes in frequency. For small changes, there
might be a reasonable possibility of approximating the relationship
with a linear function, but for major changes the. effect will
depend on the elasticity of demand for the particular market in question,
and market conditions such as distance and time for journey, and
competition, will be important determinants of this. Additional
frequency in the Los Angeles - San Diego corridor, for example, has
resulted in exponential growth in ridership.
The "new equipment" variable is also unusual - surely it is important
to know what the new equipment does, rather than just that it is
"new." New, high-speed cars on a corridor service may have a rather
different effect than Superliners on a long-distance route and this,
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like frequency, will vary according to market characteristics.
The change in on-time performance item is also questionable. When it
was seen that AMTRAK long-distance trains were almost invariably late,
the schedules were lengthened, often by inserting a "recovery" period
into the last part of the journey, so that the train would appear
to be on time more eften. Does this stimulate new ridership? The
formula suggests that it does.
Lastly, we have the population variable. This is likely to behave in
markedly different ways in different markets, having a rather greater
effect in the congested Northeast Corridor than on some sunny patch
of empty New Mexico.
This formula, then, as some sort of be-all-and-end-all predictor, is
wholly inadequate. While the variables it does use are curious and
unreliable, it ignores such factors as fare level, speed of service,
and relative standing as compared to other modes. In orientation,
further, it is geared towards the long-distance services, and in
relative terms, as compared to more accurate predictive devices,
because it neglects the quantum performance improvements possible from
major corridor upgrading, it reflects relatively more favorably on
long-distance train retention than on short-distance service
development.
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A P P E N D I X D
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 PL 91-518.
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Public Law 91-518
91st Congress, H. R. 17849
October 30, 1970
%nt
To provide financial assistance for and establishment of a national rail passen-
ger systenh, to provide for the modernization of railroad passenger equipment,
to authorize the prescribing of minimum standards for railroad passenger
service, to amend section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may Rail Passenger
be cited as the "Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970". Service Act of
1970.
TITLE I-FINDINGS, PURPOSES, AND DEFINITIONS 84 STAT. 1327
SEC. 101. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSE. 84 S AT. 1328
The Congress finds that modem, efficient, intercity railroad pas-
senger service is a necessary part of a balanced transportation system;
that the public convenience and necessity require the continuance and
improvement of such service to provide fast and comfortable transpor-
tation between crowded urban areas and in other areas of the country;
that rail passenger service can help to end the congestion on our high-
ways and the overcrowding of airways and airports; that the traveler
in America should to the maximum extent feasible have freedom to
choose the mode of travel most convenient to his needs; that to achieve
these goals requires the designation of a basic national rail passenger
system and the establishment of a rail passenger corporation for the
purpose of providing modern, efficient, intercity rail passenger service;
that Federal financial assistance as well as investment capital from
the private sector of the economy is needed for this purpose; and that
interim emergency Federal financial assistance to certain railroads
may be necessary to permit the orderly transfer of railroad passenger
service to a railroad passenger corporation.
SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.
For the purposes of this Act-
(1) "Railroad" means a common carrier by railroad, as defined in
sectioir 1(3) of part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended
(49 IT.S.C. 1(3)) other than the corporation created by title III of 41 Stat. 474;
this Act. 54 Stat. 899.(2) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Transportation or his dele- Post, p. 1330.
gate unless the context indicates otherwise.
(3) "Commission" means the Interstate Commerce Commission.
(4) "Basic system" means the system of intercity rail passenger
service designated by the Secretary under title II and section 403(a) Post, pp.1329,
of this Act. 1335.
(5) "Intercity rail passenger service" means all rail passenger serv-
ice other than (A) commuter and other short-haul service in metro-
politan and suburban areas, usually characterized by reduced fare,
multiple-ride and commutation tickets, and by morning and evening
peak period operations, and (B) auto-ferry service characterized by
transportation of automobiles and their occupants where contracts
for such service have been consummated prior to enactment of this
Act.
(6) "Avoidable loss" means the avoidable costs of providing pas-
senger service, less revenues attributable thereto, as determined by
the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the provisions of
section 553 of title 5, United States Code. 8o stat. 383.
(7) "Corporation" means the National Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration created under title III of this Act.
52-068 0
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Pub. Law 91-518 October 30, 1970
H4 STAT. 1329
(8) -R1egional t ransportation agency" means an authority, corpo-
ratioi, or other entity established for the purpose of providing pas-
senger service within a region.
TITLE Il--BASIC NATIONAL RAIL PASSENGER SYSTEM
SEC. 201. DESIGNATION OF SYSTEM.
In carrying otit the congressional findings and declarItion of pur-
pose set forth in title 1 of this Act, the Secretary, acting In cooperation
with other interested Federal agencies and dep mrtments, is authorized
Preliminary and directed to submit to the Commission and to the Congress within
report to ICC thirty days after the date of enactment of this Act his preliminary
and Congress. report an'd recomminendations for the basic system. Such recominenda-
tions shall specify those points between which intercity passenger
trains shall be operated, identify all routes over which service may he
provided, and the trains presently opernated over such routes, together
with basic service characteristics of operations to be provided within
the basic system, taking into account schedules, number of trains, con-
nections, through car service, and sleeping, parlor, dining, and lounge
facilities. In recommending tile basic system the Secretary shall take
into account the need for expeditious intercity rail passenger service
within and between all regions of the contillental United States, and
the Secretary shall consider the need for such service within the States
of Alaska aid Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puierto Rico. In
formulating such recommendations the Secretary shall consider
opportunities for provision of faster service, more convenient service,
service to more centers of population. and service at lower cost, by
the joint operation, for passenger service, of facilities of two or more
railroad companies; the importance of a given service to overall
viability of tile basic system; adequacy of other transportation facil-
ities serving the same points; unique characteristics and advantages
of rail service as compared to other modes of transportation; the rela-
tionship of public benefits of given services to the costs of providing
such services; and potential profitability of the service. The exclusion
of a particular route, train, or service from the basic system shall not
be deemed to create a presumption that the route, train, or service is
not required by public convenience and necessity in any proceeding
72 Stat. 571. under section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 13a).
SEC. 202. REVIEW OF THE BASIC SYSTEM.
The Commission, the State Commissions, the representatives of the
railroads, and labor organizations duly authorized under the Railway
44 Stat. 5771 Labor Act to represent railroad employees shall, within thirty days
49 Stat. 1189. after receipt of the preliminary report of the Secretary designating
45 USC 151-188. the basic system, review such report consistent with the purposes of
this Act and provide the Secretary with their comments and recom-
mendations in writing. The Secretary shall give due consideration to
Final report such comments and recommendations. The Secretary shall within
to Congress. ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act, submit his final
report designating the basic stem to the Congress. Such final report
shall include a summa of thieir recommendations together with his
Effective date. reasons for failing to adopt any such recommendation. The basic sys-
tem as designated by the Secretary shall become effective for the pur-
poses of this Act upon the date that the final report of the Secretary
is submitted to Congress and shall not be reviewable in any court.
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October 30, 1970 Pub. Law 91-518
84 STAT. 1330
TITLE ILI-ClEATION OF A RAIL PASS ENGER
CORPORATION
SEC. 301. CREATION OF THE CORPORATION.
There is autlhorized to be created a National Railroad Passenger
Corporation. The Corp oration shall be a for profit corporation, the
purpose of which shall be to provide intercity rail passenger service,
employing innovative operating and market ing concepts so as to fully
develop the potential of modern rail service in meetmng the Nations
intercity passenger t ransportation requirements. The Corporation will
not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.
It shall be subject to the provisions of this Act and, to the extent
consistent with this Act, to the District of Columbia Business Corpora-
tion Act. The right to repeal, alter, or amend this Act at any time is
expressly reserved.
SEC. 302. PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION.
The President of the United States shall appoint not fewer than
three incorporators, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
who shall also serve as the board of directors for one hundred and
eighty days following the (late of enactment of this Act. The incor-
porators shall take whatever actions are necessary to establish the
('orporation, including the filing of articles of incorporation, as
approved by the President.
SEC. 303. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS.
(a) The Corporation shall have a board of fifteen directors colsist-
ing of individlials who are citizens of the U'nited States, of whoim one
siall be elected ainnially by the board to serve as chairman. Eight
nwmubers of the board shall be appointed by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and (onsent of the Senate, for
teris of four years or tit l their snecessors have been appointed and
<alified, except that the first three members of the hoard so appointed
shall continue in office for terms of two years, and the next three
miemibers for terms of three years. Any member appointed to fill a
va iic may be appointed only for the unexpired term of the direc-
tor whom lie suceeds. At all times tie Secretary shall be one of the
imiembers of the board of directors appointed by the President and at
all t imes at least one such m1eimber shall be a consunier representative.
Three members of the board shiall be elected annually by coimimoi
stotckhollers. and four shall be elected annually by preferred stock-
holers of the corporation. Tle members of the board appointed by
the President and those elected by comnion stockholders s'lall take
office on the one hundred and eighty-first day after the date of enact-
ment of this Act. Election of the remaining four members of the
board shall take place as soon as practicable after the first issuance
of preferred stock by the Corporation. Pending election of the remain-
ing four members, seven members shall constitute a quorlim for the
purpose of conducting the business of the board. No director alppointed
by the President may have any direct or indirect financial or employ-
nent relationship with any railroad during the time that he serves on
the board. Each of the directors not employed by the Federal Govern-
ment shall receive compensation at the rate of $300 for each meeting
of the board he attends. In addition, each director shall be reim-
bursed for necessary travel and subsistence expenses incurred in
attending the meetings of the board. No director elected by railroads
shall vote on any action of the board of directors relating to any con-
tract or operating relationship between the Corporation and a rail-
read, but he may be present at meetings of the board at which snch
matters are voted upon, and lie may be included for purposes of
68 Stat. 177;
73 Stat. 242.
C. Code
29-901s,
Incorporators,
appointment by
President.
Board or
directors.
Conflict of
interest, pro-
hibition.
Compensation,
travel ex-
penses.
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determining a quorum and may participate in discussions at any such
meeting.
Bylaws. (b) The board of directors is empowered to adopt and amend
bylaws governing the operation of the Corporation. Such bylaws shall
not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or of the articles
of incorporation.
(c) The articles of incorporation of the Corporation shall provide
for cumulative voting for all stockholders and shall provide that, upon
conversion of one-fourth of the outstanding shares of preferred stock,
the common stockholders shall be entitled to elect four directors and
the preferred stockholders shall be entitled to elect three directors:
upon the conversion of one-half of the outstanding shares of preferred
stock, the common stockholders shall be entitled to elect five directors
and the preferred stockhAlders shall be entitled to elect two directors;
upon the conversion of three-fourths of the outstanding shares of pre-
ferred stock, the common stockholders shall be entitled to elect six
directors and the preferred stockholders shall be entitled to elect one
director; and upon conversion of all outstanding shares of preferred
stock, the common stockholders shall be entitled to elect seven directors.
Any change of directors resulting from such stock conversion shall
take effect at the next annual meeting of the Corporation following
such stock conversion.
President and (d) The Corporation shall have a president and such other officers
officers of as may be named and appinted by the board. The rates of compensa-
oorporation. tion of all officers shall befixed by the board. Officers shall serve at
the pleasure of the board. No individual other than a citizen of the
United States may be an officer of the Corporation. No officer of the
Corporation may have any direct or indirect employment or financial
relationship with any railroad during the time of his employment by
the Corporation.
SEC. 304. FINANCING OF THE CORPORATION.
Stock issues, (a) The Corporation is uuthorized to issue and have outstanding,
restriction, in such amounts as it shall determine, two issues of capital stock, a
common and a preferred, each of which shall carry voting rights and
be eligible for dividends. Common stock may be initially issued only
to a railroad. Preferred stock may be issued to and helk only by any
person other than (1) a railroad or (2) any person controlling one
or more railroads, as defined in section 1(3) (h) of the Interstate
54 Stat. 899. Commerce Act. The articles of incorporation of the Corporation shall
49 USC 1. provide for the following respective rights of each issue of stock:
(A) COMMON sToC.-Common stock shall .lave a par value
of $10 pr .share and shall be designated fully paid and non-
assessable. No dividends shall he.paid on the common stock when-
ever dividends on the preferred stock are in arrears.
(B) (i) PREFERRED s'ocK.-Preferred stock shall have a par
value of $100 per share and shall be designated fully paid and
nonassessable. Dividends shall be fixed at a rate not less than 6
per centum per annum, and shall be cumulative so that, if for any
dividend period dividends at the rate fixed in the articles of
incorporation shall not have been declared and paid or set aside
for payment on the preferred shares, the deficiency shall be
declared and paid or set apart for payment prior to the making of
any dividend or other distribution on the common shares.
(ii) Preferred stock shall be entitled to a liquidation preference
over common stock, which shall entitle 'preferred stockholders to a
liquidating payment not less than par value plus all accrued
unpaid dividends prior to any payment on liquidation to common
stockholders.
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(iii) Preferred stock shall be convertible into shares of com-
mon stock at such time and upon such terms as the articles of
incorporation shall provide.
(b) At no time after the initial issue is completed shall the aggre. Stock owner-
gate of the shares of common stock of the Corporation owned by a ship, limi-
smgle railroad or by any person controlling one or more railroads, as tation.
defed in section 1(3) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, directly 54 Stat. 899.
or indirectly through subsidiaries or affiliated companies, nominees, or 49 USC 1.
any person subject to its direction or control, exceed 331/3 per centum
of such shares issued and outstanding.(c) At no time mav any stockholder, or any syndicate or affiliated
group of such stockholders, own more than 10 per centum of the
shares of preferred stock of the Corporation issued and outstanding.
(d) The articles of incorporation shall provide that no shares of
any issue of stock may be redeemed or repurchased for five years,
following the date of enactment of this Act.
(e) The Corporation is authorized to issue, in addition to the stock Bonds, seou..
authorized by subsection (a) of this section, nonvoting securities, rities, etc.,
bonds, deben'tures, and other certificates of indebtedness as it may authorization.
determine.
(f) The requirement of section 45(b) of the District of Columbia Inspection righ
Business Corporation Act (D.C. Code, see. 29-920(b)) as to the per. requirfenents,
centage of stock which a stockholder must hold in order to have the ex**ptio**
rights of inspection and copying set forth in that subsection shall 68 stat. 197.
not be applicable in the case of holders of the stock of the Corpora-
tion, and they may exercise such rights without regard to the per-
centage of stock they hold.
SEC. 366. GENERAL POWERS OF THE CORPORATION.
The Corporation is authorized to own, manage, operate, or con-
tract for the operation of intercity trains operated for the purpose of
providing modern, efficient, intercity transportation of passengers and
to carry mail and express on such trains; to conduct research and
development related to its mission; and to acquire by construction,
purchase, or gift, or to contract for the use of, physical facilities,
equipment, and devices necessary to rail passenger operations. The
Corporation shall, consistent with1 prudent management of the affairs
of the Corporation, rely upon railroads to provide the employees neces-
stry to tie operation ind maintenance of its pas:enger trains and to
the performance of all services and work incidental thereto, to the
extent the railroads are able to provide such employees and services
in an economic and efficient manner. To carry out its functions and
purposes, the Corporation shall have-the usual l'powers conferred upon
a stock corporation by the District of Columbia Business Corporation 68 Stat, 179;Act. 73 Stat. 242.
SEC. 366. APPLICABILITY OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT AND D. C. Code
OTHER LAWS.
(a) The Corporation shall be deemed a comnion carrier by railroad
within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Interstate Comieree Act
an( shall he subject to all provisions of the Interstate Comumerce Act
other than those pertaining to.-
(1) regulation of rates, fares, and charges:
(2) abandonment or extension of lines of railroads utilized
solely for passenger service, and the abandonment or extension of
operations over such lines of railroads, whether by trackage rights
or otherwise:
(3) regulation of routes and service and, except as otherwise
provided in this Act, the discontinuance or change of passenger
train service operations.
29-901.
41 Stat. 474;
54 Stat. 899.
49 USC 1.
as
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(b) The Corporation shall be subject to the same laws and regula-
tions with respect to safety and with respect to the representation of
its employees for purposes of collective bargaining, the handling of
disputes between carriers and their employees, employee retirement,
annuity and unemployment systems, and other dealings with its
employees as any other common carrier subject to part I of the Inter-
24 Stat. 379; state Commerce Act.
54 Stat. 919. (c) The Corporation shall not be subject to any State or other law
49 USC 27 and pertaining to the transportation of passengers by railroad as it relates
note. to rates, routes, or service.
(d) Leases and contracts entered into by the Corporation, regard-
less of the place where the same may be executed, shall be governed by
the laws of the District of Columbia.
(e) Persons contracting with the Corporation for the joint use or
operation of such facilities and equipment as may be necessary for the
provision of efficient and expeditious passenger service shall -e and
are hereby relieved from all prohibitions of existing law, including
the antitrust laws of the United States, with respect to such contracts,
agreements, or leases insofar as may be necessary to enable them to
enter into such contracts and to perform their obligations thereunder.
SEC. 307. SANCTIONS.
(a) If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to
any action, practice, or policy inconsistent with the policies and pur-
poses of this Act, obstructs or interferes with any activities authorized
this Act, refuses, fails, or neglects to discharge its duties and respon-
sibilities under this Act, or threatens any such violation, obstruc-
tion, interference, refusal, failure, or neglect, the district court of the
United States for any district in which the Corporation or other
person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as other-
wise prohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General of the
United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition
of any employee affected thereby, including duly authorized employee
representatives, to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or
appropriate to prevent or terminate any violation, conduct, or threat.
(b) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving
any person of any punishment, liability, or sanction which may be
imposed otherwise than under.this Act.
SEC. 306. REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS.
Annual reports. (a) The Corporation shall transmit to the President and the Con-
gress, annually, commencing one year from the date of enactment of
this Act, and at such ofther times as it deems desirable, a compr-e-
hensive and detailed report of its operations, activities, and accom-
plishments under this Act, including a statement of receipts and
Legislative expenditures for the previous year. At the time of its annual report,
reoounendations. the Corporation shall submit such legislative recommendations as it
deems desirable, including the amount of financial assistance needed
for operations and for capital improvements, the manner and form
in which the amount of such assistance should be computed, and the
sources from which such assistance should be derived.
Biennial (b) The Secretary and the Commission shall transmit to the Presi-
reports, dent and the Congress, one year following the date of enactment of
this Act and biennially thereafter, reports on the state of rail passen-
ger service and the effectiveness of this Act in meeting the require-
inent for a balanced national transportation system, together with
any legislative recommendations.
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TITLE IV-PROVISION OF RAIL PASSENGER SERVICES
SEC. 401. ASSUMPTION OF PASSENGER SERVICE BY THE CORPORA-
TION; COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS.
(a) (1) On or before May 1, 1971, the Corporation is authorized
to contract and, upon written request therefor from a railroad, shall
tender a contract to relieve the railroad, from and after May 1,
1971, of its entire responsibility for the provision of intercity rail
passenger service. On or after March 1, 1973, but before January 1,
1975, the Corporation is authorized to contract, and upon written
request therefor, shall tender a contract to relieve the railroad of its
entire responsibility for the provision of intercity rail passenger serv-
ice and such relief shall become effective upon the date on which such
contract is entered into. Contracts may be entered into on or before
May 1, 19,71, notwithstanding the fact that the decision of the Com-
mission under section 102(f) of this Act with respect to avoidable loss
has not become final. Any contract entered into before such decision
of the Commission has become final shall be subject to adjustment to
assure that the contract is consistent with such final decision of the
Commission. The contract may be made upon such terms and condi-
tions as necessary to permit the Corporation to undertake passenger
service on a timely basis. Upon its entering into a valid contract
(including protective arrangements for employees), the railroad shall
be relieved of all its responsibilities as a common carrier of passengers
by rail in intercity rail passenger service under part I of the Interstate
Commerce Act or any State or other law relating to the provision of
intercity passenger service: Provided, That any railroad discontinu-
ing a train hereunder must give notice in accordance with the notice
procedures contained in section 13a(1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act.
(2) In consideration of being relieved of this responsibility by the
Corporation, the railroad shall agree to pay to the Corporation each
year for three years an amount equal to one-third of 50 per centuml
of the fully distributed passenger service deficit of the railroad as
reported to the Commission for the year ending December 31, 1969.
The payment to the Corporation may be made in cash or, at the
option of the Corporation, by the transfer of rail passenger equip-
ment or the provision of future service as requested by the Corpora-
tion. Unless the railroad waives all rights to receive stock in exchange
for its payments, the railroad shall receive common stock from the
Corporation in an amount equivalent in par value to each payment.
(3) In agreeing to pay the amount specified in paragraph (2) of
this subsection, a railroad may reserve the right to pay a lesser sum
to be determined by calculating either of the following:
(A) 100 per centum of the avoidable loss of all intercity rail
passenger service operated by the railroad during the period
January 1, 1969, through December 31, 1969; or
(B) 200 per centum of the avoidable loss of the intercity rail
passenger service operated by the railroad during the period
January 1, 1969, through December 31, 1969, covering all inter-
city service over the routes between those points between which
the Secretary, under sections 201 and 202 of title II of this Act,
has specified that intercity passenger trains shall be operated
within the basic system.
If the amount owed the Corporation under either of these alternatives
is agreed by the parties to be less than the amount paid pursuant to
paragraph (2), the Corporation shall pay the difference to the railroad
and the railroad shall surrender to the Corporation an amount of
stock, at par value, equivalent to such payment. If the railroad and the
Interoity rail
passenger serv-
i*e, contracts.
Ante, p. 1328.
24 Stat. 379;
54 Stat. 919.
49 USC 27 and
note.
72 Stat, 571.
49 USC 13a.
Passenger serv-
toe defioit pay-
ments.
Ante, p. 1329.
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Corporation are unable to agree as to the amount owed, the matter
shall be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission for decision.
The Commission, upon investigation, shall decide the issue within
ninety days following the date of referral, or within such additional
time as the Commission may order not to exceed an aggregate of one
hundred and eighty days following such date of referral, and its
decision shall be binding on both parties.
Payment sched- (4) The payments to the Corporation shall be made in accordance
ule. with a schedule to be agreed upon between the parties. Unless the
parties otherwise agree, the payments for each of the first twelve
months following the date on which the Corporation assumes any of
the operational responsibilities of the railroad shall be in cash and
not less than one thirty-sixth of the amount owed.
Comencement (b) On May 1, 1971, the Corporation shall begin the provision
of operations, of intercity rail passenger service between points within the basic
system unless such service is being provided (i) either by a railroad
with which it has not entered into a contract under subsection (a) of
this section or (ii) by a regional transportation agency, provided such
agency gives satisfactory assurance to the Corporation of the agency's
financial and operating capability to provide such service, and of its
willingness to cooperate with the Corporation and with other regional
transportation agencies on matters of through train service, through
car service, and connecting train service. The Corporation may at any
time subsequent to May 1, 1971, contract with a regional transporta-
tion agency to provide intercity rail passenger service between points
within the basic system included within the service of such agency.
Prohibition. (c) No railroad or any other person may, without the consent of the
Corporation, conduct intercity rail passenger service over any route
over which the Corporation is performing scheduled intercity rail
passenger service pursuant to a contract under this section.
SEC. 402. FACILITY AND SERVICE AGREEMENTS.
(a) The Corporation may contract with railroads or with regional
transportation agencies for the use of tracks and other facilities and
the provision of services on such terms and conditions as the parties
Interstate may agree. In the event of a failure to agree, the Interstate Commerce
Commerce Commission shall, if it finds that doing so is necessary to carry out the
Commission, purposes of this Act, order the provision of services or the use of tracks
authority, or facilities of thd railroad by the Corporation, on such terms and for
such compensation as the Commission may fix as just and reasonable,
and the rights of the Corporation to such services or to the use of tracks
or facilities of the railroad or agency under such order or under an
order issued under subsection (b) of this section shall be conditioned
upon payment by the Corporation of the compensation fixed by the
Commission. If the amount of compensation fixed is not duly and
promptly paid, the railroad or agency entitled thereto may bring an
action against the Corporation to recover the amount properly owed.
(b) To facilitate the initiation of operations by the Corporation
within the basic system, the Commission shall, upon application by the
Corporation, require a railroad to make immediately available tracks
and other facilities. The Commission shall thereafter promptly pro-
ceed to fix such terms and conditions as are just and reasonable.
SEC. 403. NEW SERVICE.
(a) The Corporation may provide intercity rail passenger service
in excess of that prescribed for the basic system, either within or out-
side the basic system, including the operation of special and extra
passenger trains, if consistent with prudent management. Any inter-
city rail passenger service provided under this subsection for a con-
tinuous period of two years shall be designated by the Secretary as
a part of the basic system.
-258-
October 30, 1970 Pub. Law 91-518
84 STAT. 1336
(b) Any State, regional, or local agency may request of the Corpo- Rail service
ration rail passenger service beyond that included within the basic beyond basic
system. The Corporation shall institute such service if the State, system.
regional, or local agency agrees to reimburse the Corporation for a
reasonable portion of any losses associated with such services.
(c) For purposes of thi-s section the reasonable portion of such Reimbursement
losses to be assumed by the State, regional, or local agency, shall be no casts.
less than 66% per centum of, nor more than, the solely related costs
and associated capital costs, including interest on passenger equip-
ment, less revenues attributable to, such service. If the Corporation
and the State, regional, or local agency are unable to agree upon a
reasonable apportionment of such losses, the matter shall be referred
to the Secretary for decision. In deciding this issue the Secretary shall
take into account the intent of this Act, and the impact of requiring
the Corporation to bear such losses upon its ability to provide
improved service within the basic system.
SEC. 404. DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE.
(a) Unless it has entered into a contract with the Corporation pur-
suant to section 401(a) (1) of this Act, no railroad may discontinue
any intercity passenger train whatsoever prior to January 1, 1975, the
provisions of any other Act, the laws or constitution of any State, or
the decision or order of, or the pendency of any proceeding before, a
Federal or State court, agency, or authority to the contrary notwith-
standing. On and after January 1, 1975, passenger train service oper-
ated by such railroad may be ..discontinued under the provisions of
section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act. Upon filing of a notice 72 Stat. 571.
of discontinuance by such railroad, the Corporation may undertake to 49 USC l3a.
initiate passenger train operations between the points served.
(b) (1) The Corporation must provide the service included within
the basic system until July 1, 1973, to the extent it has assumed respon-
sibility for such service by contract with a railroad pursuant to section
401 of this Act.
(2) Except as provided in section 403 (a) of this Act, service beyond
that prescribed for the basic system undertaken by the Corporation
upon its own initiative may be discontinued at any time.
(3) If at any time after July 1, 1973, the Corporation determines
that any train or trains in the basic system in whole or in part are
not required by public convenience and necessity, or will impair the
ability of the Corporation to adequately provide other services, such
train or trains may he discontinued under the procedures of section
13a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 13a) : Provided. how. Notice to
eer. That at least thirty days prior to any change or discontinuance, Governors of
in whole or in nart, of any service under this subsection, the Corpora- change in
tion shall mail to the Governor of each State in which the train service.
question is operated, and post in every station, depot, or other facility
served thereby notice of the proosed change or discontinuance. The
Corporation may not change or discontinue this service if prior to the
end of the thirty-day notice period, State. regional, or local agencies
renuest continuation of the service and within ninety days agree to re-
'imburse the Corporation for a reasonable portion of any losses asso-
ciated with the continuation of service beyond the notice period.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3) of this subsection, the
reasonable portion of such losses to be assumed by the State, regional.
or local agency shall be no less than 66% per centum of, nor more than,
the solely related costs and associated capital costs, including interest
on passenger equipment, less revenues attributable to, such service. If
the Corporation and the State, regional, or local agencies are unable
to agree upon a reasonable apportionment of such losses, the matter
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shall be referred to the Secretary for decision. In deciding this issue
the Secretary shall take into account the purposes of this Act and the
impact of requiring the Corporation to bear such losses upon its ability
to provide improved service within the basic system.
SEC. 405. PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMPLOYEES.
(a) A railroad shall provide fair and equitable arrangements to
protect the interests of employees affected by discontinuances of inter-
city rail passenger service whether occurring before, on, or after
January 1, 1975.(b) Such protective arrangements shall include, without being lim-
ited to, such provisions as may be necessary for (1) the preservation
of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension
rights and benefits) to such employees under existing collective-bar-
gaining agreements or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective-
bargaining rights; (3) the protection of such individual employees
agamst a worsening of their positions with respect to their employ-
ment; (4) assurances of priority of reemployment of employees
terminated or laid off ; and (5) paid training or retraining programs.
Such arrangements shall include provisions protecting individual
employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their
employment which shall in no event provide benefits less than those
established pursuant to section 5(2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce
54 Stat. 905. Act. Any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this title
49 Usc 5. shall specify the terms and conditions of such protective arrangements.
No contract under section 401(a) (1) of this Act between a railroad
and the Corporation may be made unless the Secretary of Labor has
certified to the Corporation that the labor protective provisions of
such contract afford affected employees fair and equitable protection
by the railroad.
(c) After commencement of operations in the basic system, the
substantive requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall apply
to the Corporation. The certification by the Secretary of Labor that
employees affected have been provided fair and equitable protection
as required by this section shall be a condition to the completion of
any transaction requiring such protection.
(d) The Corporation shall take such action as may be necessary
to insure that all laborers and mechanics employed by contractors and
subcontractors in the performance of construction work financed with
the assistance of funds received under any contract or agreement
entered into under this title shall be paid wages at rates not less than
those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as determined
49 Stat. 1011; by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act.
78 Stat. 238. The Corporation shall not enter into any such contract or agreement
40 USC 276a- without first obtaining adequate assurance that required labor stand-,
276a-5. ards will be maintained on the construction work. Health and safety
standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section
107 of the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (40
83 Stat. 96. U.S.C. 333) shall be applicable to all construction work performed
under such contracts or agreements, except any construction work
nerformed by a railroad employee. Wage rates provided for in col-
lective baranininig agreements negotiated under and pursuant to the
44 Stat. 577; Railway Labor Act shall be considered as being in compliance with
49 Stat. 1189. the Davis-Bacon Act.
45 usc 151..188- (e) The Corporation shall not contract out any work normally
performed by employees in any bargaining unit covered by a contract
between the Corporation or any railroad providing intercity rail pas-
senger service upon the date of enactment of this Act and any labor
organization, if such contracting out shall result in the layoff of any
employee or employees in such bargaining unit.
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TITLE v-EsrAUISIIMENT OF A FINANCIAL
INVESTMENT ADVISORY PANEL
SEC. 501. APPOINTMENT OF ADVISORY PANEL
Within thirty days after enactment of this Act, the President shall
appoita fifteenl-mana tinianiicial advisory panel. Six menamer4s of tho
panel shall represAit. t lie business of invest ient. banking, conimercial
ankinr, and rail transportation. Two menbers shall be representa-
tives of the Secret airy of the Treasury and seven members shall repre-
sent the public in the various regions of the Nation.
SEC. 502. PURPOSE OF ADVISORY PANEL
The advisory panel appointed by the President shall advise the
directors of the Corporation on ways and means of increasing capi-
talization of the Corporation.
SEC. 503. REPORT TO CONGRESS.
On or before January 1, 1971, the panel shall submit a report to
Congress evaluating the initial capitahzation of the Corporation and
the prospects for increasing its capitalization.
ILEm VI-FEDElRAl FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
SEC. 601. FEDERAL GRANTS.
There is authorized to le appropriated to the Secretary in liscal
year 1971, 40,000,000 to remain aivailable until expended, for piy-
ment to the Corporation for the purpose of aissist ing in-
(1) the iitial organization and operation of the Corporation;
(2) the establishment of improved reservations systems and
advertisig:
(3) servicing. maintenance, and repair of railroad passenger
equipmllelt:
(4) the conduct of research and development and demonstra-
tion programs respecting new rail passenger services;
(5) the development and demonstration of improved rolling
stock: and
(6) esential fixed facilities for the operation of passenger
trains on lines and routes included in the basic system over which
no through passenger trains are being operated at the time of
enactment of this Act., including necessary track connections
between lines of the same or different railroads.
SEC. 602. GUARANTY OF LOANS.
The Secretary is authorized, on such terms and conditions as he
may prescribe, to guarantee any lender against loss of principal or
interest on securities, obligations, or loans issued to finance the
upgrading of roadbeds and the purchase by the Corpration or agency
of new rolling stock, rehabilitation of existing -rolling stock and for
other corporate purposes. The maturity date of such securities, obli-
gations, or loans, including all extensions and renewals thereof, shall
not be later than twenty years from their date of issuance, and the
amount of guaranteed loans outstanding at any time may not exceed
$100,000,000. The Secretary shall prescribe and collect from the lend-
ing institution a reasonable annuaf guaranty fee. There are authorized
to be appropriated such amounts as necessary to carry out this section
not to exceed $100,000,000.
Maturity date.
Appropriation.
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TITLE VII-INTERIM EMERGENCY FEDERAL
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
SEC. 701. INTERIM AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE FOR RAILROADS OPERATING PASSENGER
SERVICE.
(a) For the purpose of permitting a railroad to enter into or carry
out a contract entered into under this Act, the Secretary is authorized,
on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, to (1) make loans
to such railroad, or (2) guarantee any lender against. loss of principal
or interest on any loan to such railroad.
Conditions. (b) Before making a loan or a guarantee under this section, the
Secretary must find, in writing, that-
(1) the loan or guarantee is necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this Act;
(2) the proceeds of any loan made or guaranteed under this
Act will be used solely to carry out contracts entered into under
this Act;
(3) the loan or guarantee is not otherwise available on reason-
able terms and conditions; and
(4) there is reasonable assurance that the business affairs of
the railroad will be conducted in a prudent manner.
(c) (1) In any case in which there is a liquidation of the assets of
any railroad which is the recipient of a loan made or guaranteed under
this Act, the United States shall have the first right to redeem that
portion of such assets consisting of those rights-of-way, tracks, and
other facilities designated by the Secretary to be necessary for the
purpose of providing intercity rail passenger service, including serv-
ices employing innovative technology, within the basic system.
(2) It is the intent of the Congress that, in the case of a loan guar-
antee under this Act, the United States shall stand in the same position
with respect to other creditors as in the case of a direct loan by the
United States giving the United States priority over secured and
unsecured creditors.
Interest rate, (d) Interest on loans made under this section shall be at a rate not
determination less than a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, taking
by Treasury into consideration the current average market yield on outstandingSecretary. marketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods
to maturity comparable to the average maturity of such loans adjusted
to the nearest one-eighth of one per centum.
(e) The maturity date on any loan made or guaranteed under this
section, including renewals and extensions thereof, shall not be later
than five years from the date of issuance.
(f) The aggregate amount of loans and loan guarantees made under
this section shall not exceed $200,000,000.
SEC. 702. AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS.
There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such amounts not
to exceed $200,000,000 as may be necessa to carry out the purposes
of this title. Any sums appropriated shall available until expended.
TITLE VIII-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 801. ADEQUACY OF SERVICE.
Regulations, The Commission is authorized to prescribe such regulations as it
violation, considers necessary to provide safe and adequate service, equipment,penalty, and facilities for intercity rail passenger service. Any person who
violates a regulation issued under this section shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not to exceed $500 for each violation. Each day a
violation continues shall constitute a separate offense.
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SEC. 802. EFFECT ON PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
Upon enactment of this Act, no railroad may discontinue any inter-
city rail passenger service whatsoever other than in accordance with
the provisions of this Act, notwithstanding the provisions of any other
Act, the laws or constitution of any State, or the decision or order of,
or the pendency of any proceeding before, any Federal or State court,
agency, or authority.
SEC. 803. SEPARABILITY.
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby
SEC. 804. ACCOUNTABILITY.
Section 201 of the Government Corporation Control Act (31 U.S.C.
856) is amended by strikin out "and" immediately preceding" (5)"
and by inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the
following: "and (6) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation".
SEC. 805. RECORDS AND AUDIT OF THE CORPORATION.
(1) (A) The accounts of the Corporation shall be audited annuallyin accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by inde-
pendent certified public accountants or independent licensed public
accountants certified or licensed by a reguatory authority of a State or
other political subdivision of the United States. The audit shall be
conducted at the place or places where the accounts of the Corporation
are normally kept. All books, accounts, financial records, reports, files,
and other papers, things, or property belonging to or in use by the
Corporation and necessary to facilitate the audit shall be made avail-
able to the person conducting the audit; and full facilities for verify-
ing transactions with the balances or securities held by depositories,
fiscal agents, and custodians shall be afforded to such person.
(1) The report of each such independent audit shall be included in
the annual report required by section 308(a) of this Act. The audit
report shall set forth the scope of the audit and include such state-
ments as are necessary to present fairly the Corporation's assets and
liabilities, surplus or deficit, with an analysis of the changes therein
during the year, supplemented in reasonable detail by a statement of
the Corporation's income and expenses during the year, and a state-
ient of the sources and application of funds, together with the inde-
pendent auditor's opinion of those statements.
(2) (A) The financial transactions of the Corporation for any fiscal
year during which Federal funds are availabli to finance any portion
of its operations may be audited by the Comptroller General of the
United States in accordance with the principles and procedures ap-
plicable to commercial corporate transactions and under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General.
Any such audit shall be conducted at the place or places where
accounts of the Corporation are normally kept. The representative of
the Comptroller General shall have access to all books, accounts,
records, reports, files, and other papers, things, or property belonging
to or in use by the Corporation pertainig to its financial transactions
and necessary to facilitate the audit, and they shall be afforded full
facilities for verifying transactions with the balances or securities held
by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians. All such books, accounts,
records, reports, files, papers, and property of the Corporation shall
remain in possession and custody of the Corporation.
(B) A report of each such audit shall be made by the Comptroller
General to the Congress. The report to the Congress shall contain
such comments and information as the Comptroller General may
5 Stat. 600;
70 Stat. 667.
Annual audit
by independent
acoountants.
Report to Con-
gress, contents.
Ante p. 1333.
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deeti necessary to ill form Congress of the financial oprations an1d
co0ndition of tlt- Corporation, together with such reconnnteidat ions
with respect thereto as he uiuy deein advisable. The report shall also
show specifically a ny pet Lrrinm, expenditure, or other fiancial trans-
action or aunderAking olh .... td inl the course of the audit, which, in
the opiniion of the ( Comlipt roller (reneral, has been carried on or made
Reports, copy without ullitiority of law. A oy ,V of each report shall be furnished
to President. to Ile P residetu, to file Secftary, and to tle ('orporation at the
t ime sulbmnitt id to the Conlgre."
TITLE TX. -TAX DWUCTION FOR CEITAIN PAYMENTS
T) Titi.: NATION.\ li.\ILIOA) P.\SSEN( ll ( ( )IPO-
.ATION
6"A St.t. 7?;
n3 stat. 612.
r, uSe 241-249.
Ssc. 901. (a) Part VIll of suibehlapter It of eApter I of t4 .m
Internal I fevenuile ('ohe of 195[ -leatinig to special dedhuict iontis for
corpoat ions) is a nlu led Iby addiig at th le end thereof t he following
new Set. ion-
"SEC. 250. CERTAIN PAYMENTS TO THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSEN-
GER CORPORATION.
"(a) ( sEN~iaI, ler.v.-I f-
1 ) aliv corpor:i lol which is a colninlimn carerier lv railroad
(as tefiIned in) section 3) of tle Interstate Commier-A .t. (4)
41 Stnt. 474; I .S.('. 1(3))) innIkes a payntent in cash, rail pa:sseger equip-54 A i't. R99. mient , or serviees to the National Rlailroad Passenger o 'rporation
hereinafter il this section referred to as the 'Passenger Corpo-
ral ion') plrsllant to a contract entitered into mider section 401(a)
of the Rlail Passenger Service Ait of 1970, and
"(2) no stock in the Passenger Corporation is issued at any
time to stieh corporation in connection with any contract entered
int o iuder such section 401 (a )
then the aiunount of such payment shall (subject to subsectioni (c))
he allowed as a deduction for the taxable year in which it is made.
"(b) WIHu PAIYENT Is MADE -Under regilations prescribed by
the Secretary or his delegate, a payment in rail passenger equipment
shal be treated as niale when title to the equipment is transferred,
an1id a payment in services shall be treated as made when the services
:re ren ldered.
"(c) FFE-r oF CERTAIN SUBSEQUENT AcQUIsiTIoY- or S-rtt K.-
"(1) DIs.\LL.owANCE OF DEDtuTIOs.-1f any dedction has been
allowed under subsection (a) tot a corporation and such corpora-
tion (or a successor corporation) acquires any -.to-k in the Pas-
senger Corporation (other than in a transactior de,-ribed in se
70 Stat. 402; tion 374 or 381) before the close of the ;6-mlonth period which
68A Stat. 124. begins with the day on which the la.4 payment is iade to the
26 USC 374, 381. Passenger Corporation pursuant to the contract entered into
under such section 401(a), then such deduction shall be disallowed
(as of the close of the taxable year for which it was allowed under
subsection (a)).
"(2) CoLL10CrON OF DEFICIENCY.--If any deductio is dis-al-
lowed by reason of paragraph (1). then the periods of limitation
68A Stat. 803. provided in s'ections 6501 and 6502 on the making of an assess-
26 USC 6501, ment and the collection by levy or a proceeding in court shall,
6502. with respect to any deficiency (incliuding interest and additions
to the tax) resulting from such a disallowance, include one year
following the tdate on which the person acquiring the stock which
results in the disallowance (in accordance with regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary or his delegate) notifies tne Secretary
or his delegate of such acquisition; and such assessment and col-
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lection may he inade notwithstanding any provision of law or
rule of law which otherwise would prevent such assesisment and
collection.
-(d) MEMBERS OF CONTROLLED GRouP.-Under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary or his delegate, if a corporation is a member
of a controlled group of corporations (within the meaning of section
1563), subsections (a) (2) and (c) shall be applied by treating all
members of such controlled group as one corontion."
(b) The table of sections for such part \ III is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following:
"See. 250. Certain paynentm to the National Railroad PnsA-
senger Corporation."
(c) The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable
years ending a fter the date of the enactment of this Act.
Approved October 30, 1970.
78 Stat. 120;
83 Stat. 602.
26 USC 1563.
Erfective date.
LFGISLATTVE HISTORY:
HOUSE RrPORT No. 91-1580 (Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 116 (1970):
Oct. 13, 14, considered and passed House.
Oct. 14, considered and passed Senate.
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Public Law 96-73
96th Congress
An Act
To amend the Rail Passenger Service Act to extend the authorization of appropri- Sept. 29, 1979
ations for Amtrak for 2 additional years, and for other purposes. [H.R. 3996]
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled, Amtrak
Reorganization
TITLE I-AMTRAK REORGANIZATION Act of 1979.
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 101. This title may be cited as the "Amtrak Reorganization 45 USC 501 note.
Act of 1979"
PURPOSES
SEC. 102. Section 101 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 45 USC 502.
502) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" immediately before "The Congress";(2) by striking out "and" after "this purpose;";
(3) by striking out the period after "Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration' and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "; and that
rail passenger service offers significant benefits in public trans-
portation for the safe movement of passengers with minimum
energy expenditure and represents a significant national trans-
portation asset in time of national emergency or energy short-
age."; and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(b) The Congress further finds that-
"(1) inadequately defined goals for the Corporation have
denied its board of directors an effective role in guiding the
Corporation or in promoting and increasing the number of
intercity rail passengers;
"(2) uncertain goals and financial commitment have discour-
aged the development of effective corporate management;
"(3) uncertainty arising from the lack of specific goals has
made the achievement of high employee morale difficult;
"(4) State participation in subsidizing interstate rail passenger
service has, for the most part, been unworkable;
"(5) lack of full cooperation by the railroad industry has
impeded effective systemwide operation of passenger trains by
the Corporation; and
"(6) a greater degree of cooperation is necessary among rail-
roads, the Corporation, States with subsidized service, labor
organizations, and suppliers of services and equipment to the
Corporation in order to achieve a level of performance sufficient
to justify additional expenditure of public funds.".
GOALS
SEC. 103. (a) GOALS FOR AmRAK.-The Rail Passenger Service Act
(45 U.S.C. 501 et seq.) is amended by redesignating section 102 as 45 USC 502.
59-139 0 - 79 (76A)
-267-
93 STAT. 538 PUBLIC LAW 96-73--SEPT. 29, 1979
45 Usc 503. section 103 and by inserting after section 101 the following new
section:
45 USC 501a. "SEC. 102. GOALS.
"The Congress hereby establishes the following goals for Amtrak:
"(1) Improvement of on-time performance by at least 50 per-
cent within the three-year period beginning on the date of
enactment of this section.
"(2) Implementation of schedules which provide a systemwide
average speed of at least 55 miles per hour, and which can be
adhered to with a degree of reliability and passenger comfort.
"(3) Improvement of the ratio of revenues to operating ex-
penses, with the goal of coverage of at least 44 percent of
operating expenses, excluding depreciation, from revenues by
the end of fiscal year 1982 and 50 percent by the end of fiscal year
1985.
"(4) Improvement of the feasibility of State-subsidized service
through the use of technical assistance panels to coordinate,
plan, and implement such service.
"(5) Encouragement of rail carriers to, assist in improving
intercity rail passenger service.
"(6) General improvement of Amtrak's performance through
comprehensive, systematic operational programs and employee
incentives.".
(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.-The heading for title I of the Rail
Passenger Service Act is amended by inserting "GOALS," after
"PURPOSES,".
DEFINITIONS
45 USC 502. SEC. 104. Section 103 of the Rail Passenger Service Act, as redesig-
Ante, p. 537. nated by this Act, is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 103. DEFINITIONS.
45 USC 741.
45 USC 711, 763.
92 Stat. 923.
45 USC 521 note.
Post, p. 546.
Post, pp.
539-541.
"For the purposes of this Act-
"(1)'Amtrak' means the National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion created under title III of this Act.
"(2) 'Auto-ferry service' means intercity rail passenger service
characterized by transportation of automobiles or recreational
vehicles and their occupants.
"(3) 'Avoidable loss' means the avoidable costs of providing
passenger service, less revenues attributable thereto, as deter-
mined by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the provi-
sions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code.
"(4) 'Basic system' means (A) prior to October 1, 1979, the
system of intercity rail passenger service designated by the
Secretary under title II and section 403(a) of this Act, and (B) on
and after October 1, 1979, the system of intercity rail passenger
service designated by the Secretary under section 4 of the
Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-421) and
approved by the Congress, and service required to be operated
under sections 404(d) and 404(e) of this Act and under section 4(g)
of the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978, including changes to
such system or service made by the Corporation using the Route
and Service Criteria.
"(5) 'Center' means the Performance Evaluation Center estab-
lished under section 305 of this Act.
"(6) 'Commission' means the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.
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"(7) 'Corporation' means the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation created under title III of this Act.
"(8) 'Intercity rail passenger service' means all rail passenger
service other than commuter and other short-haul service in
metropolitan and suburban areas, usually characterized by re-
duced fare, multiple-ride and commutation tickets, and by morn-
ing and evening peak period operations.
"(9) 'Model Program' means a program carried out by the
Corporation under section 807 or section 809 of this Act and the
employee assistance program established by the Corporation.
"(10) 'Panel' means a Technical Assistance Panel established
under section 403(b) of this Act.
"(11) 'Rail carrier' and 'railroad' mean a person providing
railroad transportation for compensation.
"(12) 'Regional transportation agency' means an authority,
corporation, or other entity established for the purpose of provid-
ing passenger service within a region.
"(13) 'Route and Service Criteria' means the Criteria and
Procedures for Making Route and Service Decisions established
pursuant to section 404(c) of this Act.
"(14) 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Transportation or his
delegate unless the context indicates otherwise.".
REDUCED FARE PROGRAM
SEC. 105. Section 305(c) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
545(c)) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "(c)"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(2)(A) Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this para-
graph, the Corporation shall establish a reduced fare program for
elderly and handicapped individuals.
"(B) For purposes of this paragraph-
"(i) the term 'elderly individual' means a person who has
attained the age of 65 years; and
"(ii) the term 'handicapped individual' means any person who
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, has record of
such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impair-
ment, but the term handicapped individual does not include any
person who is an alcoholic or drug abuser."
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
SEC. 106. Section 305 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
545) is amended by redesignating subsections (f) through (j) as
subsections (g) through (k), respectively, and by inserting after
subsection (e) the following new subsection:
"(f) The Corporation shall, not later than January 1, 1981, develop
and submit to the Congress and to the President a comprehensive
plan for the improvement of all intercity rail passenger service
provided in the basic system. The Corporation shall commence
implementation of such plan as soon as practicable after all or any
portion thereof is developed. Such plan shall include-
"(1) a zero-based assessment of all operating practices and
implementation of changes to achieve the minimum use of
employees consistent with safe operations and adequate service;
"(2) a systematic program for optimizing the ratio of train size
to passenger demand;
93 STAT. 539
45 Usc 7 41.
45 USC 645; Post,
p. 551.
Post, p. 542.
"Elderly
individual."
"Handicapped
individual.'
Comprehensive
plan, submittal
to President and
Congress.
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"(3) a systematic program for trip time reduction on all trains
in the basic system;
"(4) establishment of training programs to achieve on-time
departures and priorities for passenger trains over freight trains
en route;
"(5) adjustment of purchasing and pricing of food and bever-
ages to achieve, as soon as practical after the date of enactment
of this subsection, a continuing reduction in losses associated
with food and beverage services with a goal of ultimate
profitability;
"(6) cooperative marketing opportunities between the Corpora-
tion and governmental entities at all levels having intercity rail
passenger service; and
"(7) cooperative marketing campaigns sponsored by the Corpo-
ration and the Department of Energy, the Federal Highway
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency..
REGIONAL MAINTENANCE PLAN
Establishment. SEC. 107. Section 305(g) of the Rail Passenger Service Act, asAnte, p. 539- redesignated by this Act, is amended to read as follows:
"(g) The Corporation shall, not later than January 1, 1980, establish
a Regional Maintenance Plan. Such plan shall include-
"(1) a review panel at corporate headquarters consisting of
such members as the President of the Corporation shall desig-
nate;
"(2) a systemwide inventory of spare equipment parts by
operational regions;
"(3) establishment of the necessary number of maintenance
employees per number of cars and locomotives per region;
"(4) establishment of a systematic preventive maintenance
program;
"(5) a method for periodic evaluation of maintenance costs,
time lags, and parts shortages with appropriate corrective
actions; and
"(6) such other elements or activities as the Corporation
considers appropriate.".
RAILROAD POLICE
Ante, p. 539. SEC. 108. Section 305(j) of the Rail Passenger Service Act, as
redesignated by this Act, is amended by striking out "security
guards" each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad
police" and by striking out "Security guards" and inserting in lieu
thereof "Railroad police".
BUY AMERICA PROTECTION
Ante, p. 539. SEC. 109. Section 305(k) of the Rail Passenger Service Act, as
redesignated by this Act, is amended by redesignating paragraphs (3)
and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively, and by inserting after
paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
"(3) In addition to the exemptive authority set forth in paragraph
(2), the Secretary may, upon application of the Corporation, exempt
the Corporation from the requirements of paragraph (1) of this
subsection with respect to the purchase of rolling stock or power train
equipment if the Secretary determines that such rolling stock or
power train equipment, as the case may be, cannot be purchased and
delivered in the Untied States within a reasonable time.".
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PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CENTER
SEC. 110. Section 305 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. Establishment.
545), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end Ante, p. 540.
thereof the following new subsection:
"(1) The Corporation shall establish a Performance Evaluation
Center within the Corporation which shall have the responsibility of
providing an ongoing review of operations. The Center should evalu-
ate both short-term and long-term operational problems and make
recommendations for improvement of operations. Each six months,
the Corporation shall submit a report of the Center's activities and
recommendations to the appropriate authorizing committees of both
Houses of Congress and to the Secretary.".
ADEQUACY OF SERVICE REPORTS
SEC. 111. (a) REPORTS.-Section 305 of the Rail Passenger Service
Act (45 U.S.C. 545), as amended by this Act, is further amended by Supra.
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(m) For purposes of assessing the operational performance of
trains, the President of the Corporation shall have the authority to
direct the conductor on any Amtrak train to report to the Center any
inadequacy of train operation. Adequacy of service reports required
under this subsection shall be promptly transmitted to the Center.
Each report shall be signed by the conductor and contain sufficient
information to locate equipment or personnel failures.".(b) REPEAL.-Section 801 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 Repeal.
U.S.C. 641) is hereby repealed.
APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAWS
SEC. 112. (a) ExCEPTIONS TO APPLICABILITY.-Section 306(a) of the
Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 546(a)) is amended by striking
out the period at the end of paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof
"; and" and by adding at the end thereof the following new para-
graph:
"(4) the issuance of securities or the assumption of any obliga-
tion or liability with respect to the securities of others.".
(b) THROUGH ROUTES AND JOINT FARES.-Section 306(j)(2) of the Rail
Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 546(j)(2)) is amended by striking out
"motor carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "any domestic or
international motor, air, or water carrier".
(c) PAY PERIODS AND QUALIFICATIONS.-Section 306 of the Rail
Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 546) is further amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new subsections:
"(1) The Corporation shall not be subject to any State or local law
relating to pay periods or days for payment of employees. No
employee of the Corporation shall be paid less frequently than such
employee is paid as of the effective date of this subsection, other than
pursuant to an applicable collective bargaining agreement.
"(m) The Corporation shall be deemed to be qualified to do business
in each State in which it performs any activity authorized under this
Act. In connection with the performance of such activities, the
Corporation shall accept service of process addressed by certified mail
to the secretary of the Corporation at its principal office and place of
business in Washington, District of Columbia. The Corporation shall
be deemed to be a citizen of the District of Columbia for the purpose of
determining the original jurisdiction of the district courts of the
United States in civil actions to which the Corporation is party.".
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REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS
SEC. 113. Section 308(a)(1) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970
is amended to read as follows:
"(a)(1) Not later than the 45th day following the end of each
calendar month, the Corporation shall transmit to the Congress and
release to the public the following information applicable to its
operations for such calendar month:' .
UNIFORM CONTRACT
SEC. 114. Section 402 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
562) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(g) The Corporation shall enter into a contract with rail carriers
on an industrywide basis -to establish rights for the operation of
special or charter trains between specific routes and points anywhere
in the Nation upon provision of reasonable notice (of not less than
seven days) to the carriers involved in the operation of any special or
charter trains, except that with respect to rail lines on which rail
passenger service has not been operated for the preceding 180 days,
reasonable notice under this sentence shall be notice of not less than
21 days. If the Corporation and the rail carriers are unable to reach
agreement by January 1, 1981, the Commission shall, upon applica-
tion by the Corporation, order rail services to be provided under this
subsection and shall, consistent with just and reasonable compensa-
tion principles, determine within 180 days after such date the proper
amount of compensation for the provision of such services and the
proper method of prior notification of the schedule and routing of a
special or charter train by the Corporation."
NEW SERVICE
SEC. 115. RoUTE ADDITIoNs.-Section 403(a) of the Rail Passenger
Service Act (45 U.S.C. 563(a)) is amended to read as follows:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, after October 1, 1979,
all route additions shall be in accordance with the Route and Service
Criteria.".
(b) SUBSIDIZED SERvICE.-Section 403(b) of the Rail Passenger
Service Act (45 U.S.C. 563(b)) is amended to read as follows:
"(bX1XA) Any State or group of States, or any regional or local
agency, may submit an application to the Corporation requesting the
institution of rail passenger service in addition to that service
provided in the basic system.
"(B) An application for rail passenger service under this subsection
shall be submitted at least 180 days prior to the beginning of the fiscal
year in which such service is to be operated, except that an applica-
tion for service to be operated in the fiscal year ending September 30,
1980, shall be submitted no later than the 60th day following the
beginning of such fiscal year.
"(C) Each application by a State or agency for rail passenger service
under this subsection shall contain-
"(i) adequate assurances by such State or agency that it has
sufficient resources to meet its share of the cost of such service
for the period such service is to be provided;
"(ii) a market analysis acceptable to the Corporation to ensure
that there is adequate demand to warrant such service;
"(iii) a statement by such State or agency that it agrees to
provide 20 percent of the solely related costs of such service in
-272-
PUBLIC LAW 96-73-SEPT. 29, 1979
the first year of operation, 35 percent of such costs in the second
year of operation, and 50 percent of such costs in each year of
operation thereafter; and
"(iv) a statement by such State or agency that it agrees to
provide, in each year of operation of such service, 50 percent of
the associated capital costs of operating such service.
"(2)(A) The Corporation shall review each application submitted by
a State or agency for the institution of service under this subsection
and shall convene a Technical Assistance Panel to consider such
application if the Corporation determines that-
"(i) the application complies with requirements of paragraph
(1)(C) of this subsection; and
"(ii) there is a reasonable probability that the service requested
can be provided with the resources available to the Corporation.
"(B) The Corporation shall make its determinations under this
paragraph, and convene a panel if appropriate, at least 150 days prior
to the beginning of the fiscal year in which the service requested is to
be operated, except that with respect to an application for service to
be operated in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, the
Corporation shall make its determinations, and convene a panel if
appropriate, no later than 30 days after the date such application is
submitted.
"(C) Any application submitted by a group of States shall be
considered in the same manner as an application submitted by a
single State, and not on the basis of whether each State that is a party
to such application meets the requirements of paragraph (1)(C) of this
subsection.
"(3)(A) Each panel convened by the Corporation to consider an
application shall be composed of-
"(i) a State rail planning official from each State that is a party
to the application;
"(ii) a representative of the Corporation;
"(iii) a representative from a railroad labor organization repre-
senting operating crafts of employees; and
"(iv) a representative from a railroad labor organization repre-
senting nonoperating crafts of employees.
"(B) The Corporation shall submit to each panel data projecting the
solely related costs and associated capital costs of operating the
service under consideration. Each panel. shall, no later than 90 days
after the date it is convened, consider and make recommendations to
the Corporation with respect to-
"(i) appropriate measures for minimizing such costs, including
measures such as-
"(I) the assumption by the applicant State or agency of
certain responsibilities in connection with the operation of
the service under consideration; and
"(II) a reduction in the labor costs of operating such
service; and
"(ii) if more than one State is a party to the application, the
appropriate manner for allocating such costs among the appli-
cant States.
"(4)(A) After taking into account the recommendations of the panel
with respect to rail passenger service requested by a State or agency
under this subsection, the Corporation shall enter into an agreement
with such State or agency for the institution of such service, in
accordance with the funding formula set forth in paragraph (1)(C) of
this subsection, if the Corporation determines that such service can
be provided with resources available to the Corporation.
93 STAT. 543
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"(B) An agreement entered into pursuant to this section may by
mutual agreement be renewed for one or more additional terms of not
more than 2 years.
"(C) If more than one application is made for service and all
applications are consistent with the requirements of this subsection,
but all the services applied for cannot be provided with the available
resources of the Corporation, the Board of Directors shall decide in its
discretion which application or applications best serve the public
interest and can be provided with the available resources of the
Corporation, except that a proposal for State support of a service
deleted from the basic system in effect prior to October 1, 1979, or the
basic system in effect after such date, shall be given preference.
Fare increases. "(5) Prior to instituting any fare increase that applies to service
provided under this subsection and that represents an increase of
more than 5 percent over a 6-month period, the Corporation shall
consult with and obtain the views of the appropriate officials of each
State to be affected by such fare increase. The Corporation shall
provide the officials of each such State with an explanation of the
circumstances warranting the proposed fare increase (such as the
unique costs of or demand for the services involved).
Federal funds, "(6XA) Federal funds available for expenditure under this subsec-
limitation. tion shall not be in substitution for the average amount of State and
local funds expended for the operation of rail services under this
subsection in the State for the two fiscal years preceding the fiscal
year for which the funds are made available.
"(B) If service provided under this subsection on the date of
Ante, p. 537. enactment of the Amtrak Reorganization Act of 1979 is terminated
by a State or agency and such State or agency subsequently decides to
resume such service, the Corporation shall agree to provide funding
at the level provided under the contract in effect on such date of
enactment.
Additional "(C) A State may add additional frequencies of service on an
frequencies of existing route. Additional frequencies shall be initiated in accordance
service. with the funding formula described in paragraph (1)(C) of this
subsection, without regard to funding. ratios then in effect on other
frequencies on such existing route.
"(7XA) Any funds provided by the Corporation under an agreement
with an agency pursuant to this subsection which are allocated for
associated capital costs and which are not expended during the fiscal
year for which they are provided shall remain available until
expended.
Reimbursement. '(B) An agency entering into an agreement with the Corporation
for the operation of service under this subsection shall be entitled to
reimbursement for staff services in an amount equal to 1 percent of
the operating losses and associated capital costs.
"(C) The Board of Directors shall establish the basis for determining
the solely related costs and associated capital costs of service operated
under this subsection, and the total revenue from such service.
Advertising and "(8) Not more than five percent of all revenues generated by eachpromotion, particular route operated under the authority of this subsection shalllimitation. be dedicated to advertising and promotion of such service on a local
level.".
(c) REPEAL.-Section 403(c) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45
U.S.C. 563(c)) is repealed.
(d) ComMuTER SERvIcE.-Section 403(d) of the Rail Passenger
Service Act (45 U.S.C. 563(d)) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(1)" immediately before "The Corporation";
(2) by inserting immediately after the first sentence thereof the
following: "An agreement made pursuant to this section may by
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mutual agreement be renewed for one or more additional terms
of not more than two years."; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
"(2) Any rail passenger service which is operated by the Corpora-
tion on January 1, 1979, and which constitutes commuter rail
passenger service as defined in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall,
until April 1, 1981, continue to be operated by the Corporation and
funded in accordance with the method of funding in effect for that
service on January 1, 1979. In addition, any rail passenger service
which (A) is operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation, (B) is the
subject of an application for discontinuance filed with the Commis-
sion before July 15, 1979, and (C) constitutes commuter rail passenger
service as defined in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall, until April
1, 1981, be operated by the Corporation and funded by the Corpora-
tion in the same manner as service operated under the preceding
sentence.
"(3) The Corporation shall, until April 1, 1981, continue to accept
commuter based fares for any rail passenger service which it operates
and for which such fares are accepted on January 1, 1979. Nothing in
this paragraph shall be construed as prohibiting the Corporation or
any other railroad from increasing the amount of any fare charged
for rail passenger service."
SERVICE CHANGES
SEC. 116. (a) SERVICE CHANGES.-Section 404(b) of the Rail Passen-
ger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 564(b)) is amended to read as follows:
"(b) After October 1, 1979, all route discontinuances by the Corpora-
tion shall be in accordance with the Route and Service Criteria.".
(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.-Section 404 of the Rail Passenger
Service Act (45 U.S.C. 564) is amended by striking out
"SEC. 404. DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE."
and inserting in lieu thereof
"SEC. 404. SERVICE CHANGES."
APPLICATION OF ROUTE AND SERVICE CRITERIA
SEC. 117. Section 404(c) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
564(c)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraph:
"(4)(A) The Corporation shall conduct an annual review of each
long-distance route in the basic system to determine if such route
meets the criteria set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of this
section, as adjusted to reflect constant 1979 dollars. If the Corporation
determines, on the basis of such review, that a route fails to meet the
criteria set forth in such paragraph, the Corporation shall evaluate
such route under the Route and Service Criteria. If the Corporation
determines, on the basis of such evaluation, that such route fails to
meet the Route and Service Criteria, the Corporation shall dis-
continue the operation of rail passenger service over such route.
"(B) The annual review conducted by the Corporation under
subparagraph (A) shall include an evaluation of the potential market
demand for, and the cost of providing service on, portions or segments
of long-distance routes, and the potential market demand for, and
cost of providing service on, alternative routings. The Corporation
shall transmit the results of the annual review to each House of the
Congress and to the Secretary of Transportation.".
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EXCEPTIONS TO APPLICABILITY OF ROUTE AND SERVICE CRITERIA
SEC. 118. Section 404(c) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
564(c)), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(5) The Route and Service Criteria shall not apply to-
"(A) decisions of the Corporation to increase or, where con-
struction schedules, other temporary disruptive factors, or sea-
sonal fluctuations in ridership so warrant, to decrease frequency
of service on existing routes or portions of existing routes or on
routes where an additional frequency of service is being tested;
and
"(B) rerouting of service between major population centers on
existing routes.".
ADDITIONAL QUALIFYING ROUTES
SEC. 119. Section 404 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
564) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsections:
"(d)(1) Where reductions in operating expenses can be obtained, the
Corporation shall operate rail passenger service over any long dis-
tance route which is recommended for discontinuance by the Secre-
92 Stat. 923. tary pursuant to section 4 of the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978,
45 USC 521 note. with or without any restructuring of such route to serve major
population centers as end points or principal intermediate points, in
order to maintain a national intercity rail passenger system, if-
"(A) the short term avoidable loss per passenger mile on such
route, as calculated by the Corporation and projected for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, is not more than 7 cents
per passenger mile; and
"(B) the passenger mile per train mile on such route, as
calculated by the Corporation and projected for the fiscal year
ending September 30,1980, is not less than 150.
Short term avoidable loss per passenger mile calculated by the
Corporation for purposes of this subsection shall be based upon
consistently defined factors for all types of routes, and such short
term avoidable loss and passenger mile per train mile shall be
calculated in the same manner for all routes. The Corporation shall
make its calculations under this subsection on the basis of the most
recent available statistics for a 90-day period, except that the Corpo-
ration may also utilize historical data (such as seasonal fluctuations
in ridership) as long as such data is adjusted to reflect the most
Report to recent available statistics. The Corporation shall, no later than 30
congressional days after the effective date of this subsection, submit a report to the
committees. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation of the Senate on the methodology, equations, factors used,
assumptions, and results in connection with the calculation of short
term avoidable loss per passenger mile and passenger mile per train
mile under this subsection.
"(2) Where reductions in operating expenses can be obtained, the
Corporation shall operate rail passenger service over any short-
distance route which is recommended for discontinuance by the
Secretary pursuant to section 4 of the Amtrak Improvement Act of
1978 with or without any restructuring of such route to serve major
population centers as end-points or principal intermediate points, in
order to maintain a national intercity rail passenger system, if-
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"(A) the short-term avoidable loss per passenger mile on such
route, as calculated by the Corporation and projected for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, is not more than 9 cents
per passenger mile; and
"(B) the passenger mile per train mile, as calculated by the
Corporation and projected for the fiscal year ending September
30, 1980, is not less than 80.
"(e)(1) In order to preserve regional balance in the national inter-
city rail passenger system and to ensure that long-distance routes
recommended for discontinuance by the Secretary pursuant to sec-
tion 4 of the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978 which provide service
to regions with few population centers in a large geographic area
have equal opportunity to qualify for continued operation, the Corpo-
ration shall operate a long-distance route in each section of the
United States (with sections being determined by dividing the United
States into four quadrants) if-
"(A) service is not maintained on any long-distance route in
that section under the criteria set forth in subsection (d)(1) of this
section; and
"(B) the Corporation determines that (i) a long-distance route
exists in that section which has shown and will show improve-
ments in performance under the criteria, set forth in subsection
(d)(1) of this section, and (ii) such route shows potential, under such
criteria, to warrant maintenance in the system.
"(2) The Corporation shall not continue to operate any route under
this subsection if service is provided on a significant part of that route
by any other route.
"(3) Service operated on a route under this subsection shall con-
tinue to be operated after October 1, 1981, only if such route meets the
criteria set forth in subsection (d)1) of this section: Provided, That the
Corporation shall continue to operate the Inter-American train to the
Mexican border if that train meets the criteria set forth above.
"(f) For the purpose of this section and section 4 of the Amtrak
Improvement Act of 1978, the reference to Tampa in table 4-1 at page
4-7 of the Secretary's Final Report to Congress on the Amtrak Route
System, dated January 1979, shall be deemed to mean Saint
Petersburg.
"(g) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act (including
the requirements of section 403(d)), the Corporation is authorized, to
the extent available resources permit, to operate short-haul trains, on
a demonstration basis for the purpose of determining the feasibility
and benefits of such services, on additional routes of 200 miles or less
which link two or more major metropolitan areas.".
FREE OR REDUCED RATE TRANSPORTATION OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEES
SEC. 120. (a) REIMBURSEMENT RATE.-Section 405(f) of the Rail
Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 565(f)) is amended by striking out
"The Corporation shall be reimbursed" and all that follows through
"in accordance with the agreements." and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "Unless the Corporation and a railroad or group of
railroads agree on a different basis for compensation, the Corporation
shall, during the 2-year period beginning on the effective date of the
Amtrak Reorganization Act of 1979, be reimbursed by each railroad
at the rate of 25 percent of the systemwide average monthly yield per
revenue passenger mile. Reimbursement at this rate is in lieu of any
charges for liability incident to travel of railroad employees eligible
for free or reduced-rate transportation and any other costs incurred
by the Corporation in connection with free or reduced-rate transpor-
93 STAT. 547
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tation and any other costs incurred by the Corporation in connection
with free or reduced-rate transportation. Nothing in this subsection
shall preclude the Commission from ordering retroactive relief in any
proceeding instituted or reopened after October 1, 1981.".
45 USC 565 note. (b) REPoRT.-The Comptroller General shall conduct a study of the
free or reduced-rate transportation provided to railroad employees by
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation under section 405(f) of
Ante, p. 547. the Rail Passenger Service Act. Within 180 days after the effective
date of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to the
Congress- and to the Interstate Commerce Commission setting forth
recommendations regarding the appropriate means for reimbursing
the Corporation for the cost of providing such transportation services,
taking into account the value of the services being provided.
RETENTION AND MAINTENANCE OF FACILITIES
SEC. 121. Title IV of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 561 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
section:
45 USC 566. "SEC. 406. RETENTION AND MAINTENANCE OF FACILITIES.
Downgrading or "(a) No facilities of a railroad (including a regional transportationdisposal of a agency) which are used in the operation of rail passenger services byfacility the Corporation on February 1, 1979, shall be downgraded or disposed
of without obtaining the prior approval of the Secretary under this
section.
Notification. "(b) Whenever any railroad intends to downgrade or dispose of a
facility referred to in subsection (a) of this section which is not
currently being used in the operation of services by the Corporation,
such railroad shall first notify the Corporation of its intention to take
such action. If, within 60 days after receipt by the Corporation of such
notice, the Corporation and such railroad are not able to enter into an
agreement for the retention or maintenance of such facility or for the
conveyance to the Corporation of such facility or an interest therein,
the railroad may apply to the Secretary for approval of the downgrad-
ing or disposal of the facility.
Approval. "(c)1) If the Corporation does not object to an application of a
railroad to downgrade or dispose of a facity within 30 days after the
date such application is submitted, the Secretary shall promptly
approve such application.
"(2) If the Corporation makes a timely objection to such an
application, the Secretary shall, within 180 days after the date of such
objection, determine the costs which the railroad could avoid if it
were not required to maintain or retain the facility in the condition
requested by the Corporation. If the Corporation does not, within 60
days after the date of the Secretary's determination, agree to pay
such avoidable costs to the railroad, the Secretary shall approve such
application.
"(d)1) In electing whether to enter into an agreement pursuant to
this section to pay a railroad the avoidable costs of maintaining or
retaining a facility, the Corporation shall consider-
"(A) the potential importance of restoring rail passenger
service on the route on which such facility is located;
"(B) the market potential of such route;
"(C) the availability, adequacy, and energy efficiency of alter-
nate modes or alternate rail lines for providing passenger trans-
portation to or near the points which would be served by the
route;
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"(D) the extent to which major population centers would be
served by such route;
"(E) the extent to which the provision of service over such
route would encourage the expansion of a national intercity rail
passenger system; and
"(F) the possibility of increased ridership on lines of railroad
connecting with such route.
"(2)(A) In order to prepare for a valid and timely analysis of a
facility, after a railroad gives notice pursuant to this section that it
intends to downgrade or dispose of such facility, the Corporation shall
conduct a survey of population centers with railroad passenger
service facilities and shall update such survey from time to time as
may be necessary or appropriate. Within 90 days after the date of Survey plan.
enactment of this section, the Corporation shall take steps to prepare
a survey plan which shall provide for-
"i a target completion date for the survey of population
centers of not later than 360 days after the ninetieth day after
such date of enactment; and
"(ii) a system of collection, compilation, and storage of informa-
tion gathered pursuant to the survey according to geographic
region and according to whether a facility would be part of a
short- or long-haul route.
"(B) The survey should facilitate an analysis of-
"(i) ridership potential by ascertaining existing travel patterns
or changing travel patterns which would maximize efficiencies of
railroad passenger service;
"(ii) the quality of service of competitors or likely competitors;
"(iii) the likelihood of the Corporation offering service at a
competitive fare;
"(iv) opportunities to target advertising and fares to potential
classes of riders;
"(v) economic characteristics of railroad passenger service
associated with a facility and the extent to which such character-
istics are consistent with sound economic principles of short- or
long-haul railroad operations; and
"(vi) the feasibility of applying effective internal cost controls
to a facility and the route which the facility would serve in order
to improve over time the ratio of transportation expenses,
excluding maintenance of track, structure, and equipment and
depreciation, to passenger revenue.
"(e) For purposes of this section- Definitions.
"(1) the term 'facilities' means railroad tracks, rights-of-way,
fixed equipment and facilities, and real property appurtenant
thereto, and includes signal systems, passenger station and
repair tracks, station buildings, platforms, and adjunct facilities
such as water, fuel, steam, electric, and air lines;
"(2) the downgrading of a facility means a reduction in track
classification as specified in the Federal Railroad Administration
track safety standards (49 C.F.R. 213), or any other change in
such facilities which may increase the time required for a
passenger train to operate over the route on which such facility is
located; and
"(3) approval of downgrading or disposal under this section
shall not be construed as relieving a railroad from compliance
with its other common carrier or legal obligations with respect to
a facility."
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AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 122. (a) AuTHoRIZATION.-Section 601 of the Rail Passenger
Service Act (45 U.S.C. 601) is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subsection:
"(bXl) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for
the benefit of the Corporation-
"(A) for the payment of operating expenses, not to exceed
$630,900,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, and
not to exceed $674,900,000 for the fiscal year ending September
30, 1981, of which not less than $1,200,000 for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1980, and $1,000,000 for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1981, shall be available for the cost of
Model Programs;
"(B) for the payment of the costs of capital acquisition or
improvements to the basic system, including the payment of
expenses for the retention and maintenance of facilities under
Ante, p. 548. section 406 of this Act, not to exceed $203,000,000 for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1980, not to exceed $244,000,000 for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, and not to exceed
$254,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982;
"(C) for the payment of operating and capital expenses of rail
Ante, p. 542. passenger service provided pursuant to section 403(b) of this Act,
not to exceed $23,800,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1980, not to exceed $29,000,000 for the fiscal year ending Septem-
ber 30, 1981, and not to exceed $30,000,000 for the fiscal year
ending September 30,1982;
"(D) for labor protection payments required pursuant to sec-
tion 405 of this Act, not to exceed $30,000,000 for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1980, not to exceed $12,000,000 for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, and not to exceed
$20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982; and
any sums authorized by this subparagraph which remain availa-
ble after such labor protection payments are made shall be made
available to the Corporation for use in the payment of expenses
and costs in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this
paragraph; and
"(E) for the payment of the principal of obligations (other than
leases) of the Corporation which are guaranteed by the Secretary
45 USC 602. pursuant to section 602 of this Act, not to exceed $25,000,000 for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, not to exceed
$25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, and not
to exceed $25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1982.
"(2) Funds appropriated pursuant to this section shall be made
available to the Secretary during the fiscal year for which appropri-
ated, except that appropriations for capital acquisitions and improve-
ments may be made in an appropriations Act for a fiscal year
preceding the fiscal year in which the appropriation is to be available
for obligation. Funds appropriated are authorized to remain available
until expended. Appropriated sums shall be paid by the Secretary to
the Corporation for expenditure by it in accordance with (A) the
Secretary's budget request as approved or modified by Congress at
the time of appropriation, and (B) guidelines established by the
Secretary. Payments by the Secretary to the Corporation of appropri-
ated funds shall be made no more frequently than every 90 days,
unless the Corporation, for good cause, requests more frequent
payment before the expiration of any 90-day period.
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"(3) Funds appropriated for capital grants pursuant to this subsec-
tion shall be paid to the Corporation in each fiscal quarter, and such
grants may be used by the Corporation for temporary reduction of
outstanding loan balances, including loans guaranteed by the Secre-
tary pursuant to section 602 of this Act.".
(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.-(1) Section 601 of the Rail Passenger
Service Act (45 U.S.C. 601) is amended-
(A) by striking out "(a)1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(a)";
and
(B) by striking out "(2) Funds appropriated for" and all that
follows through 'of this Act".
(2) Section 602(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C.
602(d)) is amended by striking out "clause (3) of section 601(a)" and
inserting in lieu thereof "section 601(a)(3) or section 601(b)(1)(E)".
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVE COMMISSION
SEC. 123. Title VIII of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 641
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
section:
"SEC. 808. EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVE COMMISSION. 45 USC 647.
"(a) The Secretary shall, within 30 days after the date of enactment
of this section, name a five-member Employee Compensation and
Incentive Commission. The members of the Commission shall be
selected on the basis of their knowledge of the railroad industry.
"(b) The Employee Compensation and Incentive Commission Functions.
shall-
"(1) evaluate the salary paid officers of Amtrak in relation to
Amtrak's ability to attract and maintain qualified officers; and
"(2) after consultation with the Corporation and railroad labor
organizations, develop a program for improving Amtrak em-
ployee incentive and morale, including measures such as the insti-
tution of recognition and financial awards for outstanding
empyloyees.
'(c) The Employee Compensation and Incentive Commission
shall, no later than March 1, 1980, submit recommendations to
the Board of Directors of the Corporation with respect to the
matters referred to in subsection (b) of this section. The Board of
Directors shall, within 90 days after the date of submission, notify
the Congress of (1) any action it plans to take to implement the
Commission's recommendations, and (2) any proposals for addi-
tional legislation which the board considers necessary.".
MODEL PROGRAMS
SEC. 124. Title VIII of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 641
et seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
"SEC. 809. MODEL PROGRAMS. 45 USC 648.
"Not later than October 1, 1979, the Corporation shall, in consulta-
tion with railroad labor organizations, develop and implement a Job
Placement Program for employees who will be affected by the
reduction in work force caused by the implementation of the Secre-
tary's recommendations for the restructuring of routes. Such pro-
gram shall emphasize the facilitation of reemployment of employees
dismissed or dislocated as a result of corporate restructuring. In
93 STAT. 551
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carrying out its responsibilities under this section, the Corporation
shall attempt to reduce labor protection costs and maximize utiliza-
tion of the employment skills of affected employees. Such program
may include job counseling, placement advertising, skills improve-
ment courses, and such other activities as the Corporation considers
appropriate to facilitate reemployment of affected employees within
or outside the rail industry."
STATE TAXATION STUDY
SEC. 125. Title VIII of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 641
et seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
45 USC 649. "SEC. 810. STATE TAXATION STUDY.
"The Secretary shall conduct a study of the payment of taxes by the
Corporation to State and local governments, including the payment
of property taxes, sales taxes, gross revenue taxes, fuel taxes, licenses,
and other user fees, and any other taxes paid by the Corporation to
such governments, and shall make recommendations to the Congress
no later than January 1, 1980, concerning the advisability of relieving
the Corporation, either in whole or in part,. of its obligation to make
such payments. In conducting such study, the Secretary shall
consider-
"(1) the requirement that the Corporation be operated and
managed as a for-profit corporation;
"(2) the certainty that the Corporation will need substantial
Federal subsidies for the foreseeable future;
"(3) the demand by States and localities for continued and
increased federally funded rail passenger service;
"(4) the benefit to States and localities of rail passenger service
directly funded by the Federal Government; and
"(5) the importance to the Nation of maintaining an efficient
and reliable national rail transportation system."
REPORT ON REVENUES AND EXPENSES
SEC. 126. Title VIII of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 641
et seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new section:
"REVENUE REPORT
45 USC 650. "SEc. 811. Within 60 days of the end of each fiscal year beginning
with fiscal year 1981, the Corporation shall report to the Congress on
the ratio of revenue to operating expenses on all routes in the basic
system. As part of such report, the Corporation shall specifically
identify those train routes which did not achieve a 50 percent
revenue-to-expense ratio, and the Corporation shall include state-
ments explaining the reasons which prevented such ratios from being
achieved.'
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW ROUTE PLAN
SEC. 127. Section 4(g) of the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978
92 Stat. 923. (Public Law 95-421) is amended by striking out the period at the end
45 USC 521 note. thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following: ": Provided,
however, That implementation of the Secretary's recommendations
which require (1) operation over rail lines not used in intercity
passenger service upon the date of approval thereof; (2) use of new
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facilities; or (3) new labor agreements, may be deferred by the
Corporation until any necessary capital improvements in such lines
or facilities, or required labor agreements, are made, to permit
service that is equivalent or improved service and is consistent with
the goals contained in subsection (a) of this section: And provided
further, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, pending
deferred implementation of such recommendations, the Corporation
shall provide substitute service over existing routes which are recom-
mended for restructuring in whole or in part and over other feasible
existing routes, without reference to the Route and Service Criteria.
Substitute service provided over an existing route under this para-
graph shall continue to be operated after October 1, 1981, only if such
route meets the criteria set forth in section 404(d)(1) of the Rail
Passenger Service Act, as adjusted to reflect constant 1979 dollars;
but excepting any short-haul route concentrating on commuter
ridership.".
INTERMODAL TERMINAL PROGRAM
SEC. 128. The first sentence of section 4(iX5) of the Department of
Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1653(iX5)) is amended by striking out
"within two years following the approval of the application for
Federal financial assistance under this subsection" and inserting in
lieu thereof "within such time period as the Secretary establishes".
GAO STUDY OF DEBT ELIMINATION
SEC. 129. Within 180 days after the effective date of this Act, the
Comptroller General shall submit a report to the Congress recom-
mending appropriate means for the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation to eliminate the obligations of the Corporation that are
guaranteed under section 602 of the Rail Passenger Service Act. In
developing such recommendations, the Comptroller General shall
consider (1) the feasibility of converting such obligations into stock
issued by the Corporation, (2) the likelihood of obligation retirement
from profits of the Corporation, (3) the ability of the Corporation to
continue to carry its debt service within the context of operating
subsidies, fairly and accurately reflecting current operating costs,
and (4) the extent to which debt incurred by the Corporation prior to
the effective date of this Act should be recognized as unrecoverable.
SERVICE ON PORTION OR SEGMENT OF DISCONTINUED ROUTES
SEc. 130. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation shall con-
duct an evaluation of the possibility of providing rail passenger
service on a portion or segment of any route over which service is
discontinued on or after October 1, 1979. Such evaluation shall
include an examination of the potential market demand for rail
passenger service over a portion or segment of any such discontinued
route, and the cost of providing such service. The Corporation shall,
no later than February 15, 1980, submit a report to both Houses of the
Congress and to the Secretary of Transportation setting forth its
findings under this section.
MAIL AND EXPRESS REVENUES
SEC. 131. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation shall, in
conjunction with the United States Postal Service, determine those
mail transportation requirements which can be met by the Corpora-
tion and shall develop and submit to the Congress, no later than April
93 STAT. 553
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30, 1980, a report setting forth recommendations designed to enable
the Corporation to achieve maximum levels of mail carriage and
revenues derived from such carriage. Such report shall include the
following considerations:
(1) the modification of existing facilities to handle mail and
express more efficiently;
(2) the acquisition of modern materials handling equipment
and rolling stock;
(3) optimum scheduling;
(4) trains devoted exclusively to mail carriage;
(5) staffing and promotional requirements; and
(6) proposals for such legislative action as may be appropriate.
.AMTRAK ROUTE ALLOCATION STUDY
Report to SEC. 132. (a) COST ALLOCATION REPORT.-(1) Not later than April 30,Con ess. 1980, the President of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation45 U 545 note. shall submit a report to the Congress on the feasibility of establishing
a system of uniform cost allocation for the Corporation which would
include-
(A) the avoidable cost by route;
(B) the revenue (including mail and State subsidies, if any) by
route;
(C) the fully allocated cost by route;
(D) the number of passengers carried by route;
(E) the avoidable profit or loss by route;
(F) the fully allocated profit or loss by route;
(G) the profit or loss per passenger by route; and
(H) the profit or loss by revenue passenger mile.
Definitions. (2) For the purposes of this section, the term-
(A) "avoidable profit or loss" means the result of all revenue
attributable to a route minus all reasonable and necessary
expenses (including use of tracks and other facilities) which
would be incurred by a carrier in providing a service which the
carrier can establish that it would not incur if such service were
not operated, and all other services were continued; such costs
shall be restricted to costs solely related to the service and
variable portion of common costs which would not be incurred
but for the existence of the service; such costs shall exclude fixed
common costs, allocation of any common costs which do not vary
as a consequence of providing the service, return on investment,
rent, and any other costs which the carrier cannot establish that
it would not have reasonably and necessarily incurred but for the
existence of the service;
(B) "fully allocated profit or loss" means the avoidable costs
plus all other costs, other than unallocated costs, allocated to a
route according to the Corporation's current accounting prac-
tices; and
(C) "unallocated costs" means those corporate interest, gen-
eral, and administrative costs not assigned to particular routes.
(b) PROFIT AND Loss REPORT.-(1) The Corporation shall prepare
and submit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than
April 30, 1980, a report containing-
(A) a profit and loss table by route for the upcoming fiscal year,
assuming a 50 percent Government reimbursement of the fully
allocated losses experienced by each such route; and
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(B) the average ticket subsidy required to show a systemwide
public service profit (above and beyond such 50 percent Govern-
ment reimbursement) for the upcoming fiscal year.
(2) Such reports shall be based on the best possible data available to
the Corporation including, but not limited to, historical ridership
trends, marketing studies, general economic conditions, ticket pric-
ing policies, levels of services and equipment availability among
other factors.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the term "public service profit"
means the profit or loss experienced on each route after the Govern-
ment subsidies (both operating and ticket) are added to such route's
revenues.
TITLE II-AMENDMENTS TO THE REGIONAL RAIL
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 201. Section 214(c) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973 (45 U.S.C. 724(c)) is amended to read as follows:
"(c) ASSOCIATION.-For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980,
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Association for
purposes of carrying out its administrative expenses under this Act
such sums as are necessary, not to exceed $28,500,000. Sums appropri-
ated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until
expended.".
REPORT ON SPECIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 202. Section 202(e) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973 (45 U.S.C. 712(e)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new paragraphs:
"(3) The Association shall transmit to the Congress, no later than
30 days after the end of each fiscal quarter, a report with respect to
the proceedings before the special court to determine the valuation of
rail properties conveyed to the Corporation under section 303 of this
Act. Each such report shall include-
"(A) a detailed accounting of the Federal funds expended
during such quarter in connection with such proceedings, and
the purposes for which such funds were expended;
"(B) an explanation of the status of such proceedings, including
the prospects for settlement or conclusion; and
"(C) an identification of which responsibilities in connection
with such proceedings are being carried out directly by the
Association, and which are being carried out by contract with
private organizations "
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS; MONITORING
SEC. 203. Section 202 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973 (45 U.S.C. 712) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new subsections:
"(h) TRANSFER OF LITIGATION.-No later than March 1, 1980, the
Association and the Attorney General of the United States shall
develop and submit to the Congress a feasibility study for the
transfer, to the appropriate department or agency of the Federal
Government, of all responsibility for representing the United States
in the proceedings before the special court to determine the valuation
93 STAT. 555
"Public service
profits."
45 USC 743.
Feasibility
study.
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of rail properties conveyed to the Corporation under section 303 of
45 USC 743. this Act.
"(i) TRANSFER OF OTHER FUNCTIONS.-No later than March 1, 1980,
the Association and the Secretary of Transportation shall develop
and submit to the Congress a feasibility study for the transfer of all
functions of the Association, other than those referred to in subsec-
tion (h) of this section, to the appropriate department or agency of the
Federal Government, including the abolition of those functions which
will no longer be necessary.
"(j) MONrrORING OF CoNTRACToRs.-The Board of Directors of the
Association shall adopt procedures to insure (1) that contractors,
including law firms, provide reports containing written verification
of tasks assigned, work performed, time worked, and costs incurred,
including periodic status reports on work performed, (2) that such
reports are audited by the Association, (3) that no funds are paid to
contractors without written reports complying with the requirements
of this subsection, and (4) that the Association applies such proce-
dures uniformly to all contractors."
INSURANCE COVERAGE
SEC. 204. (a) PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AND BENEFrrs.-Section
303(b)(6)(B) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (45 U.S.C.
743(b)(6XB)) is amended by striking out the first and second sentences
and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(B) The Corporation shall, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, maintain in effect any medical insurance coverage or so
much of any life insurance coverage that does not exceed in death
benefits an amount equal to twice the employee's annual salary at
the time of retirement or $60,000, whichever is lower, which coverage
was maintained by a railroad in reorganization in the region immedi-
ately prior to April 1, 1976, and which provides insurance benefits to
employees who retired, prior to April 1, 1976, from service with such a
railroad. With respect to any such employee whose medical or life
insurance coverage lapsed after April 1, 1976, due to nonpayment of
premiums, the Corporation shall-
"(i) through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, provide
medical insurance benefits or life insurance benefits at the same
level as were provided by the employer railroad in reorganization
and in effect with respect to such employees immediately prior to
April 1, 1976, except that the life insurance benefits so provided
shall not exceed in death benefits an amount equal to twice the
employee's annual salary at the time of retirement or $60,000,
whichever is lower; and
"(ii) assume and pay any claim for such employee (or his
personal representative) for any such insurance benefits, if-
"(I) such claim arose during the period beginning April 1,
1976, and ending on the date insurance coverage is provided
pursuant to clause (i) of this subparagraph;
"(II) such benefits were not paid by an insurer solely
because of the lapse of the insurance coverage during such
period,
except that such death benefits shall not be paid for any such
empoee in excess of an amount equal to twice the employee's
annu salary at. the time of retirement or $60,000, whichever is
lower.".
(b) AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 211(h).-(1) Section 211(hXl)(AXviii) of
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (45 U.S.C.
45 USC 721. 741(hXlXAXviii)) is amended to read as follows:
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"(viii) amounts required to provide adequate funding for con-
tinuation, by the Corporation, of medical and life insurance
coverage and benefits for retired employees of railroads in
reorganization as required and limited by section 303(b)(6)(B) of
this Act.".
(2) Section 211(hX6) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973
(45 U.S.C. 741(h)(6)) is amended- 45 Usc 721.
(A) by inserting "(A)" immediately before "Notwithstanding";
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as clauses
(i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, and redesignating clauses (i) and (ii)
as subclauses (I) and (II), respectively; and
(C) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(B) The Association shall have a direct claim, as a current expense
of administration of the estate of the railroad in reorganization whose
obligations were paid with the proceeds of loans forgiven under this
paragraph, equal to the amount by which the loans, plus interest,
have been forgiven. Such direct claim shall not be subject to any
reduction by way of setoff, cross-claim, or counterclaim which the
estate of such railroad in reorganization may be entitled to assert
against the Corporation, the National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion, the Association, or the United States. The direct claim of the
Association under this paragraph shall be prior to all other adminis-
trative claims of the estate of the railroad in reorganization, except
claims arising under trustee's certificates or from default on the
payment of such certificates "
TITLE III-OFFICE OF RAIL PUBLIC COUNSEL
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 301. Section 10388 of title 49, United States Code, is amended 92 Stat. 1358.
to read as follows:
"§ 10388. Authorization of appropriations
"There is authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Rail Public
Counsel to carry out this subchapter not to exceed $1,200,000 for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1980 "
TITLE IV-AMENDMENTS TO THE RAILROAD REVITALIZA-
TION AND REGULATORY REFORM ACT OF 1976
EXTENSION OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
SEC. 401. Sections 505(e), 507(a), 507(d), and 509 of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (45 U.S.C. 825(e),
827(a), 827(d), and 829) are amended by striking out "September 30,
1979" each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "September
30, 1980"
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TITLE V-EFFECTIVE DATES
EFFECTIVE DATES
SEC. 501. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the provisions of
this Act shall take effect on October 1, 1979.
(b) The amendments made by section 204 of this Act shall be
effective as of the date of enactment of Public Law 95-597.
Approved September 29, 1979.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
HOUSE REPORTS: No. 96-189 (Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce) and No.
96-481 (Comm. of Conference).
SENATE REPORT No. 96-183 accompanying S. 712 (Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 125 (1979):
July 24, 25, considered and passed House.
Aug. 1, S. 712 considered and passed Senate.
Aug. 2, action of Aug. 1 vitiated and H.R. 3996 considered and passed Senate,
amended, in lieu.
Sept. 25, Senate agreed to conference report.
Sept. 27, House agreed to conference report, receded from its disagreement and
concurred in Senate amendment.
O
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Phases of the AMTRAK Route System
I "Designated Points and Identified Route Options," from DOT (1971):
Final Report on Basic Route System;
II MAP 2: "Aerial Map - Basic System: Points Between Which Intercity
Passenger Trains Shall be Operated," source as I;
III MAP 3: Route System, July 12, 1971, from NRPC (1971): Nationwide
Schedules;
IV MAP 4: Route System, February 1, 1979 (before restructuring), from
DOT (1979): Final Report to Congress on the AMTRAK Route System;
V MAP 5: DOT's Preliminary Recommended Route Structure, from DOT
(1978): A Preliminary Report to Congress and the Public: A
Reexamination of the AMTRAK Route Structure, (reprinted in US GAO,
1978c);
VI Extract from DOT (1979);
VII MAP 6: DOT's Final Recommended Route System, from DOT (1979);
VIII MAP 7: Route System, February 15, 1980 (after restructuring), from
NRPC ( 1980): 1979 AMTRAK Annual Report;
IX MAP 8: Route System, April 26, 198.1, from NRPC (1981): National
Train Timetables.
I: DESIGNATED POINTS AND IDENTIFIED ROUTE OPTIONS
The following points are designated as the points
between which intercity passenger trains shall be
operated:
Boston - New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
- Washington
- Buffalo
- Chicago
- Kansas City via St. Louis
- Miami and Tampa/St. Petersburg
- New Orleans
Washington - Chicago
Washington - St. Louis
Norfolk/Newport News - Cincinnati
Detroit - Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
- St. Louis
- Cincinnati
- Miami and Tampa/St. Petersburg
- New Orleans
- Houston
- Seattle
- San Francisco/Oakland
- Los Angeles
New Orleans - Los Angeles
Seattle - San Diego
from DOT (1971): Final Report on Basic Route System
I I: MAP 2 AERIAL MAP - BASIC SYSTEM
POINTS BETWEEN WHICH INTERCITY PASSENGER 
TRAINS SHALL BE OPERATED
Newport News
I~rC
from DOT (1971): Final Report on Basic Route System
II: AP3 INTERCITY RAILROAD PASSENGER ROUTES 10-7
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
SEATTLE I
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Salmas \Emponria
\ ta Junt Cio
Dodge C it y wAhson o*
INoshviil ehrl
Borstow \]e
Santo 6or Fagsof Memfphe
LO NELAlbuquerque C i Atat har eston
Birmineho ee9ut
Phoenix
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Temple
O Designated end point cities *..6,0,04
NE W ORLEANS
13 Route identification points '""HOUSTON -----k"
"""**""" Service from Fort Worth to Houston will S.PTRBR l ai ec
be shifted from Temple route to Dallas
route as soon as possibleMI 
I
- -- - -- Added Amtrak service
000000 xpeimetal mtrk Rutefrom NRPC (1971): Nationwide Schedules
IV: MAP 4: ROUTE SYSTEM, FEBRUARY 1, 1979
(before restructuring)
I'-3'-0I~3
SAN
from DOT (1979): Final Report to
the Congress on the AMTRAK Route
System.
V : MA P 5: THE DEPARTMENT'S RECOMMENDED ROUTE STRUCTURE
'~0
OAKLAI
NOTE: DOTTED LINES INDICATE EXISTENCE OF OPTIONAL ROUTINGS
-from DOT (1978): A Preliminary Report
to Congress and the Public: A Reexamination
of the AMTRAK Route Structure
(reprinted in GAO 1978c)
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VI: THE RECOMMENDED ROUTE SYSTEM
The recommended route structure serves 22 of the nation's 25
largest population centers, 39 of the largest 50 cities and 40
states. It provides a basic national service grid, with east/west
routes in the northern, central and southern regions of the
country and north/south routes along the Eastern Seaboard, in the
Midwest and on the West Coast. The national service grid is
supplemented by a system of short-distance trains linking major
population centers and feeding passengers into the national
service grid. All currently operating state-supported 403b services
are included in the recommended route system, provided there is
continued state support for them.
The recommended route structure contains 43 percent fewer route-
miles than the current AMTRAK system (including the Southern
Crescent) and during Fiscal Year 1980 it will produce 34 percent
fewer train-miles than the current system would have produced in
that year. However, the recommended system will retain approx-
imately 80 percent of the passenger-miles that the current
system.would have produced in Fiscal Year 1980, and it will
continue to serve 91 percent of the passengers who would have
used the system during that year. The recommended system will
also produce an improvement of 32 passenger-miles per train-mile
compared to what the current system would have produced in
Fiscal Year 1980, reflecting the elimination of the very weak
routes and the restructuing of other routes.
Current Recommended
System System
Route-miles (Thousands) 27.5 15.7
Passengers (Millions) 19.6 17.9
Passenger-miles (Billions) 4.6 3.7
Train-miles (Thousands) 32.6 21.5
Passenger-miles per
Train-mile 141 173
As of February 1, 1979. Includes the Southern Crescent in the
AMTRAK system and excludes the portion of the Niagara Rainbow
west of Niagara Falls, New York that is to -be terminated on that
date.
(Extracted from DOT, 1979)
VII: MAP 6 RECOMMENDED AMTRAK ROUTE SYSTEM
(final)
MONTREAL
U,
NEWS
LOS ANGELES
PHOENIX
SAN DIEGO
EL PASO
from DOT (1979): Final Report to
Congress on the AMTRAK Route System
NOTES: Dashed lines indicate State assisted services.
Capitalized city names indicate route end points
and principal intermediate points.
Other city names indicate points within routes at
which some trains turn or diverge.
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Charleston
----------- Service Scheduled To Start In 1980
from:NRPC (1980) 1979 Annual Report
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(A- ef February 15,1980)
Vancouver II: MAP 7 Amtrak's Nationwide Rail Passenger System
(after restructuring)
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AMTRAK's Route and Service Criteria, excerpted from NRPC (1975): The
Criteria and Procedures for Making Route and Service Decisions.
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CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING ROUTES AND SERVICES
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
1. Financial contribution per revenue passenger mile
- Current
- Projected
2. Total financial contribution
* Current
* Projected
3. Financial impact on connecting parts of the system
4. Incremental capital investment requirements
5. Return on incremental capital investment
SOCIAL CRITERIA
1. Population served
2. Individuals currently using the route or service
3. Population deprived of or provided with rail service
4. Availability of alternate modes
5. Impact on personal safety
ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA
1. Change in energy consumed
2. Change in pollutants generated
3. Land freed for or removed from alternative use
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APPROACH TO DEVELOPING ROUTE AND SERVICE CRITERIA
SOURCES REVIEWED
ICC CONSIDERATIONS
IN ROUTE AND
SERVICE DECISIONS
PRIOR TO 1970
- Carrier economics
- Public convenience and
necessity
ORIGINAL CHARTER:
NRPC ACT OF 1970;
DOT ROUTE CRITERIA
- Cost to provide service
- Capital requirements
- Ridership demand
- Integrated national system
- Public's freedom of
transportation choice
CONGRESSIONAL
MANDATE:
AMTRAK ACT OF
1975
. Impact on
- Income
- Investment
- Demand
- Impact on
- Connecting parts
- Population
- Alternate Modes
- Impact on environment
AMTRAK'S MISSION
AND STRATEGIC
GOALS
- Provide modern, safe service
- Develop integrated National
system
- Operate "for profit"
" Benefit the environment
- Serve public
convenience/necessity
ROUTE CRITERIA CATEGORIES
ECONOMIC
CRITERIA
SOCIAL
CRITERIA
ENVIRONMENTAL
CRITERIA
ROUTE CRITERIA
- Financial contribution per revenue
passenger mile
- Total financial contribution
- Financial impact on connecting
parts of the systems
- Incremental capital investment
requirement
- Return on incremental incestment
- Population served
- Individuals currently using route
or service
- Population deprived of or provided
with rail service
- Availability of alternate modes
. Impact on personal safety
- Change in energy consumed
- Change in pollutants generated
- Land freed for or removed from
alternative use
/1
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2 - CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
ROUTES AND SERVICES
Using the approach described in the previous chapter, the Board has tried
to define the criteria - i. e., the measures on which judgments or decisions
should be based - that should be employed in determining intercity rail passen-
ger routes and services. This chapter describes those criteria, which are sum-
marized in Exhibit II.
As indicated previously, the criteria can be categorized generally as:
I Economic - measuring the impact'of a route or service on Amtrak's
current and projected financial status
5 Social - measuring the impact of a route or service on the population
offered Amtrak service and on actual ridership
I Environmental - measuring the impact of a route or service on energy
consumption, air quality, and land use.
The sections that follow discuss several specific criteria within each cate-
gory. Appendixes B, C, and D describe the methods for applying each criterion.
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
In evaluating changes to its routes and services, Amtrak must first assess
the economic effects of such changes on its financial position. This evaluation
must reflect both the current and projected financial performance of providing
service over the route, as well as the capital investment required to maintain
or upgrade service. The Board has selected five economic criteria that, taken
together, provide the information required to rank Amtrak's routes financially.
These criteria are:
1. Financial Contribution per Revenue Passenger Mile (RPM), which is
calculated by: (a) subtracting the direct costs associated with service
over a given route-* from the revenues attributable to traffic on the
* - Direct (marginal) costs will be used in this calculation to avoid possible
distortions that could be daused by an allocation formula.
I
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route; and then (b) dividing the result by the number of revenue pas-
senger miles contributed by the route. This criterion offers the
Board critical guidance in route and service evaluations for two rea-
sons. First, by taking into account both the ridership on a route and
its financial contribution, it reflects both financial and social perfor-
mance. And second, by indicating either the positive contribution
generated or the amount of subsidy required per passenger mile, it
provides a useful financial index for comparing routes - regardless
of trip length.
2. Total Financial Contribution, which is calculated by subtracting the
direct costs associated with service over a given route from the rev-
enues attributable to traffic on the route. Since there is a limit to the
amount of financial resources that the Federal Government can allocate
to Amtrak services, it is important that the Board consider the total
financial contribution made or the total financial subsidy required by
each route or service.
3. Financial Impact on Connecting Parts of the System: For cases in
which services are to be added or continued, this figure is calculated
as the net contribution Amtrak would gain from passengers travelling
to connecting parts of the Amtrak system; for discontinuance cases,
it is calculated as the contribution that would be lost on other Amtrak
routes. This criterion, by reflecting the integrated nature of Amtrak's
system, will lead the Board to consider the financial impact of indi-
vidual route and service decisions on the system, as well as on the
route and service itself.
4. Incremental Capital Investment Requirements: For cases in which
services are to be added or continued, this figure is calculated as the
capital investment needed; for discontinuance cases, it is calculated
as the'capital investment Amtrak could avoid.
As with operating subsidies, Amtrak has only limited funds that it can
expend for capital improvements. This criterion will provide the
Board with a comparison of the levels of capital investment required
* - If comparison were made based only on total loss over the route, a long-
haul train - because of the longer distance travelled - would not compare
favorably with a short-haul train. The index of financial contribution per
RPM eliminates the effect of trip distances, thereby permitting a com-
parison that is independent of distance.
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for each route, thus playing an important role in guiding systemwide
resource allocation in a fashion similar to the Total Financial Con-
tribution criterion.
5. Return on Incremental Investment, which is calculated by determining
the annual percentage -rate of return that would be earned on the incre-
mental capital investment on a route. Amtrak, like most corporations
with substantial capital assets, must ensure that its limited capital is
invested as effectively as possible; this responsibility is particularly
important given the fact that Amtrak is supported significantly by pub-
lic funds. By calculating a Return on Incremental Investment, the
Board will have a measure by which to compare the financial attractive-
ness of investing capital in alternative routes and services.
In conducting its route evaluations, the Board will review each route in terms
of the five criteria listed. And, based on a comparison of all the routes in the
system, the Board will identify those routes or services that should te subjected
to further evaluation, using the social and environmental criteria discussed
below.
SOCIAL CRITERIA
The social criteria are intended to indicate the impact of each Amtrak route
and service on the population Amtrak serves and on the riders who actually take
advantage of these services. This set of criteria includes:-
1. Population Served, which is defined as that population living within
convenient access of the route. As a passenger carrier with a national
mandate, Amtrak seeks to offer its services to as many-people as pos-
sible. The Population Served criterion provides a measure of the size
of Amtrak's market along each route, by indicating the number of per-
sons who could take advantage of Amtrak's services if they chose to
do so.
2. Individuals Currently Using the Route, which is a measure of the num-
ber of individuals who have utilized Amtrak's service along a route
one or more times in a one year period. As the ICC established during
its discontinuance proceedings, it is most important to consider the
impact of change on the persons most affected by it - the people who
actually use the train. The use of this criterion will indicate to the
-304-
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Board the number of individual riders convenienced or inconvenienced
by the change.*
3.' Population Deprived of or Provided with Rail Service, which is a mea-
sure of the number of persons within each route's service area who:
(a) in the case of a route or service addition, would be provided access
to service not previously available; or (b) in the case of discontinuance,
would lose access to service previously available. Because some per-
sons, particularly in remote rural areas, have access to only one Am-
trak train, a discontinuance on the route serving these people would
totally eliminate train service. And while economics may dictate such
an action, the Board wants to clearly understand the degree of hard-
ship that could be imposed by such a change before a decision is made.
Thus, by determining the Population Deprived of or Provided with Rail
Service, the Board could take special note of the number of persons
who would find their choices concerning transportation modes either
greatly enhanced or severely lessened by a route or service change.
4. Availability of Alternate Modes, which is an indicator of whether per-
sons along a given route have other modes of transportation readily
available. This criterion will also provide an indicator of the impact
of service changes on traffic congestion. As bne means of ascertain-
ing the availability of alternative modes, Amtrak would assess whether
its current or potential ridership-could conveniently be accommodated
by existing scheduled bus and airline services. jn addition, Amtrak
would ascertain whether limited access highways were available along
the route. This criterion would suggest travel difficulty that passen-
gers (or potential passengers) would encounter were rail service not
available. Moreover, in cases where the alternative mqdes might
need to add or delete capacity, this criterion indicates the need for a
special study to assess the financial impact of Amtrak's action on these
other passenger services.
5. Impact on Personal Safety, which is a measure of the probable increase
or decrease in deaths and injuries that would result from a decision to
eliminate or add rail passenger service in a given area. Typically,
rail is the safest mode of passenger travel. Therefore, the Board
wants to recognize explicitly Amtrak's potential contribution to the
safety of the population being served.
* - The impact of RPMs - another important measure of ridership - will be
reflected through application of the economic criteria (inasmuch as RPMs
are the principal determinant of route or service revenue).
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These five criteria will weigh most heavily in the Board's determination of
the social value of a given route or service. However, the Board expects to
consider, on occasion, other social factors - such as significant increases in the
cost of an individual rider's transportation - that could have a bearing on route
and service decisions. However, because such factors are likely to be impor-
tant in few route or service cases, the Board has not established them as cri-
teria to be applied routinely in making route and service evaluations.
ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA
Relative to other transportation modes, rail service is generally more en-
vironmentally effective - particularly in conserving energy and minimizing air
pollution. To ensure the continued environmental benefits of rail service, the
Board strongly believes that Amtrak should consider environmental impact in
making its route and service decisions. The Board has selected three environ-
mental criteria to guide its decision making on routes and services:
1. Change in Energy Consumed, which is an indicator of the increase or
decrease in total energy consumed (by Amtrak or by alternate modes
that would need to carry Amtrak passengers if rail service were not
available) as a result of changes in routes and services. The national
effort to reduce energy consumption has singled out transportation -
particularly by automobile - as a key target for obtaining reductions,
and rail service offers an attractive alternative to the automobile.
Thus, the Board, in deciding on route and service additions and dis-
continuances will consider any changes in energy consumed to ensure
that Amtrak continues to.contribute to the achievement of the nation's
energy conservation goals.
2. Change in Pollutants Generated, which is an indicator of the increase
or decrease in pollution emissions (by Amtrak or alternate modes).
The nation has embarked on programs to preserve the environment,
as well as to reduce energy consumption. Use of this criterion will
enable the Board to evaluate the contribution of each route or service
change to achieving the nation's environmental goals.
3. Land Freed for or Removed from Alternative Use, which is an indi-
cator of how much land would be affected by the route or service change.
This criterion will ensure that the Board is cognizant of the alternative
ways in which the land affected by its decisions would be used.
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2-6
The 13 criteria described in this chapter will lead to comprehensive con-
sideration of all factors important to route and service decisions. Moreover,
these criteria are fully responsive to the congressional mandate specified in the
Amtrak Act of 1975. It is important to recognize, however, that no one criterion
will be sufficient in evaluating routes. Rather, the several criteria must be ap-
plied through a decision-making process that necessarily requires substantial
exercise of judgment. This decision-making process is discussed in the next
chapter.
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A P P E N D I X H
Excerpts from NRPC (1976): Five Year Corporate Plan, FY 1977 - 1981.
I Corporate Goals;
II Emerging Corridors.
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I Corporate Goals
Amtrak's corporate goals are founded on its governing legis-
lation and upon other official communications between the Congress,
Administration and the Corporation. These goals guide the capital
and operating programs and set the overall theme of corporate
activity,. In fiscal year 1976,- Amtrak refined the five goals
expressed in the FY 76 - FY 80 plan and added several new goals
that reflect the changing and expanding nature of Amtrak's over-
all charter. Consistent with Amtrak's decentralized operating
concepts, the articulation of these goals and the programs to
implement them have been developed by operating management based
on submission from all Amtrak departments.
1) Provide modern, reliable, safe intercity rail passenger service
as part of a balanced transportation system providing freedom or
choice to the consumer and alleviation of congestion in other
modes as outlined in Section 101 of the Rail Passenger Service Act.
Planning and operational attention over the period will therefore
be focused on improved equipment design, modernization, and safety;
station and facility improvements that facilitate the comfortable
and convenient handling of passengers and controlled maintenance-
facility operations that insure reliable equipment performance
from origin to destination. Individual passenger safety and secuzity
throughout the Amtrak system is part of this goal. Special emphasis
will be given during the period to highway grade-crossing safety.
2) Develop and maintain an integrated, national rail passenger
system serving the maximum population and providing for continuous
Erips between points on different routes through hub stations and
connecting schedules. This goal includes a requirement for inter-
regional services and implies intraregional service. It implies
an obligation to connect the Amtrak system to other publit trans-
portation systems as part of a national intermodal system which
is an alternative to the automobile. It envisages the implementa-
tion by the Amtrak board of the criteria and procedures for making
route and service decisions in consideration of route additions
or deletions. This goal mandates planning for route expansion
and services to 403(b) and 403(c) markets upon the recommendation
of the appropriate authority.
3) Operate efficiently on a "for profit" basis through employment
of innovative marketing and operating concepts as directed in
Section 301 of the Act. This goal recognizes Amtrak's responsibility
to work towards financial viability consistent with its public
obligation. This goal calls for planning and operations to be
made so as to maximize ridership and revenues while minimizing
operating costs and investment. It therefore requires that oper-
ations be designed to simultaneously increase utilization of
equipment and manpower efficiency while better serving the market.
Innovative marketing, scheduling, on-board and station services
are continually being developed in response to this goal.
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4) Reduce congestion, conserve enercy and preserve the environ-
ment through the use of the unique advantages of the rail mocie.
This goal responds to stated national goals to which expanded
rail passenger service can make a major contribution. Amtrak's
objective is to optimize fuel efficiency through better use of
locomotives, stripping the system of wasteful steam heat, and
insuring that the next generation of trains represent a quantum
improvement in fuel efficiency.
5) Serve the public convenience and necessity through providing
schedules and services that are responsive to public need. This
is a major goal inherent in the basic purpose of any public trans-
portation service. Amtrak, because it is supported in the main
by public funds, has a special responsibility to provide improved
transportation service to that segment of the public that has
limited transportation options and to areas of the- country that
do not always have other transportation modes readily available.
Amtrak recognizes its obligation to provide convenient schedules
and responsive services that address the requirements of consumers.
6) Faster development of emerging corridors. This goal is inferred
from the other five. Amtrak has an obligation to significantly
enhance the speed and frequency of service in areas where advanced
rail service has inherent advantages over competing modes. Fre-
quent high-speed service linking major population centers is
under study and a separate planning annex on emerging corridors
will be provided at a later date as a supplement to this current
submission.
Two categories will be considered--present routes that could
evolve into corridors by increasing existing multiple services,
and routes that now either do not exist or do not have multiple
service and where same-day return trips cannot be sold., Amtrak
route criteria should govern the decision process. However,
priority consideration will be given to routes with state parti-
cipation in operating costs, track and crossing improvement and
station upgrading.
7) Exploitation of other sources of revenue. In support of
Goal 3, above, Amtrak will explore vigorously all other sources
of revenue that are consistent with its charter--to include
mail, express and intermodal operations.
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II Emerging Corridors
Public demand for Amtrak services during the fuel shortages
of 1974 indicated there is market potential for intercity rail
transportation above present ridership levels. Passenger
response to equipment, fare and service changes in the Northeast
corridor and/or other routes, has similarly suggested that new
passenger markets can be attained. Regional areas with
sufficient concentrations of population and trip frequency may
be prospects for corridor routes. Development of these emerging
corridors could provide a modern, energy efficient, and
environmentally safe alternative to air and highway travel between
urban centers. The planning, design and implementation of corridor
activities must consider the many interrelationships between
market forces, functional requirements, departmental responsibilities,
governmental processes and social benefits.
Development of the corridor environment is complex. The
appendix to this section only provides a preliminary check list
of functions and conceptual areas that will be considered in
evaluating the emerging corridor system.
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Potential corridors
Intercity rail operations in the Northeast corridor serve
several different markets within the region and are tightly
integrated into the region's economy and transportation system.
Although the concentration of population and commerce in the
Northeast is not duplicated elsewhere in the country, several
regions. appear to have the required population density and
moderate intercity distances that allow for development of
multiple rail services on certain route segments.
Some examples of potential corridors are:
Los Angeles-San Diego
New York-Buffalo
Chicago-Milwaukee
Pittsburq-Detroit
Washington-Norfolk/Newport News
Springfield-New York
San Francisco-Sacramento
- Chicago-Detroit/Cleveland
Los Angeles-San Francisco
Pittsburgh-Philadelphia
Chicago-St. Louis
Seattle-Portland
Preliminary consideration of travel patterns, competitive
services, or probable investment requirements may eliminate
some of these and spotlight relative strengths of others. The
most promising prospects will be the subjects of a comp'rehensive
research effort to determine the plans, commitments and procedures
necessary to establish a viable corridor operation and develop
it to the fullest extent possible.
Corridor markets
Understanding of markets is a prerequisite to proper design
of an appropriate transportation service. Large resident
populations may suggest a probable origin or destination for
travel, but it is important to determine the dimensions of the
actual intercity travel market. Given the multitude of travel
purposes and the rather limited line or branched nature of
possible rail routes, a rather specific travel market is defined,
although regional development often follows patterns that
concentrate population and travel along rail routes.
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The revelant travel market, which should not be so narrowly
defined as to exclude intermodal and multi-mode tarvel, should
then be evaluated to identify the competitive alternatives
(public and private), and to determine service aspects such
as fare, schedule, travel time, and frequencies, Existing rail
service on the route should be critically evaluated to determine
competitive weaknesses, and identify desirable changes or
supplements. Connectivity with the Amtrak national system is
an important consideration, as regional routes can help and
be helped by the major routes. However, the specific requirements
of the local or regional market must be fully reflected in
service plans if corridor development is to be successful.
Long range development
In analyzing potential corridor markets, separate perspectives
must be used to consider the route prospects as an existing
operation, after intermediate development, and after full
development. Variations of existing operations might involve
realignment of arrival and departure times, additional stops or
equipment changes. Intermediate steps might-include more frequent
operation or improved travel time due to equipment performance,
moderate right-of-way upgrading or terminal efficiencies. Full
development would include extensive track, signal, and equipment
upgrading for high-speed operation in the 100 mph range.
Station facilities
To serve the concentrated populations in a manner.that
will be competitively successful, the location of terminal
facilities should be carefully planned to capitalize on central
locations while avoiding delays due to congestion. The preferred
location will-maximize convenience of the majority of travelers,
considering their local origins and destinations and their need
for local transportation.
Quick access from local streets, roads, or interstate
highways should be complemented by convenient and adequate parking.
Full coordination with available or planned rapid transit, bus,
taxi, limousine and auto-rental services will serve to more
effectively link the terminal to the locality.
Urban areas
The location of terminals will also be an aspect of the
local urban system, and, where the goals of travellers and local
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planners are consistent, the station can be part of a scheme
that develops the central urban area. Improved attractiveness
of urban terminals and improved access from suburban residential
communities will aid corridor growth. If existing station
facilities prove not to be in a good location, presently unused
land may be available as part of local renewal efforts.
In addition to achieving the best interface with local
services, connectivity with other Amtrak routes and competitive
modes may strengthen the utility and economic performance of
corridor routes. Some proposals for station relocation may
reflect non-transportation goals or be unacceptable for
contractual or economic reasons. The market-research programs
designed to consider individual origin-destinations, trip-purpose,
and preferential factors will be a significant inbut to such
analysis.
Terminal operations
Station design for corridor travel may involve modifications
of the present standard as new ridership patterns emerge.
Volume-oriented ticketing and other station procedures may be
required to reduce station time while serving growing ridership.
Increased frequencies or schedule requirements may suggest
changes in maintenance and servicing procedures. As new facilities
are considered, design advantages and economies shouls be seen
in terms of the likely development of the route. Programmed
equipment maintenance for maximum reliability and utilization
should be related to the system programs and equipment cycles
that are planned through all stages of the corridor route
development.
Maintenance facilities
The design of maintenance facilities should also consider
optimum proximity to stations and the need for good appearance.
Some present operations approach this level, but the services
for these routes have not been directly designed to reach the
specific, quantified market- potential. .Manipulation of schedule
times to meet the greatest demand, consideration of alternate
intercity or terminal routes, or concentrated coordination with
operating railroads might produce lower travel time or improve
reliability. Larger capital investment would next be required for
spot improvements or line upgrading programs to reach higher
operating speeds. Grade crossing reductions and a signal
modification may also be programmed as performance is improved
to reach a level consistent with 80 mph to 125 mph running times.
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Railroad operations
As the frequency of corridor operations. increase, the
presence of passenger trains will become a larger consideration
for operating railroads. In some cases, the corridor may
dominate the freight traffic or a given segment. Although
separate routes may be a possibility in a small number of
cases, passenger-service plans must consider full coordination
to minimize conflict with local and through freight trains.
Competitive and economic forces will cause future freight and
passenger schedules to be more sensitive to delays or variation
from planned operations. Properly planned improvements in
track condition and capacity, grade crossings, and signal
systems should benefit all parties. Improved performance
reliability also permits more efficient utilization of equipment
and crews in both passenger and freight operations.
Government relations
As corridor research, planning, and project implementation
proceeds, Amrrak will be increasingly involved in a large
number of other planning jurisdictions. Local governments,
regional planning groups, transportation agencies, and state
governments will all be concerned with our efforts. Consumer
groups, commercial developers, and local business groups will have
an interest, and environmental or other regulatory agencies must
also be satisfied to the extent they become involved. Federal
agencies and their programs will also have a direct effect on
local planning efforts as well as on rail freight services and
competing passenger modes.
Corridor programs must minimize conflicts with these other
agencies and avoid pitfalls through continuing communication
and negotiation. Contact with these elements, and awareness of
the eventual plan, could minimize future problems if other
planners are made aware of the possibilities and allow for our
plan. This advanced coordination may also indicate opportunities
for joint funding or other significant benefits to corridor
development.
Federal Programs for right-of-way, safety, energy or
environmental improvements are presently in effect and state
programs have already supported train operations through
403(b) subsidy or promotional efforts. Corridor growth can
continue or expand these relationships.
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Corridor planning
In order to provide the optimal program for corridor
development, it is apparent that comprehensive plans for most
activities in the corporation and regional area would be
desirable. The present five-year plan will provide a starting
point for separate analyses of the system as it would be with
a given corridor program in effect.
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Appendix to Emerging Corridors
System Concept and Function Checklist
Corridor definition
Population
Oistance
Travel
Corridor markets
Population/demand relationship
Socio/economic relationship of origin/destination pairs
Rail market share by origin/destination
Present
Potential
Corridor train operations
Existing service
Improved service-
Intermediate development
Full development
Stations
Location in market
Accessability - roads
public transportation
parking
Construction, operation and maintenance
Urban areas
Contribution to urban improvement
Coordination with urban changes and desires
Connectivity
Intermodal interface
Urban
Suburban
Intercity
Amtrak national network
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Facilities
Operation and changes
Passenger processing systems
Equipment servicing and maintenance routines
System cycle coordination
Active and passive security systems for
passenger, station, maintenance facility,
equipment and train operation protection
Environmental acceptability of maintenance
and station areas
Right-of way
Defined service levels in phases
Incremental projects prioritized on
Alignment
Capacity
Rail, ties and ballest
Train control systems and dispatching
Communications
Grade crossings
Fencing
Coordination with railroad plans
Railroad operations
Minimization of passenger/freight conflict
Improvements to aid both
Efficiencies through precision and reliability
Government relations
Overlay of other planning jurisdictions
Local, regional, state (transportation and other)
Consumer, commercial, business groups
Environmental and regulatory agencies
Federal agencies
Communication and negotiation
Joint funding or non-duplication
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Corridor olanning
Directs research to determine potential
Evaluates alternative prospects
Sets general goals
Determines required actions
Programs phases and checkpoints _
Sets increment priorities
Monitors implementation of projects
Assures completion of phased system
Evaluates performance at incremental and phase levels
Adjusts plans and programs per experience
Begins next phase
Overall:
coordinates department goals
estimates critical paths to goal
reviews and evaluates program progress
considers these aspects in terms of
the emerging corridor route system and
the Amtrak network system
-319-
A P P E N D I X I
APPENDIX I contains the questionnaire which formed the basis of
most of the interview sessions held. Although, in no one case, were
all the questions asked, it formed a good framework for discussion,
and enabled comparison between repondents' replies.
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1 To whom is AMTRAK responsible?
2 What factors led to the Federal Government's conception of AMTRAK?
Would you say they were all rational?
3 Have any particular constituencies been important in shaping the
Federal image?
4 How well-defined is the Federal conception of AMTRAK? Is it rigid?
To what extent does it allow for changes in values? What changes,
if any, would you like to see in the nature of this conception?
5 Why are AMTRAK routes away from the Northeast so long?
6 Is AMTRAK seen to have a national rather than a regional function,
or vice-versa? How does this affect the nature of AMTRAK's network?
7 How is the Federal Government involved in route selection? Does it
aim to set out the type of routes that are to be serviced, and leave
specific selection to management, or does it go further in specific
selection?
8 What influence do states and regions have in determining formulation
of the network?
9 Is there varying pressure amongst states for service, and what are
the results of this?
10 Is the AMTRAK network seen as an integrated whole greater than the
sum of its parts and if so, how might this affect selection of a
route that might be isolated from the rest of the network?
11 Would you say that national and regional visions of the ideal AMTRAK
may be different? Does this lead to a conflict? If there is a
conflict, and management has to make a choice between a "national"
role or a "regional" role in selecting a route, what factors will be
influential in its resolution?
12 Given two states, one of whose Federal representatives are
sympathetic to AMTRAK, and one of whose Federal representatives
are not, will this affect decision-making on route choice in any
way?
13 The 82nd Annual Report of the ICC, 1968, stated that: "Without
immediate action on the part of the Federal Government, significant
segments of the country will soon face the loss of their last
remaining rail {passenger} service." Why is this bad of itself?
Is it more important that all states have some service than that
opportunities are maximised where service is most viable?
14 Could AMTRAK take the position of discontinuing many "national"-type
routes in favor of "regional"-type routes which might not
necessarily come together to form an "integrated" system? What would
be the political and other consequences?
15 The Commission wrote in its 82nd Report that AMTRAK must be a system
and not just "a few trunklines. As Congress has envisioned it
(Sec. 101), the system must link together the various regions,
providing service between the crowded urban areas and in other areas
of the country, so that, the traveler in America will in fact be
able to choose rail when most convenient to his needs. Short of
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that, the entire Federal expenditure could turn out to be a waste."
Is the concept of linking together "the various regions" central to
the AMTRAK brief? Has it meant that analysis for route choice has
been restricted to operating within this concept?
16 How does AMTRAK evaluate its competitive position in the various
markets? What are the potentially competitive markets of AMTRAK,
and is this a valid concept given their definition? Has it slowed
down development of "regional" services?
17 What in fact are the main criteria for route selection employed
within AMTRAK?
18 Why has AMTRAK been slow to develop short - medium distance
"corridors" away from the Northeast? When, even in Chicago to
Los Angeles, with the highest percentage of end-to-end traffic,
only 15% of passengers are through,. is there not a case for
concentrating on the city pairs between which most people travel,
some of which may now be receiving inconveniently-timed service
because they are viewed as being on part of a longer service?
19 Once a route is selected, what are the main criteria for scheduling
service over it?
20 How are fares set for AMTRAK service? Why has AMTRAK not developed
the same-range of fares as are available on airlines? Given that the
majority of travellers on long-hauls are "novelty" riders, fare
sensitive, and responsible for tew return trips, has AMTRAK
considered premium-priced high-speed service for potentially
intense corridors away from the Northeast which could potentially
capture a regular ridership?
21 Is there really a case for subsidising tourists taking & "train-
cruise?" Why was it a wiser decision to purchase the recent
"Superliners" than to spend the money on modern short-distance
equipment, or to improve the tracks in short-haul markets?
22 To what extent is schedule planning done in a "national" frame,
and to what extent is there a "regional element of influence?
23 What roles do state transportation departments have in scheduling?
How can this be put into practice on long routes crossing several
states?
24 How important is the prediction of "demand" in evaluation? Is
demand predicted with reference to any defined functional roles
of AMTRAK eg. national vs. regional?
25 What is the role of weighing up the economic benefits and costs of
providing any particular service? Is this analysis carried out
within the context of a "national" frame - ie. would you only
evaluate the possibility of a route through two regional sub-centers
were it to be part of a "national" inter-regional service? Would
you only evaluate scheduling within this context? How "rational"
is your analysis? How different is it from that which might be
done by a private corporation?
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26 Once an analysis is done, and a decision made to provide a
particular route with a particular level of service, how is
feedback from patronage and performance of that service used to
improve or alter it? Once a basic service is provided, say on
an experimental basis, are changes to it restricted to the
assumption of the initial role of the service?
27 Suppose you were to operate a daily train from Boston to Chicago
which had low patronage, how would you know if there was potential
for greater patronage between stations Boston to Albany? Would such
analysis be part of an evaluation of the present service, and how
it might be developed/altered?
28 How important is consultation with state and local governments? With
potential users? Does AMTRAK go out to the regions and seek to
consult all interested parties?
29 Does AMTRAK have regional offices, or is all planning done centrally?
Are there particular managers with responsibilities for the various
regions? Is planning for each region done separately, or within a
national frame? What effect do you suppose this has on route
selection and level of service on routes?
30 What is the impact of AMTRAK being funded out of general revenues
rather than through the states? How do you think the decision-making
process, and its products, would alter were funding, while being
maintained at present and projected levels, to be predominantly
channeled through the states?
31 Does the present method of funding effectively transfer decison-
making to the Federal Government? Would AMTRAK management be happier
were AMTRAK to be funded in some other way?
32 Bus companies have a far more decentralised pattern of operation.
There are two large organisations, Greyhound' and Trailways, but there
are also a myriad of others providing short to medium distance
service which is regulated by states and planned locally to meet
local needs. AMTRAK only has one tier, however, a national tier. Do
you feel that, given this structure, the bus is in a better position
from an organisational vantage to provide regional service? Do you
think AMTRAK could or should move towards a more decentralised
structure, possibly as a series of state-level organisations?
33 If we can turn now to the Boston - Buffalo section of route as case-
study, can I ask why there is only one train a day on the line
Boston - Springfield - Albany - Buffalo? Is one train a day
adequate for AMTRAK market identification except for novelty riders?
34 Is the daily train supposed to provide local service, or be part of
an inter-regional service? Will passengers use service locally when
there is but one train a day?
35 How was "demand" for this service ascertained? Were there any studies
of potential for local service, or was such investigation restricted
to a longer-distance frame?
36 Has the public living in the vicinity of the line been consulted
about the possibility of local service? Is market-research oriented
towards evaluation of short-distance markets at all? I gather that
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a study is now being conducted by consultants for the F.R.A. on the
possibility of a Boston - Springfield - Hartford service. Why has it
taken so many years to come round to doing such a study? Why is
AMTRAK not conducting such a study itself?
37 Given that there is more intensive bus service between Boston and
Albany than through from Boston to Chicago, why does train service
follow a different pattern?
38 Why was the 12 mile section of track between Boston and Albany
recently relaid singled out for improvement? Does this make a
significant difference to long-haul as against shorter-haul travel?
39 According to your evaluation, how does short-haul demand on this
route compare to long-haul demand? Do you feel that this evaluation
is reliable? Do you feel that a local rail service between Boston
and Albany could be competitive were it to be built up?
40 Do the states of Massachusetts and New York Have different attitudes
towards rail passenger service? How may this have affected provision
of service between Boston and Albany as against Albany and Buffalo?
41 Would you say that in a case such as service between Boston and
Albany/Buffalo national criteria are different from regional
criteria? How is it decided which are to have preference?
42 From where would protest come were the longer AMTRAK routes to be
cut and operated as a number of discrete shorter-distance routes?
Where would support come from for such a manoevre?
43 How is the need to operate as a "profit-oriented" organisation put
into practice in decision making? Just how realistic is "AMTRAK as
a corporation?" What are the similarities and differences between
AMTRAK and a private corporation?
44 Does the AMTRAK management structure resemble more closely a
corporation or a government department? How are responsibilities
for decision making distributed among the various departments? Are
the different departments run centrally, or on a more autonomous,
for example profit center basis?
45 A corporation is designed so that signals of profit indicate success,
and the direction to follow. Can AMTRAK thus be called a corporation
at all?
46 Do you suppose that because of the Federally-defined role of AMTRAK,
management may look for signals that are not there, and thereby
distort their decision making? How is conflict resolved between the
different departments of AMTRAK in the absence of well-defined
signals?
47 How is the performance of the different management units measured?
How are individual members of management evaluated? In the absence
of clearly-defined signals, how do individual managers evaluate their
own success? How do they set themselves objectives?
48 Just how is risk defined in AMTRAK, and are there in fact therefore
a different set of relevant signals? Are they used? How?
49 Does the role of AMTRAK seen by many managers differ from that of the
Federal definition? How does this affect decision making?
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50 Do you think that some alternative organisation structure might
provide better decision making in fulfilment of the AMTRAK brief?
Do you feel that AMTRAK's present brief and set-up makes for sub-
optimal management decision making?
51 Do you feel that the amount of Federal involvement in restricting
the scope of choice makes for a less viable system in both economic
and social terms than might otherwise be possible?
52 Is AMTRAK involved in the development of Federal goals and
objectives? How? The Federal Executive Branch may carry out a
study of a particular route possibility, for example, separately
from AMTRAK - as in the case of the Boston - Springfield - Hartford
line. Is this healthy? Is there good co-ordination between studies
that might be conducted by F.R.A. or other government units, and
AMTRAK? Would it not be better were AMTRAK altogether a government
department, rather than a corporation?
53 Given that AMTRAK is to be a corporation, do you think that more
freedom for AMTRAK to make decisions might result in better
decisions?
54 Instead of "subsidising" AMTRAK, do you think that the Federal
Government might "pay" AMTRAK to operate loss-making service, but
allow complete discretion in how this is done?
55 The ICC has published a series of annual reports to evaluate the
effectiveness of the 1970 AMTRAK Act. They have evaluated in terms
of the Federal mandate. Do you feel that, in doing do, they are
ignoring other goals and objectives, and are thus failing to
provide the prod to move towards them? How do you think the
framework within which AMTRAK operates should be changes to provide
for better decision making?
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A P P E N D I X J
There follows a listing of the individuals who were interviewed for
this study over the summer of 1980. Most interviews were conducted in
person in the offices of the people concerned, and were tape-recorded
for later transcription. Four were held by telephone, as indicated.
Four names have been witheld upon request.
Immeasurable thanks are due to everyone involved.
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National Railroad Passenger Corporation - AMTRAK
1 John Baesch, Operations Manager;
2 William Gallagher, Senior Director, Route & Service Planning;
3 Tom Gillespie, Congressional Affairs Officer;
4 Howard Henry, Director, Market Planning & Forecasting;
5. Bruce Horowitz, Senior SPEC., Planning;
6 Wilfred Leatherwood, Manager, State & Local Services, Government
Affairs;
7 L. Fletcher Prouty, Senior Director, Public Affairs;
8 Ira Silverman, Director of Marketing;
9 William Thornton, Manager, Corporate Employment;
United States Department of Transportation
- Office of the Secretary
10 Charles Swinburn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy;
- Federal Railroad Administration
11 Mr. X.;
12 Mr. Y.;
United States Congress
- Member
13 Representative James J. Florio (D, New Jersey), Chairman, Sub-
committee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce;
- Committee staff
14 Mr. A, House Committee on Appropriations;
15 Mr. B, House Committee on Energy and Commerce;
16 Paul Molloy, Minority Counsel, House Committee on Energy and Commerce;
17 Deborah Swartz, Special Assistant to Sub-committee on Commerce,
Transportation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce;
- Assistants to Members
19 Barbara Beatty, Legislative Assistant to Representative John H.
Rousseltot (R, California);
20 Alan Ciamporcero, Legislative Assistant to Representative Lionel Van
Deerlin (D, California);
21 Amy Dunbar, Legislative Aide to Senator Paul E. Tsongas
(D, Massachusetts);
22 Mark Dunn, Legislative Counsel to Representative John Murphy
(D, New York);
23 Michael Gessel, Legislative Assistant to Representative Robert 'T.
Matsui (D, California);
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24 Charles Hilty, Administrative Assistant to Representative Edward R.
Madigan (R, Illinois);
25 John Hoyt, Administrative Assistant to Representative Samuel L.
Devine (R, Ohio);
26 Joseph LaSala, Legislative Assistant to Representative Thomas M.
Hagedorn (IR, Minnesota);
27 Randy Mills, Press Secretary and Legislative Aide to Representative
Pat Williams (D, Montana);
28 Roy Neel, Chief Legislative Assistant to Representative Albert Gore
(D, Tennessee);
29 John Robbins, Legislative Assistant to Representative Ronald E. Paul
(R, Texas);
30 Larry Sabbath, Legislative Assistant to Representative James D.
Santini (D, Nevada);
31 Stuart Serkin, Legislative Assistant to Representative Edward J.
Stack (D, Florida);
United States Interstate Commerce Commission
32 Lawrence Lesser, Publ.ic Information Officer;
United States General Accounting Office
33 Victor Scoba, Auditor;
34 Clarence Siegler, Supervisor Auditor;
State Organisations
- American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
35 William T. Druhan,. Secretary, National Conference of State Rail
Officials;
- State of California
36 John Ingram, Federal Representative, California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans);
- Commonwealth of Massachusetts
37 Paul McBride, Assistant Secretary, State Executive Office of
Transportation & Construction, with responsibility for railroads;
38 Representative Louis Nickanello, Chairman, Committee on Transportation,
Massachusetts House;
39 William Toomey, Aide to Representative Nickanello;
- New York State
40 Peter Derrick, Director of Policy Studies, Legislative Commission on
Critical Transportation Choices;
41 John Lussi, Director, Rail Planning & Marketing Bureau, state
Department of Transportation;
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42 Gordy Peters, Chief of Rail Marketing, state Department of
Transportation;
43 Louis Rossi, Director, Rail Division, state Department of
Transportation;
- State of Ohio
44 Mark Randell, Ohio Rail Transportation Authority (telephone interview);
- State of Wisconsin
45 Doug Haist, Administrator, Wisconsin Department of Transportation
(telephone interview);
Bus Companies & Organisations
- American Bus Association
46 Harold Morgan, Manager of Revenue Economics;
- Greyhound Lines
47' Charles Loman, Assistant to regional Vice-President, New York
(telephone interview);
48~ E. W. Simmons, Director of Transportation, Phoenix;
- Continental Trailways
49 Ted Knappen, Senior Vice-President;
- Peter Pan Bus Lines
50 Don Myers, Vice-President, Operations;
51 Walter Scrobot-, Vice-President and Comptroller;
Airline - US Air
52 Robert Dunn, Director of Economic Research;
53 Jerry Phesora, Manager, Current Schedules;
54 John Scalea, Manager, Schedule Information Systems;
National Association of Railroad Passengers
55 Ross Capon, Executive Director;
Ex-President of AMTRAK
56 Paul Reistrup (now with R. L. Banks & Co.).
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